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EstEID ID – card specification

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1. Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol e ee CLA INS P1 P2 Le FID 00 A4 02 oc 02 00 10 2 Set the security environment no 2 within the card CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 02 3 Send the card the command GET CHALLENGE in order to receive the challenge consisting of eight randomly generated bytes CLA INS P1 P2 Le 00 84 00 00 08 ote From here onwards the given example cannot be exactly repeated as the challenge by the card differs each time In case of the given example the card gave the following response challenge OK trailer 06 F3 22 BD D4 84 88 A3 90 00 4 Next we will generate 2 random values the length of the first RND_IFD is 8 bytes and the second K_IFD 32 bytes Let the given values in our example be RND_IFD 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 and K_IFD 1112 13 14 15 16 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Note To ensure maximum security the applications used in practice must use better random value generation methods 5 Form the block RND_IFD Challenge from the card K_IFD in our example RND_IFD 8 bytes Card challenge 8 bytes K_IFD 32 bytes Tr b Baltic AS Public page 60 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet lt e N 01 08 06 A3 11 48 6 Encrypt the block with the 3DES
2. FE 17 3 2 Setting the passphrase by authorising with the former passphrase Passphrase may be set i e write the new key value into the Master File FID 0010 also by authorising with the present key i e the key in the Master File FID 0010 It must be admitted that the given operation is more complicated than setting the passphrase with PIN2 authorisation as it requires the establishment of EstEID secure messaging between the card and the host application NB When authorising with PIN2 we may set both passphrase1 and passphrase2 however when authorising with the passphrase we must authorise the new passphrase with the present passphrase and respectively the new passphrase2 with present passphrase2 Let the valid passphrases be the ones set in the previous chapter passphrase1 Kaks kurja kukke kaklevad kuudi katusel and passphrase2 See on minu paroollause2 Let the new passphrase be as follows KuredUlainudU UkurjadUilmad with U marking the space character Key 3DESKey1 derived from the passphrase is as follows 85 92 9D 57 D9 40 76 7A 97 89 E6 32 DC 07 BA 70 In order to set the new value to 3DESKey1 do as follows 1 Select Master File and then file FID 0010 CLA INS P1 P2 00 A4 00 oc Tr b Baltic AS Public page 59 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B
3. 63 FO EA AD E2 7E 5F CA D2 5A 09 CB 3F E3 96 5E 43 7B DA F9 The hash of passphrase2 30 A1 DB 94 DF 29 BC 65 A8 17 25 2B A6 73 88 FE 9B 7B D6 43 We take 16 bytes from the left of the hashes and set the youngest bit of each byte so that the byte would be odd The result is 3DESKey1 62 F1 EA AD E3 7F 5E CB D3 5B 08 CB 3E E3 97 5E 3DESKey2 31 Al DA 94 DF 29 BC 64 A8 16 25 2A A7 73 89 FE The given keys shall be used also in the examples to follow 17 3 Setting passphrases onto the card 3DESKey1 is located on the Master File MF 3DESKeys file FID 0010 record no 1 and 3DESKey2 is located in record no 2 of the same file The keys are given values with the command UPDATE RECORD Setting 3DESKey includes writing the key value into the respective record with the following nuance Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 57 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet BA LT Ie amp Tr B AS Bytes 04 00 must be added in front of 3DESKey1 key value and bytes 05 00 added in front of 3DESKey2 values Thus the length of each key record is 0x12 bytes The key values are usually derived from passphrases according to 3DESKey value
4. Manage Security Environment command APDU Manage Security Environment response APDU Manage Security Environment response APDU i Manage Security Environment command param Manage Security Environment command param Perform Security Operation command APDU WaS COMPpIleled SUCCESSTUI noian aaaea aaa aS M 1 do Berean eer erne rere cer cr tr rer cre cer cer creeper peer cer eres ree rey Cray cree cree rer cree eer eee mand was completed successfully 0 eeeeeceeeceeseeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeaeeneeeneeeeeeeeene ML OF aE aP EEEN EEE EEEE EEE f the command was completed successfully ueesseessesseneesnesnensnennennennnnn MINE SVENE OF E a eA E A Hare TROO aana elerP2 20diNd saaha Perform Security Operation response APDU in the event Of an erfor nuesseneessessensnennennenunnnsnnnnnnnnnennnennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnennnennnnnnn Perform Security Operation command permitted P1 and P2 combinations ueressessensesnennnnennennnnnnennnnnennnnnnennnnnennennnnn Compute Digital Signature command APDU Compute Digital Signature response APDU if the command was completed successfully eesesseeseesensesssensenneennennennennnn Compute Digital Signature response APDU in the event Of AN erfor oo eee eeeeseeseeeeeeseeeeeseceeeeeeeseeeeeeseceeeaeeneseaeeeeeneeeeeeeeeaee Decipher command APDU Decipher response APDU if the command was completed successfully 0 2 eeceecceseeeceeseesecese
5. 32 We calculate the MAC code of the given block in 3DES CBC mode with the card specific key CMK2b with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 In our case the result is MAC 4C CO 4E AO 22 E6 2D 9F 33 We form the following command to be sent to the card Header Le The block formed in step 30 Fixed values MAC calculated in step 32 Le 0C DC 01 04 21 8115 02 00 8E 08 4C CO 4E AO 22 E6 2D 9F 00 3 IS Q D Similarly to the command formed in step 11 also the present command may be reused as it does not contain session specific elements The card responds Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 87 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet AL Tlie ee Fixed values OK Trailer Fixed values MAC OK Trailer 99 02 90 00 8E 08 F9 5D 3F 23 71 D5 B7 11 90 00 f both OK Trailer and OK Trailer are 90 00 then the content of record no 1 of file FID EEEE 0033 has been successfully overwritten and the keys with the shown references set as the current keys 19 5 Generating certificate loading modules Generating certificate loading modules operation is a part of certificate renewal process and is actively used only in case of cards with EstEID application v1 0 Certificate loading module includes APDU command sequences which once sent to EstEID card will load a new certificate on to it The file structure is as follows
6. Length Contents Description CLA 1 OX Command class NS 1 20 Command code P1 1 00 Fixed value P2 1 xx Check byte Lc 1 Uie FF Length of the command data Data Le KKN Password in transfer format Le 0 Empty Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 90 00 Correct password 63 CX As for 90 00 but problems with writing 63 CX Incorrect password Appendix Table 1 73 Response APDU for Verify command in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00 Lc is not equal to the length of the command data Le is not equal to Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 146 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te Length Contents Description 20 bytes or Le is superfluous 65 81 Counter or hash value missing 66 12 Length of data object is not 28 or 64 bytes 67 00 Response data has incorrect length Lc is missing or incorrect Le is superfluous 69 82 Security conditions are not fulfilled 69 83 Retry counter has expired 69 84 Usage counter has expired 69 85 Referenced password cannot be used 69 88 ncorrect data objects for secure messaging 6A 80 Password has incorrect transport format 6A 83 Record not found 6A 86 P1 or P2 has an illegal value 6A 88 Referenced passwor
7. Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol ai e ee CLA INS P1 P2 Le FID 00 A4 01 oc 02 EE EE Set the security environment no 3 again CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 03 4 Verify PIN1 code The aim of the verification of PIN1 code is to guarantee that the card user is aware of the operation 5 In catalogue EEEE of the EstEID card is file FID EEEE 0013 including the service information regarding the secret keys It is a fixed length structured file record length 0x4F including four records each record corresponds to one secret key Key Key ID Record no in file FID EEEE 0013 Signature key1 0100 1 Signature key2 0200 2 Authentication key1 1100 3 Authentication key2 1200 4 The new key generation is lead by record byte no 0x32 counting begins from zero Its values in authentication and signature keys are different Byte no 0x32 value in the respective Key Key status record of FID EEEE 0013 Signature key1 and Signature key2 F6 No key must be generated B6 Key has been generated ready to use Authentication key1 and E4 No key must be generated Authentication key2 A4 Key has been generated ready to use In order to generate the new key pair the byte value must be set so that the key generation would be allowed This may be done for instance by reading the given record with the command READ BINARY records are readable changes the value of byte n
8. Header Le The block formed in step 11 Fixed values MAC received in the previous step Le OC DC 01 04 1D 87 11 01 5A 75 5E 8E 08 AA 51 BE C6 12 AE 73 32 00 The card responds Fixed values OK Trailer Fixed values MAC OK Trailer 99 02 90 00 8E 08 EC 51 2D D9 B1 23 65 16 90 00 Next we check the response from the card 14 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 D2 86 CA71 15 We temporarily form the following block Response from the card The extension of the card response up to length 8 99 02 90 00 80 00 00 00 Tr b Baltic AS Public page 97 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 16 We calculate the MAC code of the block in 3DES CFB mode with key SK2 and the send sequence counter as ICV The result is as follows MAC EC 51 2D D9 B1 23 65 16 As the MAC code received from the card is equals with the calculated MAC code we may consider the file FID 0012 PIN code file as successfully overwritten Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Next we must restore the value of PIN code retry counter We do it with the command RESET RETRY COUNTER 17 We form the header of the command CLA INS P1 fixed value P2 PIN sequence number in the card oc 2C 03 PIN1 01 PIN2 02 PUK 00 In case of PIN1 CLA INS P1 P2 oc 2C 03 01 18 We increase the send sequence counter
9. Yes 17 4 1 Calculating the response to SSL TLS challenge Let passphrase1 be Kured l inud kurjad ilmad and SSL TLS challenge 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 we hereby use the shortened challenge As in the previous chapter 3DESKey1 derived from the passphrase has been calcu ated as follows 85 92 9D 57 D9 40 76 7A 97 89 E6 32 DC 07 BA 70 1 We set the security environment no 2 in Master File and EEEE catalogue For that purpose We select the Master File CLA INS P1 P2 00 A4 00 0c Set the security environment no 2 within the card CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 02 Select catalogue EEEE CLA INS P1 P2 Le FID 00 A4 01 oc 02 EE EE Set the security environment no 2 again CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 02 2 Derive session keys SK1 SK2 and send sequence counter SSC as in chapter 17 3 2 see clauses 3 9 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 66 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 S Q oy Let in the present example Politsei ja Piirivalveamet rrbes BAL T Iie A From here onwards the given example cannot be exactly repeated as the session keys SK1 SK2 and send sequence counter SSC differ each time SK1 BA DA 02 DE 36 FB A7 BE 17 1D 8E A8 77 22 0D 78 SK2 44 76 34 30 52 2B 5D A3 76 90 84 B2 DD F4 60 37 and SSC
10. 69 83 Retry counter has expired 69 84 Usage counter has expired 69 85 ncorrect algorithm ID or second key reference is missing incorrect key length referenced ey cannot be used 69 98 Error encountered while deriving the session ey 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value 6A 88 Referenced key not found BE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Appendix Table 1 27 Coding of P2 for Internal Authenticate b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description 0 ame sie ste if be ade Ber Global key all information in the MF 1 is sia tes w pa Sea Pes Local key all information under the MF 0 0 en ine a an En Other values are RFU x x x x x Key reference KID KV FF The following table shows how the command data is to be laid out depending on the algorithm ID i e depending on the security feature Procedure Algorithm ID Command data Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 128 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a A Procedure Algorithm ID Command data Authentication one sided RND IFD internal DES Length 8 bytes 2111 internal DES3 2112 Authentication one sided RND IFD internal RSA Length 1 byte lt length RND IFD lt 2114 40 modulus length 1 9 MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT There are two variants of the command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 1 The SET variant in which
11. 90 81 CO lt CO hex byte data block gt The last block is in the form Data 80 lt length of the last block gt lt the last data block gt Tr b Baltic AS Public page 45 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ACL Te W Length of the last block 2 The length of the last block may also be 40 bytes In case the protocol T 0 is used the card responds hex Bytes waiting in the card The number of bytes waiting SHA 1 hash length 61 14 And the hash calculated on the card may be read with the command In case protocol T 1 is used Le 14 may be added at the end of the command sending the last block to the card then the card shall send back the calculated hash In case Le has not been added at the end of the command the card shall only respond 90 00 under the T 1 protocol 6 Send the card the command to calculate the signature for the hash on the card The card shall add the necessary bytes in front of the 20 dec byte hash to form the ASN 1 SHA 1 hash object a In case of T 0 we send For example The aim is to calculate the signature for the following text text length is 8A bytes U marks the space character let PIN2 be 12345 and the protocol used T 0 Autolonus it jateUv iUveosteUveoksUv oiUs idukiteUhaakesUvedamiseksUv i Verit deltegemisekslVetten htuduv hemaltuneljarattalinelmootors iduk 1 Select the root directo
12. 20 We form the command to be sent to the card Header Le Fixed values Fixed values Fixed values MAC calculated in the previous Le step OC 46 00 00 10 81 04 83 02 10 00 8E 08 2B 08 D5 EF B2 53 FC C6 00 The card responds Fixed values OK Trailer Fixed values MAC OK Trailer 99 02 90 00 8E 08 69 CA B6 19 A6 EC 60 C9 90 00 Next we check the authenticity of the received response 21 We increase the send sequence counter by one Triib Baltic AS Public Page 84 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet BALTIC AS SSC 05 06 07 08 4E 56 55 CD 22 We temporarily form the block Card response Card response extension to length 8 99 02 90 00 80 00 00 00 23 We calculate the MAC code of the formed block with card key CMK2b in 3DES CFB mode with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 The result is as follows MAC 69 CA B6 19 A6 EC 60 C9 As the result equals the MAC code received from the card it may be said that the key has been successfully generated Next the public key must be read from the card in order to use it for instance to form the certificate request Note The public key must be read from the card before the next key generation operation at the latest as EstEID card has only one public key file FID EEEE 1000 and the content of the file is overwritten during the next key generation operati
13. 97 01 00 added at the end mean that the expected response length is not known and thus the length value is given as 0 The crypto block usually includes the object encoded according to the SSL TLS session data encryption secret key ASN 1 various crypto Tr b Baltic AS Public page 72 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet amp Tr B BA LT Ie AS algorithms of various key length may be used Thus we cannot foresee the length of the key object in the crypto block and the data length expected from the card is set as Le 0 9 We form the command header to the calculation of SSL TLS challenge response This is analogous to the command header used in PIN1 authorisation the only difference is in CLA byte value 0x0C CLA INS P1 P2 oc 2A 80 86 10 We temporarily form the following block Command header extended to the length of 8 bytes ll Data field formed in step 8 extended to eightfold length In our case Header Header extension The block received in step 8 The extension of the block received in to length 8 step 8 to eightfold length OC 2A 80 86 80 00 00 00 87 81 89 01 36 53 97 01 00 80 1 1 We calcula counter as CV In our case the result is as follows MAC 53 2B 42 7E 06 87 29 7A 12 We form the command to be sent to the card In case protocol is T 1 Le 0 must also be added at the end e the MAC code of the
