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Validation Report
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1. Assurance Activities Report AAR Common Criteria Assurance Activity Report Doc ID 13 2624 R 0030 V1 0 Sponsor Developer Arista Networks Inc Common Criteria Testing Lab CCTL InfoGard Laboratories Inc CCTL Evaluators Kenji Yoshino Marvin Byrd CCEVS Validators Jerome F Myers Kenneth B Stutterheim Table 1 Evaluation Identification The following User Guidance is considered part of the TOE delivered via electronic download and within the scope of the evaluation e Common Criteria Guidance Supplement Arista 7150 Series 1 10 GbE SFP Ultra Low Latency Switch Guidance Documents AGD_OPE 1 AGD _PRE 1 Version 1 9 Date December 17 2013 e Arista Quick Start Guide 7000 Series Data Center Switches PDOC 00019 11 e User Manual Arista Networks Arista EOS Version 4 12 0 5 Date September 24 2013 e Arista EOS System Message Guide Software Release 4 12 0 5 September 13 2013 This table identifies components that must be present in the Operational Environment to support the operation of the TOE Component Description Syslog Server Syslog server conforming to RFC 5424 SSH server allowing port forwarding and supporting RSA 2048 AES 128 256 CBC HMAC SHA1 and diffie hellman group14 sha1 NTP Server NTP server conforming to RFC 5095 SSH Client SSHv2 client supporting RSA 2048 AES 128 256 CBC HMAC SHA1 and diffie hellman group14 shal RS 232 Terminal Ser
2. by the administrator s own actions or automatically after a specified time of inactivity These termination features apply to both local and remote connections to the TOE The TOE will also display a customizable warning message that is displayed to the user during each administrative logon The message can serve as an advisory notice and consent warning regarding use of the TOE 4 8 Trusted Path Channels The TOE implements and requires a secured method of communication between itself external devices and remote administrators In order to accomplish a secure connection to external devices the TOE uses an SSHv2 connection with RSA based authentication and AES based encryption A private public key pair can either be generated by the TOE or imported from another device and imported into the TOE After an SSHv2 connection is authenticated via RSA key pairs AES encryption keys are exchanged via diffie hellman group14 shal key exchange algorithm After these steps all further traffic between the TOE and the external device is encrypted via AES 128 256 CBC encryption This method provides assured identification of the external device and prevents disclosure or undetected modification of data across the communication channel Communications between the TOE and external devices may be initiated from either the TOE or the external device Remote administrators may also create a secured connection to the TOE that provides cryptographic authentication
3. 11 Feb 2013 The TOE passed all required test activities 8 2 Vulnerability Analysis On September 12 2013 the evaluation team searched http www cvedetails com for known vulnerabilities in e Linux version 2 6 38 8 Ar 1398415 e OpenSSH_5 5p1 e OpenSSL 1 0 0e fips 6 Sep 2011 e ntpd version 4 2 6p3 RC10 e Arista EOS 4 12 0 The evaluation team determined that suitable vulnerabilities would have Low CVSSv2 Access Complexity because a Medium Access complexity as defined by http www first org cvss cvss guide html i2 1 2 requires additional access social engineering and or a non default configuration The evaluation team found three potential vulnerabilities Of the three potential vulnerabilities a public exploit has only been released for one of the vulnerabilities The evaluation team ran the one exploit against the TOE and determined the TOE was not vulnerable 15 9 Results of the Evaluation The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme CCEVS processes and procedures The TOE was evaluated against the criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3 1 Revision 3 The evaluation methodology used by the Evaluation Team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3 1 Revision 3 InfoGard has determined that the TOE meets the security criteria in the Secu
4. FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140 2 16 13 Bibliography 1 2 8 4 5 6 1 0 NIST OCSP PP OSFP SF SFR SFP SSH ST STP TOE TSF Input Output National Institute of Standards and Technology Online Certificate Status Protocol Protection Profile Quad Small Form factor Pluggable Security Functions Security Functional Requirements Small Form factor Pluggable Secure Shell Security Target Spanning Tree Protocol Target of Evaluation TOE Security Functions Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1 Introduction and general model dated July 2009 Version 3 1 Revision 3 CCMB 2009 07 001 Common Criteria CC for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2 Security functional components July 2009 Version 3 1 Revision 3 CCMB 2009 07 002 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3 Security assurance components July 2009 Version 3 1 Revision 3 CCMB 2009 07 003 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Evaluation methodology July 2009 Version 3 1 Revision 3 CCMB 2009 07 004 Network Device Protection Profile June 8 2012 Version 1 1 Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata 1 December 19 2013 Version 1 0 17