14. EstEID card response is 80 bytes formatted according to PKCS 1 ver 1 5 block type 1 followed by a challenge encrypted with the hex authentication key According to SSL standard the length of the challenge is 24 bytes however EstEID card also enables the calculation of responses hex to challenges of other length Note In case of EstEID v1 0 cards the maximum allowed length of SSL TLS challenge is 30hex bytes In case of v1 1 cards the maximum length is 75hex bytes in case of cards with version v3 0 and above F5hex bytes The response to the SSL TLS challenge may also be calculated with ECC key The following rules apply when calculating the challenge response with ECC key 1 The maximum length of the challenge is 32 bytes Sending a longer data block results in an error dec 2 Incase the challenge is shorter than the module of the used key a required amount of zeros is added to the block from the left 3 Incase the challenge is longer than the module of the used key the data block is shortened from the right so that the length of the operation input would be equal to the length of the key module As EstEID card application version 3 0 uses keys of various lengths also the responses to the challenges received from the card are of various lengths Thus the value of Le byte is not always 0x80 as in case of RSA 1024 The value of Le byte may be 0 Note In EstEID v3 0 and v3 4 the return length argument L
15. Politsei ja Piirivalveamet BP WR CalculatedMAC Block 0 for i 0 i lt NumBlocks i if i NumBlocks 1 Last block 3DES only with the last block 3DESEncrypt CalculatedMAC 3DESKey else with all other blocks single DES with the left part of 3DES key DESEncrypt 3DESKey K1 CalculatedMAC XOR CalculatedMAC Block it1 20 3 3DES MAC in CFB mode Calculating 3DES MAC code in CFB mode takes place as follows here 3DESKey is the key MACICV is the initialisation vector and CalculatedMAC receives the final result CalculatedMAC MACICV DESEncrypt CalculatedMAC 3DESKey K1 Single DES with 3DES key leftmost part XOR CalculatedMAC Block 0 for i 0 i lt NumBlocks i if i NumBlocks 1 Last block 3DES only with the last block 3DESEncrypt CalculatedMAC 3DESKey else with all other blocks single DES with the left part of 3DES key DESEncrypt 3DESKey K1 CalculatedMAC XOR CalculatedMAC Block i 1 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 104 147 NN TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR h B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Cc AS 21 EstEID file system EstEID file system has been described in the figure below It does not show files that external applications have no access to ME Only regarding to AID v1
16. ag wi ER der Indicates chaining mode as specified by ISO x x a it Secure messaging format SM 0 0 A sit No SM or SM is not shown 0 1 ot zine RFU treated as an error 1 0 ee St SM file header is not MAC secured 1 1 ai gi SM file header is MAC secured x x Logical channel number 1 2 CHANGE REFERENCE DATA The command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA launches a comparison between the data that accompanied the command and a reference value stored in he chip card The parameter P2 specifies which reference value is to be used for the comparison the comparison is acceptable the security status of the chip card is changed and the old password replaced by the new password contained in he command data n the command data the old password is immediately followed by the new one without any kind of separator The additional information relating to he password which is referenced by the parameter P2 tells the chip card the transfer format and the length of the old password This information is sufficient to enable it to explicitly extract the old password and the new one from the command data D Suppose that a user wishes to replace his old password ABC by the new one 123 If he inadvertently enters ABCD for the old password then the data field for the command will contain ABCD123 Since the beginning of the data field does correctly correspond to the old password the command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA will be executed and will mistakenly s
17. dec 3 2 Recognising the application EstEID application is a default selected application on the card For EstEID application recognition SELECT FILE command must be used see chapter 9 Using the data reading command SelectEile e v3 0 and further cards must be sent SELECT FILE command CLA Application ID AID oo fas Jos foo oe FO 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 ASCII 6EStEID ver 1 0 Card must respond with OK trailer 0x9000 Otherwise the application selection failed with given AID Note v1 1 and v3 0 cards answer with 0x9000 to any application selection command regardless of whether there is an application with the given AID value in the card or not See chapter 25 1 Differences between card applications for more information e For cards below v3 0 must be used following SELECT FILE command cLa Appicaion ID AD oo aa los oo 10 D2 33 00 00 01 00 00 01 o0 00 00 00 00 00 o0 00 V 1 0 card must respond with 0x6127 which means that there are 0x27 bytes waiting to be read on from card The reading can be done with GET RESPONSE command If card responds something else then the application selection failed V1 1 card Digi ID must respond with OK trailer 0x9000 otherwise the application selection fails 4 The application data requests 4 1 The identification of the card application version Card applications with v3 0 and v3 4 can be identified by the application version
18. oO oO E E o fo 8 8 g s 8 3 r 2 x s oe ce 3 3 zellen lg 3 2 2 p gt o al a 2 2 2 s 2 2 s s 8 2 2 e a 8 e D 2 8 3 5 2 2 2 2 2 8 S E 5 3 D D 8 8 5 8 e e Pi ePe e 2 2 8 8 e se ele 2 5 3 3 4 a a a a Ed 3 a a ao o 8 a gt gt gt gt g D o e 2 5 D D D D D 2 Z cs lt D D Z lt lt B 3 D d E E 3 3 D E E Z a 5 g E 5 grl d dD a E a D a D 5 w S 2 3 z E 7 F 5 2 x 2 gj 5 2 5 5 a 2 2 2 2 a 3 5 PIN2 PKI environment SE 01 ALW ALW PIN1 For PUK PUK alw NEV NEV Pina PIN2 NEV NEV Nev NEV each op 3DK1 3DK2 PKI environment secured ALW ALW 3DK1 3DK2 and and ALW NEV NEV 3DK1 3DK2 NEV NEV NEV NEV communication SE 02 PUK PUK PIN1 PIN1 Certificate loading SE 03 ALW alw NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV and and NEV A2 SC2 Replacing authentication ALW ALW NEV NEV A1 A1 NEV A1 A1 NEV NEV A1 NEV NEV NEV objects SE 04 PIN1 Loading applications SE 05 Alw ALW NEV Nev Nev NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV NEV and SCc3 PIN2 Decrypting with PIN ALW ALW PIN1 For PUK PUK ALW NEV NEV PUK PUK NEV NEV NEV NEV authentication SE 6 sachiop Decrypting with passphrase ALW ALW 3DK1 3DK2 NEV NEV ALW NEV NEV 3DK1 3DK2 NEV NEV NEV NEV authentication SE 7 Definitions Marking Explanation ALW Operation is always available NEW Operation is not
19. In order to identify the card application version the GET DATA command must be sent to the card Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 17 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol e ee CLA INS P1 P2 Le 00 CA 01 00 02 The card with EstEID application version 1 1 issues Version number most significant byte least significant OK trailer 0101 90 00 The card with EstEID application version 3 0 issues Version number most significant byte least significant OK trailer 03 00 90 00 The card with EstEID application version 3 4 issues Version number most significant byte least significant OK trailer 03 04 90 00 z IS Q D In case of EstEID v3 4 the card responds as well with data 0x0300 Note Only cards with version v1 1 v3 0 and v3 4 respond to the command with an application version number and OK trailer Cards with application version v1 0 respond with 0x6D00 Instruction code not supported See chapter 25 1 Differences between card applications for more information 4 2 The card s free memory query For the given task the following command must be sent to the card CLA INS P1 P2 Le 00 CA 01 01 02 Only EstEID cards with application version 3 0 and 3 4 issue Free memory most significant byte first OK trailer NN NN 90 00 Important TIP
20. OX Command class NS 1 2A Command code for PSO command P1 1 80 Plaintext data object not TLV coded P2 1 86 Padding indicator followed by a cryptogram Lc 1 XX Length of the command data in bytes Data Le KX NE Command data not TLV coded Le 1 00 FF Length of the response data Length Contents Description Data 8 XX YY Plaintext data Trailer 2 90 00 Command was performed correctly Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 134 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 rr s Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te Appendix Table 1 41 Decipher response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Trailer 2 64 00 Hardware fault during the operation inconsistencies in file with FID 0013 inconsistent or incorrect data 65 81 Error encountered while writing retry counter or usage counter 67 00 Response data has incorrect length Lc is not equal to the length of the command data Le is smaller than Lr 69 82 Access conditions for the key not fulfilled 69 83 Retry counter is zero 69 84 Usage counter is zero 69 85 Usage conditions for the key not fulfilled 69 85 Referenced key cannot be used 69 88 Contents of the cryptogram are not correct 69 88 Contents of the cryptogram are not correct 6A 88 Referenced key not found 1 10 3 HASH The PSO command HASH
21. The user s previous authentication key The card user s authentication key that was used prior to the generation of the new keys on the card The certificate enabling the user s digital Calculating and checking the card user s electronic signature signature and the secret signature key The user s previous signature key The card user s signature key that was used prior to the generation of the new keys on the card User personal data file Includes the card user s personal data CMK1 3DES key which is used to secure the PIN code replacement procedure CMK2a 3DES key which is used to authorise the new key pair generation CMK2b 3DES key which is used to form the secure command series to load the user certificates CMK3 3DES key which is used to the secure command series to load additional applications onto the card 1 3 EstEID security chip operations EstEID security chip enables the execution of the following operations l The certificate and data reading operations a Reading certificates Certificate retrieval b Reading the card user personal data file 2 The administration of the card user authentication objects Tr b Baltic AS Public page 12 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 3 4 J a b C Changing the values of PIN1 PIN2 and PUK f Politsei ja Piirivalveamet amp T R J B Resetting the consecutive incorrect entries of PIN1 and PIN2 Assigning values
22. Tr b Baltic AS Public page 55 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ip nie ae WR 2 The host application derives 3DES key from the passphrase 3 During the mutual interaction the card and the host application derive a unique session key 4 The session key is used to encrypt the content of the commands sent to the card and to calculate the cryptographic check sums The attempt to execute the operation with an incorrect key leads to an error situation The responses from the EstEID card are also encrypted and include cryptographic check sums A detailed example of each given step is given below EstEID card has two keys derived from the passphrases 1 3DESKey1 enables the execution of operations with an authentication key 2 3DESKey2 enables the execution of operations with signature key The attempt to execute the operation with another 3DES key for instance calculating the electronic signature with 3DESKey1 leads to an error situation In card personalisation the value of the keys is set as 00 00 the given key is not usable In order to execute operations with the given keys the card user must first set them on the card with 3DESKey setting procedure The keys cannot be read from the card but they can be replaced by the above mentioned procedure The keys are related to retry counters with the initial value OxFF The counter value is reduced by one after each unsuccessfu
23. he keys are related to the use counter with the initial value OxFFFFFF which is decreased by one after each operation executed with the key As the given keys are not visible to external applications the present document shall not discuss their location in the card 12 Reading counters in the card E P stEID card has the following counters 1 PIN1 retry counter 2 PIN2 retry counter 3 PUK retry counter 4 Passphrase 1 3DESKey1 retry counter 5 Passphrase 2 3DESKey2 retry counter 6 Signature key version 1 use counter 7 Signature key version 2 use counter 8 Authentication key version 1 use counter 9 Authentication key version 2 use counter IN and PUK code retry counters are in the card s root directory Master File with the FID File Identifier 0016 The file record 1 corresponds to PIN1 record 2 to PIN2 and record 3to PUK T he passphrases are related to counters similar to PIN code retry counters for further information on PIN code counters see Chapter 8 Unblocking PIN1 and PIN2 codes Their values are located in records 4 Passphrase 1 counter and 5 Passphrase 2 counter in file MF 0016 T he passphrase retry counters operate on principles analogous to those of PIN code retry counters e The initial value of counters is 3 e Each unsuccessful operation with a passphrase reduces the counter value by 1 A successful operation resets the initial value of the counter A
24. 05 06 07 08 F9 2D E6 B3 3 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 F9 2D E6 B4 4 We add the byte 0x80 to the right of the challenge and as many zero bytes as needed to make the block length eightfold z S Q D If the block length is eightfold already without adding supplementary bytes we nevertheless add 8 bytes 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 In this case 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 80 00 00 00 00 00 S 5 We encrypt the given block in 3DES CBC mode with the key SK1 and use send sequence counter as ICV which was increased by one in clause 3 The resul is 29 5E DE E3 41 2A 82 30 0E F8 74 c8 23 7E 6C CD 6 We form the command block as follows Fixed Length of the Fixed value The block received from the previous step Fixed Fixed value Fixed value value following data length value 0x10 bytes 87 11 01 29 CD 97 01 80 The bytes 97 01 80 added at the end mean that the length of the expected response is 0x80 bytes 1024 bit RSA cryptoblock Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 67 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet amp Tr B BAL T I AS Command header extended to the length of 8 bytes 7 We form the header of the command to calculate the response to SSL TLS challen
25. AA Command code P1 1 OX Type of navigation P2 1 OX Quantity of information in the response data Triib Baltic AS Public Page 141 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te Appendix Table 1 58 Select File command APDU Length Contents Description Le 1 Empty 0 Kea S i Length of the command data Data 0 Empty Le XX YY Optional command data containing the FID or the name of the DF Le 0 No response data 1 100 FF Length of the response data Appendix Table 1 59 Select File response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty var XX YY Information about the file Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings 62 83 File has been deactivated Appendix Table 1 60 Select File response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00 File header and checksum are inconsistent 67 00 Lc is not equal to the length of the command data Le is missing or is superfluous Le is smaller than Lr 6A 80 P1 00 yet FID is not 3F00 6A 82 File not found 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value 6A 87 Lc is missing or is superfluous BE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Appendix Table 1 61 Coding of P1 for Select File b8 b7
26. MAIA1A1A1A1A1A1A2A2A2A2A2A2A2A2 2 CMK2a BOBOBOBOBOBOBOBOB3B3B3B3B3B3B3B3 3 CMK2b C1C1C1C1C1C1C1C1C2C2C2C2C2C2C2C2 4 CMK3 DODODODODODODODOD3D3D3D3D3D3D3D3 Tr b Baltic AS Public page 77 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet baitie F 19 3 Deriving the card specific keys 3DES algorithm is a symmetrical crypto algorithm the secret keys must be written also on each EstEID card For security reasons the main keys stored in the card centre are not written on the cards but only the card specific keys derived from the main key and the card holder s personal identification number The card management code derivation procedure is as follows 1 Calculating the SHA 1 hash of the card user s personal identification number 2 Taking 16 bytes from the left of the given hash 3 Encrypting the given bytes with the respective main key using 3DES algorithm in CBC mode with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4 Setting the youngest bit of each byte so that the byte would be odd Example Let the card user s personal identification number ASCII be 01234567890 We calculate the card specific keys according to the sample main keys given in 19 2 Card management keys CMK1 CMK2a CMK2b CMK3 a The hash of the given personal identification number is 7E D1 OE 4A 58 9C 87 F9 E6 A8 5C 22 E4 BO C3 8E CF 5F 50 59 b We encrypt the 16 bytes on the left with the key CMK1 in 3DES CBC mod
27. Next the security environment within the card must be modified The given operations are analogous to the session key decryption with PIN code authorisation see chapter 16 of the manual We modify the security environment within the card by deleting the reference to the authentication key i e we tell the card that there is no need for authentication operations CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Key reference 00 22 41 A4 02 83 00 We modify the security environment within the card by deleting the reference to the signature key i e we tell the card that there is no need for signature operations CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Key reference 00 22 41 B6 02 83 00 We modify the security environment within the card by setting a reference to the key that we want to use in the decryption operation In case we want to decrypt with the signature key we send the following command CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Key reference 00 22 41 B8 05 83 03 80 01 00 Note The key reference for decryption with authentication key would be 83 03 80 11 00 3 We derive session keys SK1 SK2 and send sequence counter SSC similarly as described in chapter Setting the passphrase b authorising with the former passphrase see Chapter 17 3 2 3DESKey2 must be used i e the sequence number of the key in EstEID card is 5 4 in case of 3DESKey1 14 PR y 2 ei P amp The command is in t
28. Referenced EF is deactivated inconsistent or incorrect data 65 81 Write error 67 00 Response data has incorrect length command data is missing or Lc is not equal to the length of the command data or the data length is not equal to the fixed record length Le is superfluous 69 81 Referenced EF is not formatted 69 82 Security conditions are not fulfilled 69 86 Command not allowed no EF selected 69 88 Incorrect data objects for secure messaging 6A 82 File not found via SFI 6A 83 Referenced record does not exist BA 84 Too much data for the EF 6A 86 Parameters P1 P2 incorrect 6E 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 145 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Cc AS Appendix Table 1 70 Coding of P2 for Update Record b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description SFI usage 0 0 0 0 0 ait sed a References current EF no SFI x x x x x res sty att 5 bit SFI x x x Type of addressing 1 0 0 Absolute record number is given in P1 1 17 VERIFY The command VERIFY launches a comparison between data that is sent with the command and a reference value stored in the chip card The parameter P2 specifies which reference value is to be used for the comparison If the comparison is acceptable the security status of the chip card is changed
29. 0 0xD23300000100000100000000000000000 EstEID v1 0 AID v3 0 0xF04573744549442076657220312E30 ASCII EstEID ver 1 0 i AID v3 4 0xF04573744549442076657220312E30 ASCII EstEID ver 1 0 EstEID v3 0 v3 4 Tokeninfo Reading Always allowed Changing Not allowed EstEID DF FID OxEEEE Certificate enabling digital siqnatures FID OxDDCE Reading Always allowed Changing Restricted Certificate enabling digital identification FID OxAACE Reading Always allowed Changing Restricted Personal data file FID 0x5044 PD Reading Always allowed Changing Not allowed Secret key use counter FID 0x0013 Key references FID 0x0033 3DesKey1 3DesKey1 FID 0x0010 PIN codes FID 0x0012 Passphrase retry counters FID 0x0013 PIN retry counters FID 0x0016 Additional EsdEID sub applications N Figure 2 EstEID file system Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 105 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 a D Politsei ja Piirivalveamet amp T R J B Same AlDs as in figure are used also in Chapter 3 2 Recognising the application 22 Objects on EstEID card at issuance When issued to the user the EstEID card includes the following data Object Content Personal data file Completed during personalisation Authentication key Generated on the card during personalisation The former authentication key Unused Certificate enabling identification Loaded on the card dur
30. 00 Command class NS 1 CO Command code P1 1 00 Fixed value P2 1 00 Fixed value Le 0 Empty Data 0 Empty Le 1 00 FF Response data expected Appendix Table 1 22 Get Response response APDU ifthe command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data var XX YY Data requested from user data Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 126 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet En TR Appendix Table 1 22 Get Response response APDU ifthe command was completed successfully Length Contents Description 62 82 Length of the response data is less than Le 62 81 User data and checksum are inconsistent Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 67 00 No errors and no warnings 69 85 Length of the response data is less than Le 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value BE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent 6C XY Send same command with Le XY 1 8 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE The command INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE has the effect of generating authentication data from a token passed to the chip card The key that is used for this purpose is either specified by the parameter P2 or referenced via the active security environment of the current directory The additional information regar
31. 01 04 12 04 00 85 92 9D 57 D9 40 76 7A 97 89 E6 32 DC 07 BA 70 However the given command cannot be sent directly to the card The data field i e Key ID Key value must be processed with session keys and send sequence counter 12 The data field of the given command must be encrypted with 3DES algorithm Therefore byte 0x80 must be added at the end of the block followed by as many zero bytes as needed to make the number of bytes in the block eightfold Note If the block length is eightfold already without adding supplementary bytes we add 8 bytes 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 In the present case 04 00 85 92 9D 57 og 40 76 7A 97 89 E6 32 DC 07 BA 70 80 00 00 00 00 00 13 Next we encrypt the block with SK1 in 3DES CBC mode using send sequence counter as ICV The result is 0 5 9 1 A B D 1 8 1 F A F 9 2 7 Cc 1 F F 8 7 A B B 2 5 5 E 3 6 0 C 8 4 4 F 6 9 B 14 We reconstruct the command formed in clause 11 as follows CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Fixed value Length of Fixed value Crypto block received in the previous clause the next block oc DC 01 04 Open 87 19 01 08 FB NB CLA byte 0x0C meaning that securi
32. 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 45 30 3F 45 31 22 30 20 06 03 55 04 0A 13 19 41 53 20 53 40 4F 65 72 74 69 66 69 74 73 65 65 72 69 6D 69 736B 0 5F 65 73 6B 75 73 31 10 30 OE 06 03 55 04 0B 13 07 60 6F 54 45 53 54 2D 53 4B 31 OA 30 08 06 03 55 04 04 7O TF 13 01 31 31 17 30 15 06 03 55 04 03 13 OE 54 45 80 8F 53 54 2D 45 53 54 45 49 44 2D 53 4B 30 1E 17 0D 90 9F 30 31 31 31 32 36 31 32 31 31 32 37 5A 17 0D 30 400 40F CO 88 E9 94 DB 6C DE FD 2A C8 5E 45 24 05 06 31 410 41F 04 25 69 D3 BF 74 38 7B 03 1C 12 DO 21 B6 A2 13 420 42F 58 5A 37 FE 1C B1 D9 3F 6E F7 E6 27 A1 EC B2 3C 430 43F 02 59 85 F3 36 7B 7B 14 A2 14 80 33 67 51 24 43 440 44F B3 A2 55 8E F2 37 9C 6B 38 DO EC 24 9D 37 5F 73 450 45F 99 E2 CE E0 5B 82 00 1B 69 4B AE 04 53 CA 39 EC 460 46F 42 1F 77 OE F1 44 10 CO 33 61 8D C3 B5 43 90 F7 470 47F 1E 6E EC EE 3F B3 8F C7 A9 CC 1F 07 B5 15 DD C8 480 48F 6F 4C C4 40 2A CO A4 FF B7 2E 6D 98 FE 5A 06 D2 490 49F DD 52 48 B9 F6 2A DE 9C DE 0C 8B 1F 84 44 5A D3 4A0 4A8 08 A8 AB 02 53 53 6D 80 5D Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 89 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet 1 We form a data block with the length of 0x600 bytes to be written into the file rrbes BA LT I AS Bytes no Values OF 30 82 04 A5 30 82 03 8D A0 03 02 01 02 02 04 3C 10 1F 02 31 6F 30 OD 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 OD 01 01 05 20 2F 05 00
33. 1 The extension of the block formed in length 8 step 1 to eightfold length OC E0 38 00 80 00 00 00 81 77 62 02 64 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 4 We calculate the MAC code of the block in 3DES CBC mode with card specific key CMK3 with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 In our example the result is MAC 4B 5A F7 09 E8 53 10 1C 5 We form the command as follows Header Lc The block formed in step 3 Fixed MAC calculated in the previous step Le values OC E0 38 00 83 81 77 62 02 64 00 8E 08 4B 5A F7 09 E8 53 10 1C 00 NB Byte Le 0 must be added at the end of the command The application loading software using protocol T 0 must eliminate the byte before sending the command to the card Application loading is similar to certificate loading see Chapter 13 3 however catalogue EEEE does not need to be selected and the security environment no 5 must be set 19 9 Creating and deleting files It is possible to create new sequence files and variable length files on EstEID cards There could be altogether 35 files The created files may be later deleted In that case also the memory space used by the file and the reference in the file table will be vacated File creation and deletion require that PIN1 be checked and the command secured either with CMK2a or CMK2b Storing data in the created files similarly requires that PIN1 be checked and the command secured either with CMK2a or CMK2b There
34. 20120611 69 82 SecurityStatusNotSatisfiedError 69 83 AuthenticationBlockedError 69 84 ReferencedDatalnvalidatedError 69 85 CommandExecutionOrderError ConditionOfUseNotSatisfiedError 69 86 CommandNotAllowedError 69 87 SmDataObjectsMissingError 69 88 SmDataObjectsIncorrectError 69 89 SmWithoutSessionkeysError Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Error code Mnemonics rr s c AS Explanation The command sent to the card requires that the card user be authorised beforehand For instance PIN control has not been executed The given error occurs also in case the PIN code was checked but it was incorrect The number of allowed incorrect PIN insertions has been exceeded PIN is blocked PIN code or key cannot be used any longer The command sent to the card requires the use of such an object usually a key that is not allowed to be used in the given circumstances This usually occurs when the wrong security environment has been set The command sent to the card is not allowed in the given circumstances The command sent to the card does not include certain data necessary for secure messaging The data included in the secure command sent to the card are incorrect The given error may occur in connection with certificate loading when the command is either incorrectly formed or it is attempted to load the certificate into the wrong card There are no session keys needed for secure messaging 6A80 Incorrect
35. 30 68 31 OB 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 45 30 3F 45 31 22 30 20 06 03 55 04 0A 13 19 41 53 20 53 40 4F 65 72 74 69 66 69 74 73 65 65 72 69 6D 69 73 6B 50 5F 65 73 6B 75 73 31 10 30 OE 06 03 55 04 0B 1307 60 6F 54 45 53 54 2D 53 4B 31 OA 30 08 06 03 55 04 04 70 7F 13 01 31 31 17 30 15 06 03 55 04 03 13 OE 54 45 80 8F 53 54 2D 45 53 54 45 49 44 2D 53 4B 30 1E 17 0D 90 9F 30 31 31 31 32 36 31 32 31 31 32 37 5A 17 0D 30 400 40F CO 88 E9 94 DB 6C DE FD 2A C8 5E 45 24 05 06 31 410 41F 04 25 69 D3 BF 74 38 7B 03 1C 12 DO 21 B6 A2 13 420 42F 58 5A 37 FE 1C B1 D9 3F 6E F7 E6 27 A1 EC B2 3C 430 43F 02 59 85 F3 36 7B 7B 14 A2 14 80 33 67 51 24 43 440 44F B3 A2 55 8E F2 37 9C 6B 38 DO EC 24 9D 37 5F 73 450 45F 99 E2 CE E0 5B 82 00 1B 69 4B AE 04 53 CA 39 EC 460 46F 42 1F 77 OE F1 44 10 CO 33 61 8D C3 B5 43 90 F7 470 47F 1E 6E EC EE 3F B3 8F C7 A9 CC 1F 07 B5 15 DD C8 480 48F 6F 4C C4 40 2A CO A4 FF B7 2E 6D 98 FE 5A 06 D2 490 49F DD 52 48 B9 F6 2A DE 9C DE 0C 8B 1F 84 44 5A D3 4A0 4A8 08 A8 AB 02 53 53 6D 80 5D 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 4B0 4BF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 590 59F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2 We form the first row command SELECT FILE Header Lc Certificate file FID 00 A4 02 0C 02 AA CE The FID of the signature certificate is DDCE Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 90 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet
36. 4 upper part As the length of the challenge response is 0x80 bytes which is eightfold the card additionally appends 8 bytes at the end 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Next we must check the authenticity of the response received from the card by calculating the MAC code and comparing it to the MAC code received from the card Baltic AS Public Page 68 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE ee 1 1 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 F9 2D E6 B5 12 We temporarily form the next block from the response received from the card leaving out the MAC object at the end tag Ox8E length 0x08 and MAC value and replace it with 80 00 00 00 to make the block length eightfold Fixed values Encrypted challenge response length 0x88 bytes Fixed values 87 81 89 01 side 80 00 00 00 13 We calculate the MAC code of the block received in the previous step in 3DES CFB mode using SK2 as the key and send sequence counter as ICV The result in our example is MAC 1E E7 D9 C2 42 41 D6 63 This equals with the MAC code received from the card 14 We decrypt the challenge response with key SK1 in 3DES CBC mode The result is as follows Challenge response length 0x80 bytes Extension with the length 8 bytes 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 We leave out the extension at the end and get the calculated challenge r
37. 6 We form the command header CLA INS P1 PIN record number in the file P2 fixed value oc DC PIN1 01 04 PIN2 02 PUK 03 In case of PIN1 CLA INS P41 P2 oc DC 01 04 7 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 D2 86 CA 70 8 We form the next block PIN file record The extension of PIN file record to eightfold length 04 7E B3 98 5F 23 22 9E 91 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 9 We encrypt the block with key SK1 in 3DES CBC mode with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 The result is 05 F0 E5 98 6D AD 9A 7E 92 02 27 EA B6 5A 75 5E Page 96 147 Tr b Baltic AS Public TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Re ee 10 We form the next block Fixed values The crypto block received in the previous step 87 1101 05 FO E5 98 6D AD 9A 7E 92 02 27 EA B6 5A 75 5E 1 1 We temporarily form the next block Header Header extension to The block formed in the previous step The extension of the block length 8 formed in the previous step to eightfold length OC DC 01 04 80 00 00 00 87 11 01 5A 75 5E 80 00 00 00 00 12 We calculate the MAC code of the block in 3DES CFB mode with key SK2 and the send sequence counter as ICV The result is MAC AA 51 BE C6 12 AE 73 32 13 We form the command to be sent to the card in case protocol T 0 there is no need to send Le
38. 8D C5 66 F2 30 SSC 05 06 07 08 D2 86 CA 6F 5 PIN codes are not stored unrestrained on EstEID card despite the fact that reading their file FID 0012 is forbidden The record of FID 0012 file is 9 bytes long with the following structure Byte no 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Content PIN code length The block is sent as follows 1 PIN code is in BCD HEX format and values F are added to the right with the length of 7 bytes 2 Byte with value 0x20 PIN code length are added to the left 3 The block is encrypted with DES algorithm using itself as the key n the given example we use PIN1 code as follows PIN block in the form of BCD HEX Byte no 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 T Value 24 12 34 FF FF FF FF FF The block DES encrypted with itself 7E B3 98 5F 23 22 9E 91 Thus the record of PIN1 1234 is as follows Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 95 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE WS Byte no Value 04 7E B3 98 5F 23 22 9E 91 PIN2 12345 block is 05 1F 8A 25 12 DC EF 34 6C PUK 12345678 block is 08 E6 76 6E 41 75 43 43 D5 Next we shall consider the operation on the basis of PIN1 The operation is similar with PIN2 and PUK codes the differences have always been marked separately Next we will execute the operation UPDATE RECORD