5. a a a aa s aa ah ca nA iA 11 AT TO ACCESS tia AA AT E A E ES 12 4 8 Trusted Path Cha nNe liren n n a a a a a a a aaria 12 5 TOE Security Environment sssssssssssosesssessescssssssosesssecsesosseossoseessecseseesso 12 5 1 Secure Usage ASSUMPTIONS sssssssssssesssssseeresssssssserresesssessseteoesssessesrroesesessererorsssessereeeee 12 6 Architectural Information sica ainia 13 6 1 Architecture Overview anieri da ai ainan Aaaa A Dea se aid ea ieaiaia 13 6 1 1 TOE Hard Ware cia ada 13 6 1 2 TOE SoftWare id AAA A ita 14 7 DOCUMENTATION sesi n iris 14 AL Guidance DOCUMENTATION resi see iedndsousdilyealsdeaweaceodees 14 J2 SSQCULITY Targeta ien a DEAR AREA ARA RRA 15 8 IT Product TE Stine AAA AAA EA 15 8 1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing cccononocoocnnncncnononononnnnnnnoncnnnononnnnnnnnnnonnonnnnnnnnnos 15 8 2 Vulnerability Analysis nasenne iaae e a ead ie aes 15 9 Results of the Evaluation iii an 16 10 Validator Comments Recommendations oooooononnoconnnoconononnnnanananinnnnnnos 16 11 SecuritV Target A ai O 16 12 Terms 12 1 AChONY INS rice Shage iir a a TRADE ER IAEA A 13 Bibliography 1 Executive Summary This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership NIAP validation team s assessment of the CCEVS evaluation of the Arista Networks 7150 Series with EOS 4 12 0 5 This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any a
6. and protection of data Remote administrators connecting to the TOE via SSHv2 have the option of using password based authentication or RSA key based authentication 5 TOE Security Environment 5 1 Secure Usage Assumptions The following assumptions are made about the usage of the TOE 12 A NO GENERAL PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general purpose computing capabilities e g compilers or user applications available to the TOE other than those services necessary for the operation administration and support of the TOE A PHYSICAL Physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains is assumed to be provided by the environment A TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner 6 Architectural Information The TOE is classified as a Network Device for Common Criteria purposes The TOE is made up of hardware and software components The TOE is an ultra low latency and feature rich network switch that is intended to connect many Ethernet based network devices together in an enterprise environment while maintaining security reliability and wire speed network connections 6 1 Architecture Overview Each non administrative network interface uses a small form factor pluggable SFP transceiver to provide connectivity between the network device motherboard and a fiber optic or copper cable This allows the customer to use several
7. different types of network cables with the network device The list of compatible SFPs is provided in Table 1 and the user guidance Each model of the TOE under evaluation varies by the amount and type of SFPs supported by the hardware The 7150S 24 supports 24 separate SFP modules the 7150S 52 supports 52 separate SFP modules and the 7150S 64 supports 48 separate SFP modules and 4 Quad Small Form factor Pluggable QSFP modules The Arista Extensible Operating System or Arista EOS is built upon the mainline Linux kernel www kernel org and an x86 dual core CPU 6 1 1 TOE Hardware The TOE hardware is one of the following models e DCS 7150S 24 F e DCS 7150S 24 R e DCS 7150S 24 e DCS 7150S 24 CL e DCS 7150S 24 CLD e DCS 7150S 52 CL F e DCS 7150S 52 CL R 13 DCS 7150S 52 CL DCS 7150S 52 CLD DCS 71505 64 CL F DCS 71505 64 CL R DCS 71505 64 CLH DCS 71505 64 CLDH All of these models use CPU 03 02 Hardware 04 00 Security Chip R5H30211 6 1 2 TOE Software The TOE software is Arista EOS v4 12 0 5 7 Documentation This section details the documentation that is a delivered to the customer and b was used as evidence for the evaluation of the Arista 7150 Series In these tables the following conventions are used Documentation that is delivered to the customer is shown with bold titles Documentation that was used as evidence but is not delivered is shown in a normal typeface Documentation that is
8. required for the models ending in Version 1 1 Exact compliance indicates that the TOE implements the security functions exactly as specified by the PP however functions not described in the Security Target may be used but were not tested as part of this evaluation 4 Security Policy This section contains the product features and denotes which are within the logical boundaries of the TOE The following Security Functions are supported by the TOE e Audit e Cryptography e User Data Protection e Identification and Authentication e Security Management e Protection of the TSF e TOE Access e Trusted Path Channels 41 Audit The Arista EOS uses an internal syslog process that receives stores and forwards auditable events from all system processes When a user or system process triggers applicable TSF functionality an audit message is generated and sent to the internal syslog process These events are then sent to an external audit server for storage and review by an administrator The communication between the TOE and external audit server is protected by tunneling the syslog protocol through an encrypted SSH tunnel 42 Cryptography The TSF performs the following cryptographic operations e SSH with the following algorithms o RSA 2048 for public key authentication FIPS algorithm Cert 1315 o AES 128 256 CBC for data encryption FIPS algorithm Cert 2567 o HMAC SHA1 for data integrity FIPS algorithm Cert 1584 o di