39. ALTE WS We form secured UPDATE BINARY commands to write the certificate on to the card It is recommended to send the amount of 0x40 or 0x40 bytes i e 0x80 or 0xC0 to the card with one command as these values are optimal for the EstEID chip hardware Next we will consider the formation of secure UPDATE BINARY command from certificate bytes 0 0x40 3 We form the command header CLA INS P1 P2 Offset older byte Offset younger byte 0c D6 00 00 4 We form the next block Fixed value The length of the next data Certificate bytes 0 0x40 block 81 40 30 82 04 A5 41 53 20 53 ote When sending 0x80 or 0xCO with one command the given data block must be formed as follows in case of 0x80 bytes Fixed value Fixed value The length of the Certificate bytes 0 0x80 next data block 81 81 80 30 82 04 AS 03 55 04 04 5 We temporarily form the following block Header Header extension to The block formed in the previous step The extension of the block length 8 formed in the previous step to eightfold length OC D6 00 00 80 00 00 00 81 40 30 82 04 A5 41 53 20 53 80 00 00 00 00 00 6 We calculate the MAC code of the block in 3DES CBC mode with card specific key CMK2b with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 The result is as follows MAC 91 18 2F 52 15 BA 44 74 7 We form the command as follows Tr b Baltic AS Public Page
40. Authentication key 2 0x12 5 Signature key 3 0x03 6 Signature key 4 0x04 T Authentication key 3 0x13 8 Authentication key 4 0x14 9 Signature key 5 0x05 10 Signature key 6 0x06 11 Authentication key 5 0x15 12 Authentication key 6 0x16 13 Signature key 7 0x07 14 Signature key 8 0x08 15 Authentication key 7 0x17 16 Authentication key 8 0x18 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 29 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet aitia RR The record of file EEEE 0013 includes the following information on the key Table 12 2 EEEE 0013 key record descriptors Byte no RSA key ECC key dec counting from zero 2 Key reference 6 0xC0 OxEO 9 Module length no significance 12 14 Key use counter 32 Key type and status 60 no significance 0x06 61 no significance ECC group s OID length bytes 62 no significance ECC group s OID Byte value module length in bits 1024 32 Byte values are as follows OxF6 Signature key not generated OxE4 Authentication key not generated OxB6 Signature key ready for use OxA4 Authentication key ready for use 12 2 Finding the retry counter values In order to find the retry counter values do as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default 2
41. CLA and INS are inconsistent Appendix Table 1 66 Coding of P1 for Update Binary b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description 0 x x x x x x x Offset MSB 1 0 0 x x x x x 5 bit SFI 1 16 UPDATE RECORD The command UPDATE RECORD overwrites the entire contents of a record The data field can either be selected previously using the command SELECT FILE or you can use the short file identifier SFI given in parameter P2 to make this data field the current data field In the command parameters P1 and P2 specify which record is to be overwritten Triib Baltic AS Public Page 144 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a A Appendix Table 1 67 Update Record command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 OX Command class NS 1 DC Command code P1 1 OA RE Record number P2 1 xx Type of addressing Lc 1 OI FF Length of the command data Data Lc RXNY New contents of the record that is to be overwritten Le 0 Empty Appendix Table 1 68 Update Record response APDU ifthe command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings 63 CX Repeated write attempts were necessary Appendix Table 1 69 Update Record response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00
42. EstEID cards below v3 0 respond to given command with status 0x6D00 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 18 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet baitie F z IS Q D In case the capacity is higher than Ox7FFF bytes the card replies as well with Ox7FFF Note The card s free memory query is not actively used in case of EstE D cards 5 T 0 or T 1 The standard ISO 7816 3 and its Appendix 1 include two protocols for the communication with smartcards 1 T 0 2 T 1 The difference between the protocols must be considered not only inside the lower level driver but also in the application communicating for instance on the PC SC level EstEID card supports both protocols After the initial loading the card activates T 0 protocol After the initial loading the application using the card may switch the card over to T 1 protocol In PC SC there are no convenient opportunities for the execution of such an operation however the PC SC drivers of some readers can handle it after they have been activated to communicate via T 1 during initialisation The differences between T 0 and T 1 protocols must also be considered in case of commands where both the command to the card and the card s response include data Such commands are file reading from the card calculating the response to SSL TLS challenge calculating the signature decrypting the session key Neglecting the consid
43. External Mutual Authentication response APDU if the command was completed successfully eeesseensesseneenneneennenn External Mutual Authentication response APDU in the event Of an erfor oo ee eeceeeeeseseeeeceseeeeeeeeseeseeeseeeesaeeeeneeeaeceeeeaeeneeeaees Coding of P2 for External Mutual Authentication Get Public Key Pair command APDU Generate Public Key Pair response APDU if the command was completed successfully 00 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeeeneeeaee Generate Public Key Pair response APDU in the event Of an error ueeesersessessensnnnsnsnnsnnnnnnnnsnnnsnnnnnennnnnnsnnnnnnennnnnsnennnnnnn Generate Public Key Data command data description ee eeeeceeseesceeeeesececeeseeeceesecseeaeeseeeeeseeseeeaecseeeaeseesenesseseaeeaeeeeeeaee Get Challenge command APDU cncene Get Challenge response APDU if the command was completed successfully ueseessessssnessensnenennennnennnnnnnsnennnnnennnnnennennnn Get Challenge response APDU in the event of an error ueneesssssnssensannnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnannnnnnnnnsnnnnnnnnnsnnnnnnsnnnnnnsn nn Get Response command APDU nenne Get Response response APDU ifthe command Get Response response APDU in the event of a Internal Authenticate command APDU Internal Authenticate response APDU if the com Internal Authenticate response APDU in the eve Coding of P2 for Internal Authenticate
44. Hash response AFDE im the event ofan errdh a ansnien iii Read Binary command ARDU s 2 scasscacscstcscsssetacsacetzcacachtasctacntacesaczicaateentasctecstacedacztasaaesatesst avatacsaaczteaaiasateastadatacstacetsentadstosstcizia Read Binary response APDU if the command was completed successfully uessesseessessnessnnsnsennnnnnnnennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnennnna Read Binary response APDU in the event Of an error ou eesseeceeccesececeeseeeeesecseeseeeseesnsesceseessecsceaecseesaecseeaeeneeaeeaeeeseaeeseeaee Coding Of PIHOFREad BINA euren AEAT vere bazs ye nalons TaT ATTAT ATT Read Recofd command APD beccsiccscccsteccut sccecenachccessaceecesiacnteattscnscsthacsesthscuseetbacseestbacnensthacsensthacxecathaseeatbanemstbnderstbanenstbante Read Record response APDU if the command was completed SUCCESSFUIIY eeeeeeseeeeceseeeeseeseeseeneeeeeseeneteaeeneeeaeeneeaees Read Record response APDU in the event Of an GTI sisaan Coding of P2 for Read MOGO PNPERNERRFPRPRENPRITPEFERFLENPEPFPRERTEPETEERTERNDENPEFEERPELTEIUEPELEENTEENPEFTECFEFTFIFLEEFEENTEPNEEUEEREELTPEFTPEFTEUFEPTPENEEEEPTEEFEERFERN Reset Retry Countercommand APD sie ssscscasccsrssassecesetacescezscagtasarcsctesatasceatzscsgacsatesSansatacceaezsccatcaazeaatesasacetasasseztasacsastgaazaztatass Reset Retry Counter response APDU if the command was completed SUCCESSFUILY eceeceeeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeeeeenseeeeneeeaeeneeenees Reset Retry Counter response APDU in the event O
45. Note Loading and deleting additional applications is not actively used in case of EstEID cards 19 8 Application loading module generation Additional applications may be loaded on to the EstEID card however the card accepts them only when secured with the card specific CMK3 key We will consider the application loading module generation on the basis of an example The following APDU command loads the application on to the card with one file with the length of 0x100 byte The file is always readable however PIN1 must be checked in order to write into the file Header Lc Data 00E03800 77 62218201388302F FDD8410D233000001 000001 00000000000000018A0105A1038B0101640062178205044100110 283020030850200168A0105A1038B01016400731E83020030850580010 19000851 18001019000800102A40795010 88302000162 138201018302000A850201 008A0105A1038B01026400 n order to secure the command we do as follows 1 We form the following block Fixed value Data block length Data block of APDU command 81 77 62 21 82 02 64 00 2 We modify the command header as follows CLA INS pi P2 oc EO 38 00 3 We temporarily form the following block j Application programming is not considered in the present manual Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 100 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Dee Header Header extension to The block formed in step
46. P1 X1 This variant modifies components of the active security environment in the current directory The parameters P1 and P2 specify which CRT components are affected New values for the affected components are passed on in the command This variant can also be used to pass data for key derivation and initiate such a key derivation process 2 The RESTORE variant in which P1 F3 This variant replaces the active security environment in the current directory by one which is permanently stored in the chip card The parameter P2 specifies the number of this security environment which comes into effect straightaway Appendix Table 1 28 Manage Security Environment command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 00 Command class INS 1 22 Command code P1 1 x1 SET Manipulates the active SE in the current DF FS RESTORE Replaces the active SE in the current DF P2 1 XY P1 X1 tag of a CRT component P1 F3 SE Le 1 XY P1 X1 length of the command data 0 P1 F3 empty Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 129 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te Appendix Table 1 28 Manage Security Environment command APDU Length Contents Description Data Le RXNY P1 X1 command data 0 P1 F3 empty Le 0 Empty Appendix Table 1 29 Manage Security Environment response APDU if the command was completed
47. Row 1 command SELECT FILE selecting the correct file for overwriting Rows 2 N commands UPDATE BINARY writing a new certificate into the selected file The commands are encoded in the form of BCD HEX UPDATE BINARY commands in rows 2 N must be secured by using the card specific key CMK2b The command SELECT FILE in row 1 does not have to be secured The certificate file size on EstEID card is 0x600 bytes which may be increased if necessary on the order of a competent institution The space left empty in the file after writing the certificate must be filled as follows 0x600 bytes Certificate Byte 0x80 Zero bytes to the end of the certificate 00 00 Le 0 must be added at the end of secured UPDATE BINARY commands The software loading the certificate onto the card using protocol T 0 must ignore the byte Let us consider the generation of the certificate loading module on the basis of the following example Let us have a new authentication certificate for the sake of clarity the certificate has been shortened at the beginning of the example Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 88 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet trie BAL T I AS Bytes no Values 0 F 30 82 04 A5 30 82 03 8D AO 03 02 01 02 02 04 3C 10 1F 02 31 6F 30 OD 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 OD 01 01 05 20 2F 05 00 30 68 31 OB 30 09
48. WR same as EstEID v1 0 cold above Important TIP DigilD doesn t support T 1 protocol Always must be used protocol T 0 e The ATR strings of EstEID application realized on Java card are as follows EstEID v3 0 recalled 46 cards Cold ATR 3B FE 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 A8 Warm ATR 3B FE 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 80 31 80 66 40 90 A4 16 2A 00 83 01 90 00 E1 EstEID v3 0 18 01 2011 and v3 4 Cold ATR 3B FE 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 A8 same as the 46 recalled v3 0 cards above Warm ATR 3B FE 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 80 31 80 66 40 90 A4 16 2A 00 83 OF 90 00 EF When interfacing EstEID cards it is recommended to prefer T 0 protocol for its less complicated structure The meanings of ATR string bytes have been defined in standard ISO 7816 3 Bytes 0 8 in cold and warm ATR include the card communication protocol parameters The parameters have no significance to the applications that communicate with the card via card reader drivers for instance PC SC CT API as this is handled by the driver Significant bytes are bytes counting from B in cold and warm ATR These are so called historical bytes that the application uses to identify the card type The historical bytes in cold ATR include the name of the card in warm ATR information as defined in ISO ICE 78164 standard On EstEID card these bytes for cold ATR are as follows EstEIDUve
49. a loading code by a specific procedure The conversion operation is executed by the card centre with the respective secret key 4 Granting authorisation for the generation of new key pairs on EstEID card EstEID card enables the generation of new secret key pairs The new key pair generation requires the authorisation by the card centre 19 2 Card management keys CMK1 CMK2a CMK2b CMK3 The security of EstEID card management system is based on four secret 3DES keys 1 Authentication object replacement key CMK1 used to execute the authentication object PIN code replacement procedure 2 New key pair generation authentication key CMK2a used to authorise the new key pair generation the card centre uses the given key to authorise the new key generation on the card 3 The key to form the certificate loading command sequence CMK2b used to form the certificate loading modules on the card and setting the key references after the key generation 4 The key to form the secure command sequence for application loading CMK3 used to form the additional application loading modules The given four secret 3DES keys are generated by the card personalisation service provider in a secure environment The keys are used to calculate the card specific CMKs loaded onto the card during personalisation The given keys cannot be read from the card or modified The example keys used in the present document are as follows 1 CMK1
50. administrator The institution responsible for the execution of the EstEID card administration procedures LSB The least significant bit FID The file identifier FCI File Control Information Data FCP FMD ISO IEC 7816 4 FCP File Control Parameters The given parameters include a list of logical structural and security attributes ISO IEC 7816 4 FMD File Management Data ISO IEC 7816 4 DES Data Encryption Standard Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 9 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE NS Abbreviation Definition 3DES Encryption Standard using DES application with three independent keys in EDE Encipher Decipher Encipher mode ICV The initialization vector of 3DES algorithm ECC The alternative for RSA encryption system based on the calculation of the discrete logarithms of elliptic functions MAC Message Authentication Code SK1 SK2 Session Keys SSC Send Sequence Counter SHA 1 Secure Hash Algorithm TLS Transport Layer Security is a cryptographic protocol responsible for communication security over the Internet TLS encrypts the segments of network connections in the communication channel of the transport layer TLS is described in IETF standard RFC 5246 based on the former SSL description by Netscape TLV Tag Length Value PIN Personal Identification Number RSA Rivest Shamir Adlema
51. bytes 8 bytes 16 bytes DES3 1 SK without SSC 321110 DES3 1 SK with SSC 321130 Key management eK RND IFD RND ICC K IFD key transport negotiation Lengths 8 bytes 8 bytes 32 bytes DES3 2 SK without SSC 321120 DES3 2 SK with SSC 321140 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 123 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 1 5 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet GENERATE PUBLIC KEY PAIR rr s c The command GENERATE PUBLIC KEY PAIR generates the private and the public part of a RSA key pair First al The private part of the RSA key is stored in the EF_Key_RSA_Private data field The command expects that the FID is referenced in the EEEE 0013 data field The public part of the RSA key is stored in the EF_Key_RSA Public data field The command expects that the necessary information for key generation is available TIP required EEEE 0010 data fields have to be created The TLV structure in the data fields has to be defined too Chapter 19 4 Generating new key pairs contains a detailed description of an RSA key generation Appendix Table 1 14 Get Public Key Pair command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 OX Command class NS 1 46 Command code P1 1 00 Fixed value P2 1 00 Fixed value Lc 1 04 Length of the command data Data Le 83 02 FID of EF_Key_RSA_Public XX YY Le 0 i Empty Append
52. bytes B and C in this case 600 hex Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 36 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q f Politsei ja Piirivalveamet T R J B BA L T Ie AS 4 Read the file content with the command READ BINARY P1 offsetMSB P2 offsetLSB Le number of bytes to read Joo feo foo foo The given command reads 64 ney Bytes from the beginning of the file Here Le is necessary in case of both T 0 and T 1 as it shows how many bytes must be read P1 and P2 show the address in the file from which to read for instance in order to read from address 120 P1 01 and P2 20 The hex maximum value of Le is FE 13 3 Certificate loading The certificate loading is conducted by the sending of secured command series onto the EstEID card The secured command series is formed by Card Centre using CMK2b key Certificate loading may take place once PIN1 has been checked in order to guarantee that the card user is aware of the operation If necessary the certificate loading command series modifies the secret key references in order to set a new key version as the active version 13 4 Certificate renewal In EstEID cards both user certificates authentication certificate and signature certificate and if present the root certificate may be renewed note that EstEID card doesn t carry root certificates Due to security considerations the certificates cannot be overwritten directly overwriting has be
53. calculates a 160 bit hash value from the data transferred in the command The calculated hash value is output in the response to the PSO command in chaining mode it is output in the response to the last block The result is also stored temporarily in RAM to be used in the event that the next command is COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE or INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE We distinguish two versions of this PSO command Hash performed entirely within the chip card The plaintext data passed in the command is formatted by the chip card as specified by the SHA conventions padding The command can be used in chaining mode in this case a plaintext block must always have a length of 64 bytes The final block may be smaller in which case it will be padded by the card Hash of previous round s If the task of hashing is shared between the card and the external world the data field is laid out as follows 1 Without chaining mode or one single block data object with tag 90 followed by one data object with tag 80 data object 90 with 20 bytes of a hash value block followed by 8 bytes of counter number of bits already hashed data object 80 containing the unpadded text remaining to be hashed of length up to 64 bytes The padding will be carried out by the card if necessary 2 Using chaining mode First command data object 90 28 bytes laid out as for 1 Second to n 1 th command data object 80 and 64 bytes
54. card Politsei ja Piirivalveamet rtrbes BA LT Ie The objects of EstEID security chip Certificate and key objects The user s active secret authentication key The user s active secret signature key The user s previous secret authentication key The user s previous secret signature key Security interface keys 3DESKey1 Passphrase1 3DESKey2 Passphrase2 The functions of EstEID security chip objects on the Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 11 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet N A Table 1 1 The functions of EstEID security chip objects on the card Object Function on the card PIN1 The authorisation of the card user 1 for the use of the authentication key 2 for the execution of the following operations a the generation of new key pairs b the loading of certificates c the loading of additional applications deletion PIN2 The authorisation of the card user 1 forthe use of the signature key 2 for setting the passphrases PUK The unblocking of PIN codes when they have been blocked after three consecutive incorrect entries 3DESKey1 3DES key for secure data transmission in operations with the authentication key 3DESKey2 3DES key for secure data transmission in operations with the signature key The certificate enabling user identification The electronic card user identification and secret authentication key
55. case of T 0 we send In case of T 1 we send The length of the file header is generally not known Thus we give Le byte with the value 0 The card responds oe op fir Jeo fos loa a1 Joo se ho lss loz so faa Jos foz lor loo The maximum length of the record is in byte no 7 and the number of records in byte no 8 NB hexadecimal numeric values Note EstEID card stores the information in file headers in the form of TLV Tag Length Value objects The maximum length of the record is in byte 3 counting starts from one of the object 82 of the compound data object 62 and the number of entries in byte 4 The correct procedure would include parsing the file header content to find the maximum record length and the number of entries However as th the file header in EstEID card presumably will not change the reading of 7 and 8 byte would also presumably yield the correct result Note v1 1 v3 0 and v3 4 cards respond with a different TLV value than v1 0 cards V1 1 cards have the byte no 8 set to OA v3 0 and v3 4 However all card versions have the maximum record length 32 bytes and cards have bytes no 7 and 8 set to 7F and 14 hex hex number of records 10 See also chapter 25 1 Differences between card applications for more information hex Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 26 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE NS 4 Read record one in the file wi
56. derivation procedure The condition for assigning 3DESKey values is that PIN2 be verified or the communication be secured with the same key the previous version 17 3 1 Setting the passphrase by authorising with PIN2 code In order to set the passphrase by authorising with PIN2 code do as follows 1 Set the security environment no 1 within the card CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 01 2 Veri y PIN2 code CLA INS Pi P2 Lc PIN2 00 20 00 02 05 31 32 33 34 35 3 Select Master File and then file FID 0010 CLA INS P1 P2 00 A4 00 oc CLA INS P1 P2 Lc FID 00 A4 02 oc 02 00 10 4 Overwrite record no 1 ofthe given file with the following command P1 record number CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Key ID Key value 00 DC 01 04 12 04 00 62 F1 EA AD E3 7F 5E CB D3 5B 08 CB 3E E3 97 5E These are the key sequence numbers for the inner structure of EstEID card For additional info look Appendix Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 58 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE NS n order to set Passphrase2 we write the key value in record no 2 of the same file CLA INS P P2 Le Key ID Key value 00 DC 02 04 12 05 00 31 A1 DA 94 DF 29 BC 64 A8 16 25 2A AT 73 89
57. new one The PIN code may be unblocked by replacing the previous code with a new one with the RESET RETRY COUNTER command New PIN 2C PUK code length As ASCII As ASCII new codes codes PIN length For example Let the PUK be 12345678 and blocked PIN1 which we want to replace with the value 1234 after unblocking In order to unblock we send New PIN Joo fo fo Jos foes 32 53305 963738 31323334 Note In case the PIN code has not been blocked i e it has not been inserted incorrectly on three consecutive occasions the EstEID card responds to the unblock command with an error trailer Cards with application version v1 0 and v3 4 respond with error trailer 0x6985 versions v1 1 and v3 0 respond with error trailer Ox6A86 IS D v3 0 cards allow the same values for old and new PIN codes when unblocking and simultaneously changing a PIN code with the command RESET RETRY COUNTER See chapter 25 1 2 Differences of application version v3 0 9 Using the data reading command SelectFile In order to read the data from EstEID card the command SelectFile is used The given command may be sent to the card in four ways Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 23 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet aA L Te WR CLA INS P1 P2 Command description 00 A4 0X 00 The card response includes FCI FCP FMD 00 A4 0X 04 The card response includes FCP 00 A4 0X 08 T
58. not change in case a new key pair is generated on the card as in case of key generation or the loading of new certificates also the key references on the card shall be changed However this is not the case with session key decryption operations In case it is impossible to presume that new keys have not been generated on the card after personalisation we must execute some additional operations before the decryption operations Note Information regarding to Signature and Authentication keys references are located in chapter 19 4 1 New key pair generation on EstEID card clause 5 In the card personalisation Authentication key1 and Signature key1 are generated and Signature key2 and Authentication key2 are left blank referring to them results in an error situation In case new key pairs are now generated the new secret keys shall be placed respectively in the position of Signature key2 and Authentication key2 and the previous keys remain In the next generation the new secret keys shall be placed in the position of Authentication key1 and Signature key1 and the previous keys remain in the position of Authentication key2 and Signature key2 The keys that were formed during personalisation are removed as the result of the last key pair generation There is no limit to the number of new key pair generations The present valid keys are written in file FID 0033 in catalogue EEEE It is a structured file including one record which after
59. of text Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 135 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet En a nth command data object 80 containing the final unpadded text block of length up to 64 bytes the padding will be carried out by the chip card if necessary Length Contents Description CLA 1 00 Final command in chaining mode 10 Chaining mode additional command calls will follow NS 1 2A Command code for PSO command P1 1 90 Create hash value P2 1 80 Plaintext data object not TLV coded AO TLV coded data objects in the data field Lc 1 XX Length of the command data in bytes Data Le KK NY Message data not TLV coded or XX YY 90 14 XX YY hash value XX YY 90 1C hash block 8 bytes counter 80 L text to be hashed XX YY 80 40 text to be hashed in chaining mode Man 80 L final portion of text to be hashed nth command Le 1 00 FF Length of the response data Appendix Table 1 43 Hash response APDU if the command was completed successfully CLA 00 Length Contents Description Data 20 KX Y Hash value Trailer 2 90 00 Command was performed correctly Appendix Table 1 44 Hash response APDU if the command was completed successfully CLA 10 Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 90 00 Com
60. rr s c AS 24 EstEID card error messages Error code Mnemonics 62 81 CorruptDataWarning 62 82 EndOfFileWarning EndOfRecordWarning 62 83 FilelnvalidWarning 64 00 CorruptDataError ExecutionError InconsistentDataError FilelnvalidError UndefinedTechnicalProblemError 65 81 MemoryFailureError 67 00 TinyLeError 69 00 NoChvReferenceError NoKeyreferenceError 69 81 IncompatibleFileStructureError Tr b Baltic AS Public Explanation Check sum is incorrect usually refers to a damaged card Le is too large Refers to an attempt to read too many bytes from the file at once the maximum is FE The selected file is deactivated Not in case of EstEID Refers to serious data inconsistency either in the card application or in the command sent to the card The error message may also result from an attempt to execute an inapplicable operation for instance to read a secret key from the card The inconsistency may also be caused by a damaged card EstEID card EEPROM writing failed the card is damaged Le is too small The given error occurs also when Le has been omitted in using T 1 protocol The command sent to the card refers to a PIN code or key not on the card The file structure on the card does not enable the fulfilment of the command For instance it is attempted to add a record into a file that already consists of the maximum number of records Page 109 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App
61. successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 67 00 Lc is not equal to the length of the command data Lc is missing or is superfluous Le is missing or is superfluous 69 85 Chip card contains no data from which to derive a key referenced key cannot be used 6A 80 Incorrect command data 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value 6A 88 Referenced key not found 6E 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Appendix Table Manage Security Environment command parameter P1 coding b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description x x x x 0 0 0 1 SET variant 1 0 0 0 1 External and mutual authentication AT 1 0 0 0 1 Data authentication DST data confidentiality CT internal and mutual authentication AT 1 er 0 0 0 1 Secure messaging for response to message CCT CT 1 0 0 0 1 Secure messaging for command message CCT CT 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 RESTORE All other values RFU Not supported Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 130 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet aitia WR Appendix Table 1 32 Manage Security Environment command parameter P2 coding P2 Significance RESTORE variant xY Number of the new SE XY 01 FE except EF SET AA AT components in the data
62. with writing Appendix Table 1 9 Create File response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00 Current DF is deactivated inconsistent or incorrect data 65 81 Write error 67 00 Response data has incorrect length Lc is missing or incorrect Le is superfluous 69 82 Security conditions not fulfilled 69 88 Incorrect data objects for secure messaging 6A 80 Error in the content of the command data 6A 84 Not enough memory available 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value or P1 varies within a chain 6A 89 FID already present in the current DF 6A 8A Name of the DF is already present in the chip card 6E 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent or the subcommands have different low half bytes 1 4 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE The command EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE modifies the security status of the chip card provided the encrypted data contained in the command matches the token that was previously requested from the external world The key that is used for this purpose is either specified by the parameter P2 or referenced via the active security environment of the current directory Which cryptographic algorithm is to be used can be derived from the additional information for the referenced key Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 121 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet En A It is absolutely es
63. 0 B6 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 01 00 In previous response byte on position A 13 Certificates EstEID card has the following certificates the certificate enabling digital identification of the card user the certificate enabling the digital signature by the card user holds the key version for au hentication key Place 14 holds the key version for signature key The certificates in the EstEID card are located in catalogue EEEE in the form of transparent files and they are always readable authentication is not required As certificate renewal is required during the validity period of the card fixed size files are reserved during personalisation for the certificates to ensure the possibility for writing new and possibly larger certificates into the card The rest of the file is filled according to the following scheme Certificate Byte 80 00 00 i e byte 80 is appended at the end of the certificate and the rest of the file is filled with zero bytes Certificates are located in the following files Certificate FID Size hex bytes Certificate enabling digital identification MF EEEE AACE 600 Certificate enabling the digital signature MF EEEE DDCE 600 Tr b Baltic AS Public File sizes may vary The part below describes how to determine the actual size of the file on the card Page 35 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp T RU B Politse