9. National Information Assurance Partnership G ri ers eo S CCEVS Validation Body pme Co ES Mp Oy e 2 S Lots Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Arista Networks Series 7150 with EOS 4 12 0 5 Report Number CCEVS VR VID10523 2013 December 23 2013 Version 1 0 National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate 100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940 Gaithersburg MD 20899 Fort George G Meade MD 20755 6940 Acknowledgements Validation Panel Jerome F Myers The Aerospace Corporation 6940 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 400 Columbia MD Kenneth B Stutterheim The Aerospace Corporation 6940 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 400 Columbia MD Common Criteria Testing Laboratory Kenji Yoshino Marvin Byrd InfoGard Laboratories Inc San Luis Obispo CA Table of Contents 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMA Yi A A AA A aaa 5 2 Identification of the TOE ui A is 6 3 interpretations da 9 3 1 ClarificationOf SOPA aio 9 A Security PONCY is 10 Bid gt AU E A A o 10 4 2 TA O 10 4 3 UseriData Protectio Nisreen a a a a a a a aeS 11 4 4 Identification and Authentication ioiiaccis siii io dio sanan sonara casa 11 4 5 Security Mandagement s ec2ccaciadetdciveseccscregesduaseetecdtscdeacaivestcvateedeadiaseatedatonleadsiwertdadtedeaeass 11 46 Protection OF LNG SE r a r e aaa a e ea a a
10. ce user facing documentation that is within the scope of the evaluation The Operational Environment IT devices required to support the secure operation of the TOE Evaluation Scheme United States Common Criteria Evaluation Validation Scheme Evaluated Target of Arista 7150 Series Evaluation Hardware Models Part Number Description DCS 7150S 24 F Arista 7150 24x1 10G SFP switch front to rear airflow 2x AC PSU DCS 7150S 24 R Arista 7150 24x1 10G SFP switch rear to front airflow 2x AC PSU DCS 7150S 24 Arista 7150 24x1 10G SFP switch no fans no PSU requires fans and power supplies from Table 2 DCS 7150S 24 CL Arista 7150 24x1 10G SFP switch high precision clock no fans no PSU requires fans and power supplies from Table 2 DCS 7150S 24 CLD Arista 7150 24x1 10G SFP switch high precision clock 50GB SSD no fans no PSU requires fans and power supplies from Table 2 DCS 71505 52 CL F Arista 7150 52x1 10G SFP switch high precision clock front to rear airflow 2x AC PSU DCS 71505 52 CL R Arista 7150 52x1 10G SFP switch high precision clock rear to front airflow 2x AC PSU DCS 7150S 52 CL DCS 7150S 52 CLD Arista 7150 52x1 10G SFP switch high precision clock no fans no PSU requires fans and power supplies from Table 2 Arista 7150 52x1 10G SFP switch high precision clock 50GB SSD no fan
11. delivered as part of the product but was not used as evaluation is shown with a hashed background The TOE is shipped to the customer using a standard parcel service The guidance documents are provided via electronic download and apply to the CC Evaluated configuration 7 1 Guidance Documentation Document Revision Date Common Criteria Guidance Supplement Arista 1 9 December 17 7150 Series 1 10 GbE SFP Ultra Low Latency 2013 Switch Guidance Documents AGD_OPE 1 AGD_PRE 1 Arista Quick Start Guide 7000 Series Data Center PDOC N A Switches 00019 11 User Manual Arista Networks Arista EOS Version N A September 24 4 12 0 5 2013 Arista EOS System Message Guide Software N A September 13 Release 4 12 0 5 2013 14 7 2 Security Target Document Revision Date Arista Networks Series 7150 Security Target 1 9 December 23 2013 8 IT Product Testing This section describes the testing efforts of the Developer and the Evaluation Team 8 1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing The evaluation team performed all of the test activities specified in the Network Device Protection Profile June 8 2012 Version 1 1 and the Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata 1 December 19 2013 Version 1 0 The test environment consisted of e centos 6 2 final o rsyslog 5 8 12 o OpenSSH 5 3p1 OpenSSL 1 0 0 fips 29 Mar 2010 e debian 7 0 0 amd64 o ntpd 4 2 6p5 o OpenSSH 6 0p1 OpenSSL 1 0 1e
12. erefore each individual system process is responsible for creating a payload that does not require padding past the minimum length requirement These features together protect user data from being disclosed 4 4 Identification and Authentication The TOE supports password authentication for administrative users over console and SSH The TOE also supports RSA key based authentication for administrative users over SSH The TOE stores the local system administrator password locally using SHA 512 hashing and allows special characters and passwords in excess of 15 characters The remote authentication server stores the privilege level of each user along with all other information required to access the TOE The TOE enforces that administrative users authenticate through this mechanism before performing any administrative actions Communications between the TOE and the external authentication server are protected by an encrypted SSH TCP tunnel between both systems 4 5 Security Management The TOE enforces protection of TSF data with encrypted and authenticated network communications The TOE also performs self tests on boot to verify that each of these cryptographic algorithms are functioning correctly 4 6 Protection of the TSF The TOE protects TSF data from disclosure using different cryptographic methods and security functionality The TOE provides administrative access to users through a CLI that enforces user and group profiles The administrato
13. ffie hellman group14 sha1 for key exchange e SHA 512 for the following purposes FIPS algorithm Cert 2163 o Local administrator password storage and authentication o CLI verify function which allows the SHA 512 hash calculation of any file e SHA 1 for the following purposes FIPS algorithm Cert 2163 o Used within HMAC SHA1 and diffie hellman group14 sha1 e HMAC SHA1 for the following purposes FIPS algorithm Cert 1584 o SSH data verification e Random bit generation using FIPS 140 2 X9 31 AES FIPS algorithm Cert 1218 10 43 User Data Protection The TOE uses various software and hardware mechanisms to ensure that network packets traveling through the TOE are not re used or accessible once they have finished being used by the TOE The hardware packet routing architecture is built without the use of padding to ensure that all data is passed between components exactly as is Therefore when an Ethernet packet is received by the switch the exact siae of the packet is known and allocated for in global memory When a packet is stored within global memory it is stored along with metadata to ensure packet integrity The Linux kernel API which handles padding in a safe manner is leveraged to generate packets internally If the kernel is given a payload that does not meet the minimum payload size requirement it will pad the payload with zeros In addition the kernel will not accept payloads with a bit length non divisible by eight Th
14. gency of the U S government and no warranty is either expressed or implied The evaluation was performed by InfoGard Laboratories Inc in San Luis Obispo California The evaluation completed in December 2013 The evaluation team determined that the Arista Networks 7150 Series meets the assurance requirements specified by the Network Device Protection Profile June 8 2012 Version 1 1 and the Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata 1 December 19 2013 Version 1 0 This report is intended to assist the end user of this product with determining the suitability of this IT product in their environment End users should review both the Security Target ST which is where specific security claims are made in conjunction with this Validation Report VR which describes how those security claims were evaluated The TOE the Arista 7150 Series 7150S 24 7150S 52 7150S 64 with EOS V4 12 0 5 is a Network Device that provides layer 2 3 and 4 Ethernet network management and interconnectivity The Ethernet management layers refer to the Open Systems Interconnection OSI model layers They refer to the data link network and transport layers respectively It also contains a modern Linux based operating system that allows for complex management solutions It is designed with high performance electronics to meet the requirements of latency critical applications such as financial Electronic Communication Networks ECNs or High Performance Com
15. ial console supporting 9600 baud no flow control 1 stop bit no parity bits and 8 data bits SPF Interfaces 40GBASE CR4 OSPF 40 Gb s 40GBASE SR4 OSPF 40 Gb s 40GBASE LR4 QSPF 40 Gb s 10GBASE CR SPF 10 Gb s 10GBASE SRL SPF 10 Gb s 10GBASE SR SPF 10 Gb s 10GBASE LR SPF 10 Gb s 10GBASE ER SPF 10 Gb s 10GBASE DWDM SPF 10 Gb s 1GbE SX SPF 1 Gb s 1GbE LX SPF 1 Gb s 1GbE TX SPF 1 Gb s 100Mb TX SPF 100 Mb s Fan and Power Supply Modules FAN 7000 F Front to rear airflow fan module FAN 7000 R Rear to front airflow fan module PWR 460AC F 460 Watt AC PSU with front to rear airflow PWR 460AC R 460 Watt AC PSU with rear to front airflow PWR 460DC F 460 Watt DC PSU with front to rear airflow PWR 460DC R 460 Watt DC PSU with rear to front airflow 3 Interpretations The Evaluation Team performed an analysis of the international interpretations of the CC and the CEM and determined that none of the International interpretations issued by the Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board CCIMB were applicable to this evaluation The TOE is also compliant with all international interpretations with effective dates on or before May 22 2013 Table 2 Operational Environment Components 3 1 Clarification of Scope The TOE claims exact compliance to the Network Device Protection Profile June 8 2012 1A power supply and fan module is