64. 01 3 The derivation of the premaster secret CLA INS P1 P2 Le length of the public key of the The other participant s public key as other participant octet strings 00 88 00 00 L 04 The card response given is 20 dec bytes SHA 1 hash of the calculated X coordinate point NB Once the reference key for the key derivation is set the card will calculate the premaster secret of the session key derivation process If the key derivation reference has not been set the challenge response shall be calculated 4 Delete the reference key for the key derivation CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Reference key deletion 00 22 41 A6 02 83 00 Note Using ECC keys are not actively used in case of EstEID cards Tr b Baltic AS Public page 53 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 f eei QOrrie Politsei ja Piirivalveamet c AS 16 2 Session key decryption in case a new key pair has been generated on the card after personalisation It is possible to generate a new RSA key pair on EstEID card for both the authentication key and the signature key During the compilation of the present manual it was not known if and in what circumstances new key pairs shall be generated on the card in case such a technical option arises key pair generation procedure is described in chapter 19 4 of the present manual The procedure of the calculation of the SSL TLS challenge response and the electronic signature does
65. 050004 1Chex a SHA 256 3031300D06096086480 1650304020105000420hex 3 SHA 384 3041300D060960864801650304020205000430hex gt SHA 512 3051300D060960864801650304020305000440hex EstEID card response is 80 bytes formatted according to PKCS 1 ver 1 5 block type 1 followed by a hash object encrypted with the hex signature key For example Let the SHA1 hash of the text to be signed be 0102030405060708090A0BOCOD0E0F1012131415 hex PIN2 12345 and the used protocol T 0 We calculate the electronic signature 1 Select the root directory 4 Verify PIN2 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 42 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q T RU B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Eh Pine Joo foto for dost sss 505 5 Send the card the command to calculate the signature os ps pope he _ Hash algorithm identifier Hash of data Hash object 30 21 30 09 06 05 2B OE 03 02 1A 05 00 04 14 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 OA OB OC OD OE OF 10 12 13 14 15 The card responds Bytes waiting in the The number of bytes card waiting 6 Read the bytes waiting The card responds Electronic signature 80 bytes OK trailer 15 1 1 Calculating the electronic signature with ECC key when the hash is ready The following rules apply when calculating the signature with ECC key 1 The maximum length of the data block given for signing is 32 bytes Sending a longer data block results in error 2 Incase the given data blo
66. 1 Allowed lenghts for PIN1 PIN2 and PUK codes Minimum length digits Maximum length digits PIN1 4 12 PIN2 5 12 PUK 8 12 EstEID card cannot handle the length for PIN or PUK which exceed the limit given in the table The length of PIN and PUK codes may vary the applications communicating with the card must support PIN codes of varying length PIN codes are transferred onto the card in ASCII format and cannot be read from the card The card user authentication with PIN1 PIN2 or PUK is conducted by the command VERIFY The given operation may be executed without restrictions Note v3 0 cards allow the same values for old and new PIN and PUK codes when changing a PIN or PUK code with the command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA or when unblocking and simultaneously changing a PIN code with the command RESET RETRY COUNTER See chapter 25 1 2 Differences of application version v3 0 z IS Q D The following differences between card applications should be taken into account when using the command VERIFY v3 0 cards respond with 0x630X trailer instead of 0x63CX when trying to verify PIN or PUK code with an incorrect value with the command VERIFY when the PIN or PUK code s length is in its allowed value range n case of an incorrect PIN or PUK input length used in the command if the length is not in the allowed range the card is expected to respond with 0x63CX error trailer and decrease the respective r
67. 1757468656E74696361 74696F 00 6E3121301F0603550403131845494B454547492C454556492C30308E0809AA438B7 3B3F7BC 6 0CD60100 4C 814030303030303030303031 10300E0603550404130745494B45454749310D300B060355042A130 00 44545564931 1430120603550405130B30303030303030303030308E08318588C51D157F1F 7 0CD60140 4C 81403081A0300D06092A864886F70D010101050003818E0030818A02818100BF588CF11BC7CA7 00 D97A3D2F60CA8AF34212A76A6BEDB0A2FB6BA4D6620347A605A0F7B8E0851A8E38B4BA89D6 F 8 0CD60180 4C 81409761BB66846A6B82016F6558E580404D4DF4ECE49035D9207ADE4C7A2497507D1AEF587C 00 AE644705A7F6C145BF61C48D7CA0E4943200EFFBB5096A8A86D7 1E7A8E084DDE851D9D4FEEC D 9 0CD601C0 4C 814052F615B815AE33E2E81D4C10CCF11A4ADD86867FA87AB5B5E41604397F02040231763FA3 00 8201AE308201AA300E0603551D0F0101FF0404030204B0301D0603558E08ABDCB9BD89895124 OxA 0CD60200 4C 81401D250416301406082B0601050507030206082B0601050507030430380603551D1F0431302F3 00 02DA02BA0298627687474703A2F2F7777772E736B2E65652F74658E08ADF4F99806354632 0xB 0CD60240 4C 8140737463726C2F6573746569642F63726C2E63726C300F0603551D110408300681046E6F6E653 00 082012C0603551D20048201233082011F3082011B06092B0604018E080A4D5D4ATECBS47E OxC 0CD60280 4C 8140CE1F0201023082010C3081E206082B060105050702023081D51E81D2005300650065002000 00 73006500720074006900660069006B0061006100740020006F006E8E089CB18AF02C3142E2 0x14 0CD60480 4C 81406F4CC4402AC0A4FFB72E6D98FE5A06D2DD5248B9F62ADE9CDE0C8B1F84445AD308A8AB 00 0253536D805D80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008E08A68444C7
68. 3 03 80 Key reference value In case bytes no 0x13 and 0x14 from file FID 0033 are 0100 the key reference value is 0200 and vice versa in order to use the non current key version in the operation execution 6 Verify PIN2 7 Send the card the command to calculate the electronic signature CLA INS P1 P2 Lc hash object length Hash object Le 00 2A 9E 9A 23 ies 80 The format of the card response does not differ from the response received in the operation executed with the current key In case passphrases are used for authorisation the reading of file FID EEEE 0033 and the setting of key references must be executed after setting the security environments and prior to deriving the session keys 18 3 Session key decryption with the previous key version In order to execute the decryption operation with the previous key version the operation must be executed similarly to the decryption with the current key however the key reference must be the opposite to the one written in file EEEE FID 0033 If the authentication key value in the file is 1100 we set it as 1200 in the card and vice versa If the signature key value in the file is 0100 we set it as 0200 in the card and vice versa 19 Card management operations 19 1 Operations in general Card management operations stand for operations executed with EstEID chip that are not thoroughl
69. 3 4 do as follows e Send an undocumented APDU command to the card in the form of 80 20 00 00 VERIFY command of PUK code Card v3 0 responds with trailer 0x6984 to the command Card v3 4 responds with trailer Ox63CX Note Sending the abovementioned VERIFY command to the card causes the PUK retry counter value to be decreased by one 25 3 Card APDU message chaining This chapter explains the basis of APDu message chaining in case of larger data to be transmitted JavaCard framework 2 2 2 and above support extended length APDU messages Unfortunately EstEID v3 0 and v3 4 mimicry EstEID v1 0 and do not have implemented extended length APDU processing Thus the data to be transmitted between the host and the card which doesn t fit into the usual length of APDU messages must be transmitted as chained EstEID applications do not respond with data longer than maximum of standard APDU response messages Thus there is no need for message chaining in given case 25 3 1 APDU command chaining EstEID cards use APDU command chaining to receive data from host for its internal processing Data is devided into several blocks before sent to the card These blocks are sent to the card successively one by one By sending chained commands inside the card the data is concatenated for processing To inform the card that APDU chaining is being used the CLA byte in command APDU must be set to 0x10 Only the very last APDU command in chaining se
70. 3 80 02 00 Such a record content is formed for instance when a new authentication key and a new signature key have been generated after the card personalisation 25 Set the security environment no 3 in both the Master File and EEEE catalogue Select the Master File CLA INS P1 P2 00 A4 00 oc Set the security environment no 3 within the card CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 03 Select catalogue EEEE CLA INS P1 P2 Le FID 00 A4 01 oc 02 EE EE Set the security environment no 3 once again CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 03 26 Select file FID 0033 27 Verify PIN1 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 86 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol e ee 28 Form the following command Header Le Record content Le 00 DC 01 04 15 00 A4 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 12 00 B6 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 02 00 00 29 Modify the record header as follows Header 0C DC 01 04 30 We form the following block Fixed values Record content 81 15 00 A4 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 12 00 B6 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 02 00 3 1 We temporarily form the following block Header Header extension to The data block formed in the The extension of the data block formed in the length 8 previous step previous step to eightfold length 0C DC 01 04 80 00 00 00 81 15 02 00 80
71. 6607248D 0x15 OCD604C0 4C 81400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008E08B31CB25697B76AC8 0x19 0CD605C0 4C 81400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008E081105CEDAD9016710 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 93 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet baitie F 19 6 Replacing PIN codes The replacement of PIN codes consists of the following parts 1 Authorisation from the card centre is received with CMK1 2 The card is set new PIN1 PIN2 and PUK may be entered by the card user in the same terminal The further changing of PIN1 PIN2 and PUK is up to the card user The procedure takes place as follows the procedure must take place in an authorised office 1 After the visual identification of the card user the terminal will read the challenge from the card 2 The terminal sends a secure challenge i e signed by the service staff to the card management centre 3 The card management centre checks if the service staff is authorised to execute the procedure and grants the authorisation using CMK1 4 After receiving the authorisation from the card management centre the card allows the use of the command RESET RETRY COUNTER without further authorization and replace the PIN and PUK codes without knowing their pre
72. 91 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp Tr B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet BAL T I Header Lc The block formed in step 4 Fixed MAC calculated in the previous step Le values 0C D6 00 00 4C 81 40 30 82 04 A5 41 53 20 53 8E 08 91 18 2F 52 15 BA 44 74 00 NB Byte Le 0 must be added at the end of the command The certificate loading software using protocol T 0 must eliminate the byte before sending the command to the card Thus the second row the first is the command SELECT FILE of the loading code file is ready We also calculate the following rows The result is Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 92 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Cc rrbe A S Row no Header Le Data Le 1 00A4020C 02 AACE 2 0CD60000 4C 8140308204A53082038DA00302010202043C02316F300D06092A864886F70D0101050500306831 00 0B300906035504061302454531223020060355040A1319415320538E0891182F5215BA4474 3 0CD60040 4C 81406572746966697473656572696D69736B65736B75733110300E060355040B1307544553542D5 00 34B310A30080603550404130131311730150603550403130E54458E08A0CA8956185B8EFC 4 0CD60080 4C 814053542D4553544549442D534B301E 170D3031313132363132313132375A170D303230343134 00 3132353434355A308 191310B3009060355040613026565310F 300D8E087 16286E53AF42D1C 5 OCD600C 04 C8140060355040A130645535445494431 173015060355040B 130E6
73. App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te Appendix Table 1 33 Perform Security Operation command APDU Length Contents Description 1 00 FF Length ofthe response data Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 6A 86 Illegal combination of P1 and P2 for PSO commands Appendix Table 1 35 Perform Security Operation command permitted P1 and P2 combinations P1 P2 PSO Function OE 9A COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE 80 86 DECIPHER 90 80 HASH command data is not TLV coded 90 AO HASH command data is TLV coded 1 10 1 COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE The PSO command COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE calculates a digital signature using an asymmetrical cryptographic algorithm and a referenced private key The calculation is performed according to the algorithm ID specified by the key reference The desired key for the calculation must previously have been set up using the command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT unless it has already been defined The referenced key is located in the relevant data field EF containing key You can select the cryptographic algorithm e Digital signature using RSA DSI according to PKCS 1 EstEID card formats the transferred data according to the format that is currently set up and returns the calculated digital signature in its response The program supports only algorithm IDs that are defined for th
74. C EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp T RU B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet BALTIC A Version information Dae veson en 21 11 2011 Fixed paragraph and clause numbering Added captions to tables and these as well into table of contents 30 11 2011 FB Added descriptions for compatibility issues between different application versions 19 04 2012 Many wording improvements Reference fixes Improved figures Some chapters have been moved as sub chapters 10 05 2012 k Some chapters have been moved as sub chapters Improved command chaining description and added chapter describing separately the basics of command chaining Added chapter containing differences between different application versions 11 06 2012 Minor fixes m CMK keys naming in EstEID objects figure m Application version number corrections m Note for PIN usage 30 11 2012 03 05 2013 j Chapter 10 1 section 3 note added Chapter 12 4 section 4 example part removed Section 13 FID in table corrected EF gt MF Section 13 2 section 3 correction of P2 value SSL challenge gt SSL TLS challenge Chapter 14 section 5 note added hapter 15 1 section 5 note added hapter 25 1 1 added new comment 6 hapter 25 1 2 added new comment 6 hapter 25 1 3 added new comment 3 Cc C C C 02 09 2013 C er 3 2 note for v1 1 cards added Cc er 11 comments added Cc er 12 4 section 4 example added note added C er 13 4 note about root certificates added C er 14 no
75. C key is used the card selects the hashing logarithm according to the key module length as follows ECC module length bits The used SHA option 160 SHA 1 192 SHA 1 224 SHA 224 256 SHA 256 NB In case the signature is calculated on a hashing card the key reference must be set before hashing In calculating the electronic signature in a hashing card the first four operations are not repeated Triib Baltic AS Public Page 44 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTI WS 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default 2 Select catalogue EEEE with the command SELECT FILE 3 Set the security environment no 1 within the card 4 Verify PIN2 5 Hash the text to be signed in the card The text must be sent to the card in 40hex byte blocks for hashing the last block may be shorter If the text to be sent to the card for hashing is longer than 80 bytes then APDU command chaining must be used In this case the text is divided into hex several parts in the way each one could fit in one of the command message described in the beginning of current chapter With the exception of the last one blocks are in the following format Dat ofan foo o fae eoa somon one cata book gt 83 80 81 80 lt 80 hex byte data block gt