16. puting HPC clusters The TOE can direct and filter network packets based on the contents within each of these layers It is also capable of supporting many modern layer specific traffic management features including the following unevaluated features 802 1w 802 1s Spanning Tree Protocol STP 802 3ad and Multi Chassis Link Aggregation 802 3x Flow Control Virtual Local Area Networks VLANs e IPv4 IPv6 routing and Network Address Translation NAT e Access Control Lists ACLs Virtualization support VXLAN and VMware Quality of Service QoS rate limiting and queuing Congestion monitoring and management The TOE supports remote administration over the Secure Shell v2 SSHv2 protocol that supports cryptographic encryption and authentication using FIPS certified algorithms The TOE also supports storage and forwarding of detailed audit logs The process that manages audit messages is capable of forwarding audit messages encrypted using SSHv2 to any syslog compatible network entity 2 Identification of the TOE Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product including The Target of Evaluation TOE the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated The Security Target ST describing the security features claims and assurances of the product The conformance result of the evaluation The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation The User Guidan
17. r configures user profiles on the authentication server that specify varying degrees of access to the system The limited CLI user account system and underlying file system permissions serve to restrict access to TSF data such as private keys Plaintext private keys used for SSH authentication are stored on internal flash which is only accessible through CLI commands performed by the local administrator The local administrator password stored by the TOE is kept in a hashed form so that it cannot be read in plaintext format 11 The TOE derives a reliable time source for logging and other system processes through the local NTP service The exact time can be provided by setting the value locally or through synchronizing the time from an external server via NTP When updating TSF functionality a published cryptographic hash of the updated software is provided to the user to ensure the integrity of the software The TOE is also able to verify that TSF protection is functioning properly by running a memory test at boot time and several diagnostic tools throughout the operation of the TOE During the EOS boot sequence the TOE also initializes FIPS self tests which utilize known answer tests against each cryptographic algorithm supported by the TOE 4 7 TOE Access In order to prevent unauthorized access to the TOE administrative sessions can be terminated manually or automatically If an administrator accesses the TOE the session may be terminated
18. rity Target which specifies an assurance requirements specified in Network Device Protection Profile June 8 2012 Version 1 1 A team of Validators on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body monitored the evaluation The evaluation was completed in October 2013 10 Validator Comments Recommendations The evaluation team s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met Additionally the evaluation team s test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST The evaluation team worked closely with the validation team to resolve issues arisen during the consistency review including retesting and re scoping of the evaluation It is important to note for that the TOE s default admin account is outside of the scope of evaluation after configuration has been completed other than to provide system updates maintenance and user management The validation team s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the NDPP and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST 11 Security Target Arista Networks Series 7150 Security Target Version 1 9 Date December 23 2013 12 Terms 12 1 Acronyms AAA Authentication Authorization and Accounting AAR Assurance Activity Report CC Common Criteria CSP Critical Security Parameters DAC Discretionary Access Control
19. s no PSU requires fans and power supplies from Table 2 DCS 7150S 64 CL F Arista 7150 48x1 10G SFP amp 4xQSFP switch high precision clock front to rear airflow 2x AC PSU DCS 7150S 64 CL R Arista 7150 48x1 10G SFP amp 4xQSFP switch high precision clock rear to front airflow 2x AC PSU DCS 7150S 64 CL Arista 7150 48x1 10G SFP amp 4xQSFP switch high precision clock no fans no PSU requires fans and power supplies from Table 2 DCS 7150S 64 CLD Arista 7150 48x1 10G SFP amp 4xQSFP switch high precision clock 50GB SSD no fans no PSU requires fans and power supplies from Table 2 Hardware Version identical for all models CPU 03 02 Hardware 04 00 Security Chip R5H30211 Security hardware built into all Arista 7150 models Software Arista EOS Version 4 12 0 5 Modular switch OS that separates switch state from protocol processing and application logic Protection Profile Security Target Network Device Protection Profile June 8 2012 Version 1 1 Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata 1 December 19 2013 Version 1 0 December 23 2013 Arista Networks Series 7150 Security Target Version 1 9 Date Dates of Evaluation May 2013 October 2013 December 2013 Conformance Result Pass Common Criteria Version Common Evaluation Methodology CEM Version v3 1 Revision 3 v3 1 Revision 3
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