76. E PUBLIC KEY PAIR 46 Generates the public and the private part of a RSA key 424 pair GET CHALLENGE 84 Generates and outputs a random number 425 GET RESPONSE CO Reads out the response data T 0 126 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 88 Authenticates the chip card or application 117 MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 22 Passes on key references random numbers and data 129 o be used for key derivation PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION ZA Various functions using symmetrical and asymmetrical 131 eys COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE 132 133 DECIPHER 135 HASH READ BINARY BO Reads from a transparent data field 137 READ RECORD B2 Reads from a formatted data field 138 RESET RETRY COUNTER 2C Resets the counter of failed attempts 139 SELECT FILE Aa Selects a directory or data field 141 UPDATE BINARY D6 Modifies a transparent data field 143 UPDATE RECORD DC Modifies a formatted data field 144 VERIFY 20 Authenticates the cardholder 146 1 1 Command Class The following table lists the possible values for the class byte CLA in the command header Tr b Baltic AS Public page 117 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Cc AS Appendix Table 1 2 APDU Command Classes b8 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description x Type of command 00 00 oe see aie ta Command and response APDU as specified by ISO in chaining mode this is the only command or the last one 00 01
77. EE 5044 SELECT FILE command 00 A4 02 04 02 50 44 with different file header TLV value than v1 0 cards v3 0 cards have the byte no 7 indicating the maximum length of a record and byte no 8 indicating the number of records in the file set to 7Fhex and 14hex respectively v1 0 cards have byte no 7 set to 32hex and byte no 8 set to 10hex By default the maximum length of a record in personal data file is 32hex and the number of records is 10hex as in case of v1 0 cards gt v3 4 cards respond with 0x63CX and decrease the PIN or PUK retry counter respectively when trying to verify PIN or PUK code by using a code value that has invalid length the allowed range is 4 12 digits in case of PIN1 5 12 digits in case of PIN2 and 8 12 digits in case of PUK v1 0 cards respond with trailer Ox6A80 instead 5 When changing the PIN or PUK code command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA by using a new code with a not allowed length then the v3 4 and v3 0 cards respond with 0x6984 retry counter value is not decreased v1 0 cards respond with trailer Ox6A80 instead 6 When calculating an electronic signature with hashing in the card then v3 4 cards do not return the calculated hash value as a response and it cannot be read from the card in any other way N Versions 3 0 and 3 4 support ECC keys Renewing certificates and generating new key pairs in the card is not actively used in case of card application versions v3 0 and 3 4 Ko T
78. EID card takes place as follows 1 We read the card user s personal identification number written in the record no 7 of the personal data file FID EEEE 5044 Let the personal identification number ASCII be 01234567890 2 We read record 1 from file FID EEEE 0033 in order to get the current key references in the card The current authentication key reference is read in record bytes 0x9 0xA and the signature key reference in bytes 0x13 0x14 the byte counting begins with zero The new key must be generated into the key that is not current at the moment Thus the current key is stored in case it will be needed later If the authentication key reference is 1100 in file FID EEEE 0033 the reference of the generated key is 1200 and vice versa If the signature key reference is 0100 in file FID EEEE 0033 the reference of the generated key is 0200 and vice versa There are no technical impediments to generating the current key reference over 3 We set the security environment no 3 both in Master File and EEEE catalogue Select the Master File CLA INS P1 P2 00 A4 00 oc Set the security environment no 3 within the card CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 03 Select catalogue EEEE w Look chapter 25 1 2 Differences of application version v3 0 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 79 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B
79. FEEREELNEETEDELERNEERNPEEER 14 2 2 Card POA US ct sc a ae E a el RR 15 3 Card recognition 15 3 1 ATR stings apd usad protocol ccnn E OE O E 15 3 2 Recognising the applic ti nia s nee abe 17 4 The application data requests 17 4 1 The identification of the card application VErSiOn ccecccseesceesceeeceecseeeseesecsecuaecaaecaaeeaeesecaecuaecaaesaaeeeseeeseaeseaecaaaesaeeseeeseeesaecaaeeeeeeseeeeeees 17 4 2 The card s free memory guaty a 22 kei 18 5 T 0 or T 1 19 6 PIN1 PIN2 PUK code 20 T Changing PIN1 PIN2 and PUK code 21 8 Unblocking PIN1 and PIN2 codes 22 8 1 Unblocking the PIN code by leaving the code UNCHANGEC ee eeceeeeeceseseeseeseesesseseceseaeceesaeeeceseaeseasaeescaeeeesaaeaeseceaseeseaseeseaeaeeessaseeseaeaeeeaeaeeese 22 8 2 Unblocking the PIN code by replacing the blocked PIN code with a new one uunnessensesensnsennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnsnnn nenn 23 9 Using the data reading command SelectFile 23 10 The card user personal data file 24 10 1 Reading data from the personal data file 11 Card user s secret keys 27 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 3 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet at ice Ree 12 Reading counters in the card 28 12 1 Reading the key types module lengths and use Counters on the card ou eeeeeeseseesceeesceseeeceseseceeaeeecsaeeceaeaesecaeee
80. FFEFEERPEITEEFFEFEPFEEPLPEFEEREETTPENTEEFTETFERRPERTE 66 7 4 2 Calculating the Slectromie Sigmatune sz sc 2cceccsees sex coeuscccceseccicesinde ct cecnsesucesetestoncninct un cncedtveshinstadtlaltvccischvedb aitanctlectse sbieiiuestdeitvediieitanentesquneni eile ibis aniRees 69 7 4 3 Becity ping BI 151 e1018 7 75 PRRPFHERPEINEDEUPEREESFELTEPHERPETEFLTPPLTEPEIETEPEFERPEITPEETPEFTETFEFEFFTEPPFITEFETPETTPPEEETFERTEREFETFLETPEUTPEFEPFTEVEPVFEEFFETPEITPPETEFFEFVERFTPFFEEFFEUTPEFEPEFTEFEETEPPEFEFFEFUERR 70 18 Operations with the previous key versions 74 18 1 Calculating the SSL TLS challenge response with the previous key version uuenesensesnennsennnnnnnnsnnnnnnnsnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnennnnn nenne nnannnnnn 74 18 2 Calculating the electronic signature with the previous key version uenesensesnnnnsennennnnennennnnnnnnnnnsnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnennnnnnnnennnnnnn nennen nenn 75 18 3 Session key decryption with the previous key version 19 Card management operations 76 19 1 Operations in geNer l HR ebenen nen 76 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 4 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a en WR 19 2 Card management keys CMK1 CMK2a CMK2b CMK3 oaio ANANA 77 19 3 Beriving the card specific keys lunsksmeiikmehin 78 19 4 Generating NOW KOy pals srnu soa ae 78 19 4 1 New key por generation om ESO Cate 2 2 c2ccsats2 seziacassezicsacseztcse
81. FFF The number of usages of other keys is read from the card analogously 12 4 1 Determining currently active keys version On the EstEID card there can be many different secure keys Still active at the same can be only one Chapter 2 2 Card features describes the amount of keys on the card Every key has its unique version number Therefore key reference file which contains references to currently active key must have the key version number as well available Key reference file has FID 0033 As described in chapter 16 2 Session key decryption in case a new key pair has been generated on the card after personalisation in this file on place 9 A is a reference to currently active authentication key and on place 13 14 a reference to currently active signature key Key reference consists two bytes First byte of the 2byte key reference holds the key identifier Second byte holds the version of the active key To read the key version from the card it needs to be get MF EEEE 0033 EF selected File selection is done as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE 2 3 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 34 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet amp Tr B BALTIE A 4 Read record 1 from EF 0033 5 Byte no 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B Cc D E F 10 11 12 13 14 Value 00 A4 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 11 0
82. ID v3 4 cards Note ECC keys are not actively used in case of EstEID cards 2 1 1 EstEID chip instruction set The present EstEID version has been realized on Java platform The card interface commands referred to in the specification may not be the only way to execute the given operation EstEID card application version can be determined by comparing the ATR strings issued by the card 2 1 2 Supported algorithms v1 0 and v1 1 support PKCS1 padding and SHA1 hashes with 1024bit RSA keys 3 0 and further supports PKCS1 padding and SHA1 SHA 224 not used as PKCS 11 does not support SHA 224 in v2 20 and SHA 256 hashes with 2048bit RSA keys Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 14 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet baitie F 2 2 Card features The EstEID card may simultaneously include up to 8 authentication keys 2 actively used and 1 active at a time in case of EstEID v1 0 1 actively used and active at a time in case of other application versions 83 signature keys 2 actively used and 1 active at a time in case of EstEID v1 0 1 actively used and active at a time in case of other application versions 35 certificates or other data files 2 actively used and active at a time one for authentication and transport encryption and one for digital signing 3 Card recognition 3 1 ATR strings and used protocols The card recognition uses the ATR strin
83. In case of RSA 2048 bit keys are used for signing then it is necessary to use APDU command chaining in the course of the operation z IS Q D In EstEID v3 0 and v3 4 the return length argument Le is not used Signature is calculated and returned in spite of the provided Le value 15 1 Calculating the electronic signature when the hash is ready Do as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default 5 Sending the command to the card to calculate the signature a In case of T 0 send Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 41 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp T RU B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a aA Tie A Le hash object Ina Hash objet Joo fa f we fs i i e b In case of T 1 send as pe f pe t hash object length Hash objet a Le value is related to RSA key length For example RSA with length 1024 has value 80 In case of RSA with length 2048 messages hex chaining must be used Note that the hash object has to be calculated by using the appropriate hash algorithm which is supported by the specific card application version Supported algorithms are provided in chapter 2 1 The used encryption algorithms and key lengths The following list specifies hash algorithm identifiers a SHA 1 3021300906052B0E03021A050004 1 4hex SHA 224 302D300D0609608648016503040204
84. Key1 valid at present derived from the passphrase Kaks kurja kukke kaklevad kuudi katusel in 3DES CBC mode whereas ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 The result is as follows F2 89 C9 96 5D 10 DC DE 8E 88 58 10 FB D6 3D C5 9B E6 2E 20 D7 36 1E 8C B5 C8 BB C7 1F E4 C9 D5 74 10 C1 7D 10 E9 F4 E8 F3 FF 7E D5 AE A8 90 17 7 We form the command MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE and send it onto the card P2 key number which in case of 3DESKey1 is 04 CLA INS P1 P2 Le Formed block Le 00 82 00 04 30 F217 30 The card responds as follows Response block 0x30 bytes OK trailer 90 00 In our example the response block is as follows 2B 4A 0B E2 2B CF 2B FD C1 ED 73 FA 5F D8 FE F2 74 DO 17 BA AB 48 DA 29 41 FF B8 33 47 2C 77 35 3B 56 C3 5A EA B6 31 70 52 D5 EA 6A 45 CA C4 5E 8 The response block is encrypted with 3DESKey1 in 3DES CBC mode with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 We decrypt the block the result is as follows Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 61 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Tee 06 F3 22 BD D4 84 88 A3 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 69 DA 9F 6F F4 27 A7 8B B6 8B DB B7 7A C7 89 43 6F 33 DB B5 9D 79 9F F2 C1 AB EA 1B B8 44 81 48 9 We execute the following operation K_IFD XOR decrypted response block 0x10 0x2F Thus we XOR the K_IFD decrypted response block with bytes 16 dec 47 dec The result is as follow
85. Lc is missing or incorrect Le is superfluous 69 00 Missing key reference 69 82 Security condition for KO IFD not fulfilled 69 83 Retry counter has expired Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 122 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Te ae 69 84 Usage counter has expired 69 85 Incorrect algorithm ID or second key reference is missing incorrect command sequence referenced key cannot be used 69 98 Error encountered while deriving the session key 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value 6A 88 Referenced key not found BE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Appendix Table 1 13 Coding of P2 for External Mutual Authentication b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description 1 B u E B u u Global key all information in the MF 0 u z i u u Local key all information under the MF 0 0 en sie en ren en Other values are RFU Key reference KID KV FF The following table shows how the command data is to be laid out depending on the algorithm ID i e depending on the security feature Procedure Algorithm ID Command data Authentication one sided eK RND ICC external DES Length 8 bytes 2121 Authentication mutual eK RND ICC RND ICC external first DES Lengths 8 bytes 8 bytes 2212 Key management eK RND IFD RND ICC K IFD key transport negotiation Lengths 8
86. Li 2d ARAA re detacd dace sa bedd AA nae AEREE SRE Eo AEAN AARETE AE 124 1 6 GET CHALLENGE Gf ir E ESE EA DEE EERDE EA EA AA EESO EA OEA EUA E T E A OE EE ORA EES PAOA Sa 125 1 7 GET RESPONSE 1 8 INTERNALSAUTHENMICATE 242 312 Rost en a Ik asain ieee Settee Sheen denne dan dena dee 127 1 9 MANAGE SECHRITYIENVIRONMENT22r 22222 2 222220025028 tess side cdecta2ecesesuce foscvece teense 2a AARE Cdscc ace fete dace EEEIEE OREO ELRADII EREA EART ERREA 129 1 10 PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION oiran eanne ENE Ea E EN Ea EEA E E ASE E SEANA EnA E RAEE EE 131 1 10 1 Compute Digital SiG 21 13 2 VORREUURPUFPEREBFPELPEFEEVEFTPEFFEEFEUTPENFPEFEETFEPTPEFFECFEETFEUFEEFEETFEPTPEFEETFETTELFLERFEEUFEETPELTECEETTPEFTEEFEEFFEPTEEUFEEEEETPEUTEELTEFFEPTPEUFEFFETTEFTPEFTEUFEETPEFEEERENEN 132 1 10 2 Ba e a BEEE ER EEE RI T AEI ETE E PIRE OIER AE AE T OIA EI A EME 133 1 10 3 la PERRETE EPAIEN EEREN E ETEA IEAA ANAE TEESEEISE AEAEE E AETA EAE EEEE TETE 135 1 11 FREAD BINARY ENE NE EE TER 137 1 12 READ RECORD 1 13 RESET RENY COUNTER EEE RE EEE Eee lel oat 139 1 14 SBLEGT 2 1E SBRRPEREER EEPPLEPPEEUPEERFERTELEPPEIFEEUEEFRERTELEEEEELEEEELEIEEETELEITERTELEPRLE EEEULEEEFERTEETELEILEEGPCERFURTELENEETREEUBEEFRERN SEHFEERFEELELEILEETETEEUER EIER TETELOPETEREETEEPERREE 141 1 15 PDATE BINARY n vesvicnssctevtatsaccvssieuec evict scavivateccseeascavsavectulsessecsuantecesteatscasduwleces ten cxesvustese hea ac avia Ws restenizdaieud eeestencst ned ctetessca ehe 143 1 16 IPDATIE REC
87. MAC code of the block in 3DES CBC mode with the card specific key CMK2b with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 In our case the result is as follows QF 7F CD 8B 02 F8 56 C4 Tr b Baltic AS Public page 81 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol aie ee 11 We form the following command Header Le The block formed in step 8 Fixed values MAC calculated in step 10 Le OC DC 04 04 5B 81 4F 83 04 11 30 8E 08 9F 7F CD 8B 02 F8 56 CA 00 12 We send the command to the card In case protocol T 1 is used there must be Le 0 at the end The card responds Fixed values OK Trailer Fixed values MAC OK Trailer 99 02 90 00 8E 08 F9 5D 3F 23 71 D5 B7 11 90 00 If both OK Trailer and OK Trailer are 90 00 we may proceed Note After the given operation the processed secret key is not usable any longer If the operation is discontinued for some reason it must be started again from the beginning Note The command formed in step 11 may be reused as it does not contain session specific elements 13 Next we will derive the session key similarly to the procedures in chapter 17 3 2 clauses 3 9 We use the card CMK2a as 3DES key with the sequence number 2 In our case let it be SK1 95 CC 39 2F 24 38 AA 24 1F B9 DC F4 77 77 30 FD SK2 30 FD B4 B6 7B A8 74 6E OE 67 43 A3 72 90 E9 5D SSC 05 06 07 08 4E 56 55 CB 14 Key generatio
88. ORT uae Hededeetshancadacsdedgstabavsata dedudeatsbsecade ladeleelsbaneuda ladedeodsbeveadasadedaadshavanueleasdandahdtagha A 144 1 17 VERIT a ea een een een 146 Table 1 1 The functions of EstEID security chip objects on the card 2 22u2202200ssnnannsonnnnnnnnnannnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnannnnnnnnannnann 11 Table 2 1 EstElD card applieation versions Properties anna un 13 Table 6 1 Allowed lenghts torPIN1 PIN2 and PUK Codesin 2 2 3 20 Table 10 1 Personal Data File Contents PUSPRPRPPUEPREUFERPEFEIRFEPFEFTEVEFFELFEFEFERFEFEFFEFTEVEEFEFTEVEFTEFTEFEFVELTEVEFTEFTETEEFEFTEVEFFERTEFEFTELTETEEFEFTETEEFEFFEFLPFEITETLEREFFEFLERER 25 Table 12 1 File EEEE OO13 lt 1211 10 014 WERPPFERPERTEPEFPEIEPFEEFIERIETPEITPERTEFIEPFEEEELFEETFEUTPEFTEFEPNEEUFECFLELEULEEFTEUFEEVEEPEELHEEFTETELFEPEFEINEEPLELHEERFEITPERRPEITETEEFLPERERN 29 Table 12 2 EEEE O01S Key reCord GesCr PtOns iaaa aTa ETA TATATATA aT T 30 Appendix Table 1 1 PREE eler r g a i EREA EE EEATT duress ie vecessiuvecssciuveanne ct ATE ATA AAA A TE AA A TA A TEA T 7 Appendix Table 1 2 APDU GommMand ClASS 6 EAE ATIA ATT TEETE AT EATA AAE A IEA T ALATT EATE 8 Appendix Table 1 3 Change Reference Data command APD isesi SAS 8 Appendix Table 1 4 Change Reference Data response APDU if the command was completed successfully uueeseseesesensenssennennnnennennnnennennnnen 9 Appendix Table 1 5 Change Reference Data response APDU in the event Of an ertor uueseensssuessnnsunnnnssnnnnnnnnnn
89. PDU or part of it Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings 61 XX Additional response data in the chip card Appendix Table 1 48 Read Binary response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 67 00 Lc is superfluous Le is missing Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 137 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te 69 85 There is no data to be fetched 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value 6E 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent 6C XY Send same command with Le XY 69 88 Incorrect data objects for secure messaging 6A 82 File not found via SFI 6A 86 Parameters P1 P2 incorrect 6B 00 Offset is outside the EF BE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Appendix Table 1 49 Coding of P1 for Read Binary b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description 0 x x x x x x x Offset MSB 1 0 0 x x x x x 5 bit SFI 1 12 READ RECORD The command READ RECORD outputs the entire contents of a record within a linear data field The data field can either be selected previously using the command SELECT FILE or you can use the short file identifier SFI given in parameter P2 to make this data field the current data field In the command the parameters P1 and P2 specify which record is to be read and Le supplies the length of the res
90. ParametersDatafieldError Erroneous data in the command 6A82 FileNotFoundError File has not been found 6A83 RecordNotF oundError Record has not been found Tr b Baltic AS Public page 110 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet AL Tlic WR Error code Mnemonics Explanation 6A84 NotEnoughMemorySpaceError There is not enough card memory space should not occur in connection with the operations included in the present manual 6A86 ncorrectParameterError Invalid parameters in the command 6A87 LelnconsistentWithP1P2Error Such a Lc cannot be used in the given command 6A88 ReferencedDataNotFoundError No referenced data oe oe i baa 6A8A DfNameExistError The catalogue already exists 6B00 WrongParametersError Wrong parameters in the command 6D00 InstructionCodeNotSupportedError The card does not support the instruction byte INS given in the sent command 6E00 ClassNotSupportedError The card does not support the class byte INS given in the sent command 6F00 NoPreciseDiagnosisError Refers to the fact that the card is not compatible with the given reader or interface 25 Instructions for the writers of the applications using the card The specification of the EstEID interface and principles given in the present document do not impose mandatory precepts for the programming of applications using EstEID card However some instructions may be useful in programming the given appli
91. Select file 0016 with the command SELECT FILE Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 30 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp T RU B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet aL Tie A bo a e he he lo 3 Read record 1 ofthe file As file 0016 is a variable length record file the amount of bytes to be read from the card cannot be predicted Thus we give Le byte with the value 0 Using T 0 protocol Le may be omitted In case T 1 Le byte must be used The record is read from the card PIN1 retry counter is in byte no 5 NB The initial value of retry counter is 3 and on the blocked card 0 thus the counter shows how many attempts to enter the PIN code are left z IS Q D EstEID card stores the information in file records in the form of TLV Tag Length Value objects The PIN retry counter is in object tagged 90 and with length 01 The correct procedure would include parsing the file content to find the counter value However as the form of the record presumably will not change during the period of card usage the reading of the 5 byte would also presumably yield the correct result 4 We use analogous command to read record 2 which includes the PIN2 retry counter The retry counter is in byte no 5 The passphrase retry counters are in Master File 0013 records 5 passphrase 1 and 6 passphrase 2 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 31 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalv
92. TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol aie ee EstEID ID card specification Document information Date of Creation 11 06 2012 Recipient Police and Border Guard Board Republic of Estonia Publisher AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus Author Tr b Baltic AS Version 1 1 Version information Dae veson iiss allie 02 05 2011 History of the changes devised The addition of the clause The use of data reading command SelectFile on the card and its subclause Reading the certificate file and its size 03 05 2011 A correction in the clause Decrypting the session key with reference to the modification 04 05 2011 The addition of concepts Hash Authorization Verification and Authentication The addition of abbreviations ASN 1 ASCII ECC SHA 1 DES 3DES HEX BCD and DEC The correction of references within the text 31 10 2011 Changed branding to Tr b Baltic AS The addition of abbreviations MF DF EF AID The addition of chapter Recognising the application 03 11 2011 The correction of references and the addition of links within the text Correction of ATR bytes definition 16 11 2011 u MICARDO related references integrated into this document as Appendix 15 07 2011 The addition of abbreviations TLS FCI FCP FMD The correction of references and the addition of links within the text Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 1 147 TB SPE
93. ard command transmitted under the security communication operated correctly Next we must check the authenticity of the card response with the MAC code of the response Thus 18 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 D4 84 88 A5 19 We extend the data in the response to eightfold length 99 02 90 00 80 00 00 00 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 64 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ip nie ee 20 We calculate the MAC code of the given block in 3DES CFB mode using SK1 as the key and send sequence counter as ICV similarly to clause 16 The result is MAC 51 CB 48 70 4D 6C DA 4C Thus the calculated MAC code equals the MAC code from the card Thus the process of replacing passphrase1 authorised with the former passphrase has been successfully completed The new passphrase is Kured l inud kurjad ilmad Replacing passphrase2 by authorising it with the former passphrase includes the same procedures with the following variations 1 The derivation of session keys and send sequence counter is conducted with 3DESKey2 which in EstEID card has the sequence number 5 P2 5 in clause 7 2 Record no 2 must be overwritten i e P1 2 in the command formed in clause 11 j S Q m Error in deriving the session keys and send sequence counter for example the use of the wrong key in the host application results in 3DESKey retry counter being re
94. are no restrictions to reading from the files Note Creating and deleting files is not actively used in case of EstEID cards 19 9 1 File creation Sequence files and variable length record files may be created on the card The CREATE FILE command to create a sequence file is as follows Tr b Baltic AS Public page 101 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet BAL T I Position Value HEX Comment CLA OxON N value according to the security communication type used INS OxEO P1 0x01 P2 0x00 L MM 4 Data field length 0 6 62MM8201018302 Fixed values MM the number of following bytes except 0x6400 footer Thus MM Lc 4 7 8 FID 9 10 8502 Fixed values 11 12 File size Older byte first Data field 13 15 8A0105 Fixed values 16 17 NN A1NN lt Data gt In the current EstEID version file access conditions Not used in EstEID JavaCard version and the element may be left out of the command 18 NN 19 NN 6400 Fixed values The CREATE FILE command to create a variable length sequence file is as follows Position Value HEX Comment CLA OxON N value according to the security communication type used INS OxE0 P1 0x04 P2 0x00 Le MM 4 Data field length 0 6 62MM8205044 100 Fixed values MM the number of Data field following bytes except 0x6400 footer Thus MM Lc 4 7 Maximum record length Maximum valu
95. asescestasacssatevetacetacays Update Record response APDU if the command was completed successfully 00 ee eeeeeeseeeseeteeneeteeseeeeeeeeeeeneteaeeneeeaeeneeeaees Update Record response APDU in the event of an Fro ee eeceseeeceeeeeceeseesceeseeseesceeseescesesseesecseeeaeeseseceeaeeeeeaeseeeeaeeseeeaees Coding of P2 fomUpdate RECOM BARA EEE EIEE TE PTP EE EE EEEE E ET Venn eamin AFD aoaaa ON O O E O OPO OOS O OEEO Verify response APDU if the command was completed successfully ueesessesssessensesnnsnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnnn Response APDU for Verify command in the event Of an ertor uenucsserssnssussnsnnnnnnnnnssnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnsnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn t Veniy command P2 COGING 2 2 aaa TETT TETTETETT Public Page 8 147 36 36 37 37 37 38 38 38 39 39 40 40 40 41 41 42 42 42 43 43 44 44 44 45 45 45 46 46 46 46 47 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp f Politsei ja Piirivalveamet T R J B Cc AS Figure 1 EET BE e e 011 Wee CPR re ee PET ER TEE TEURER TEE AA E A A ST 11 Figure 2 ESIEIB fllesysteniasaeenen meinen une Era ee REIT 105 The aim of the present document is to specify the interface and data content of the security chip of the Estonian national public key infrastructure EstEID It is meant for programmers designing applications communicating directly with EstEID cards or drivers c
96. assword not found SE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Trailers from the VERIFY and CHANGE REFERENCE DATA commands are also possible Appendix Table 1 57 Coding of P2 for Reset Retry Counter b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description x a site En en a aa ies Password 0 a ie ath es gt at on Global all information in the MF 1 ais sit or i ag is Local all information under the MF 0 0 0 0 0 ae ate Other values are RFU x x Password number PwdiD 1 14 SELECT FILE You can use the command SELECT FILE to select a file in the file system and make it the current file Depending on the parameters this command selects either a directory MF or DF or a data field EF When this command has been successfully executed the situation is as follows Ifa directory was selected the directory pointer points to this selected directory and the field pointer is undefined Ifa data field was selected the directory pointer remains unchanged and the field pointer points to this selected data field If the command cannot be completed successfully both the directory pointer and the field pointer remain unchanged The security status values the active security environments including volatile ones and all derived and negotiated keys will also remain unchanged if the command is unsuccessful Appendix Table 1 58 Select File command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 00 Command class INS 1
97. available in the given security environment PIN1 Operation is available if PIN1 is checked PIN2 Operation is available if PIN2 is checked PIN2 for each Operation is available if PIN2 is checked and the checking is valid for only one operation op PUK Operation is available if PUK is checked 3DK1 Operation is available if the communication with the card is secured with 3DESKey1 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 107 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 f ei Orrie Politsei ja Piirivalveamet c AS Marking Explanation 3DK2 Operation is available if the communication with the card is secured with 3DESKey2 Al Operation is available authorisation from the card management centre using CMK1 A2 Operation is available authorisation from the card management centre using CMK2a SC2 Operation is available if the command sequence is secured with CMK2b SC3 Operation is available if the command sequence is secured with CMK3 23 2 Comments on the security environments 1 PKI environment SE 01 This is the security environment for PKI operations where the user authentication is executed with PIN codes The connection between the card and the card application is not separately secured The security environment is suitable for secure environments with limited keyboard such as ATM machines Environments with full keyboard may use the security environment SE 2 where the communication between th
98. b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Select MF x x x Selection of DF or EF 0 Selection of MF 0 0 1 Select DF in the current DF 0 1 0 Select EF in the current DF Triib Baltic AS Public Page 142 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Cc AS Appendix Table 1 61 Coding of P1 for Select File b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description 0 1 1 Select the DF at next higher level above the current one 1 0 0 Make selection using the name of the DF All other values RFU Are not supported Appendix Table 1 62 Coding of P2 for Select b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description 0 0 0 0 x x 0 0 Contents of the response 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Return data object consists of FCP and FMD 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Return FCP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Return FMD 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 No response data All other values RFU Are not supported 1 15 UPDATE BINARY The command UPDATE BINARY overwrites all or part of the contents of a transparent data field The data field can either be selected previously using the command SELECT FILE or you can use the short file identifier SFI given in parameter P1 to make this data field the current data field In the command the parameters P1 and P2 specify the first byte to be overwritten relative to the beginning of the data field and pass the new data Appendix Table 1 63 Update Binary command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 OX Command clas
99. block received in the previous step in 3DES CFB mode using SK2 as the key and the send sequence CLA INS PI P2 Lc Fixed values Crypto block received in clause Fixed values Calculated MAC Le 7 length 0x88 code oc 2A 80 86 99 87 81 8901 36 OD E2 53 8E 08 53 7A 0 The card responds Fixed The length of the Fixed value Encrypted session key Fixed value MAC 8 bytes OK value next data block Trailer 87 11 01 F7 32 40 48 18 D5 67 96 26 1E 5B B8 6C 8E 08 60 19 E8 61 7C 6D 90 00 BB 4D 14 88 25 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 73 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTI NS Next the authenticity of the card response must be checked by calculating the MAC code and comparing it to the MAC code received from the card 13 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 B6 E4 C8 2E 14 We temporarily form the following block from the response received from the card we leave out the MAC object at the end tag 0x8E length 0x08 and MAC value and replace it with 80 00 00 00 00 so that the block length would be eightfold Fixed values Encrypted session key Fixed values 87 11 01 F7 32 40 48 18 D5 67 96 26 1E 5B B8 6C BB 4D 80 00 00 00 00 14 15 We calculate the MAC code of the block received in the previous step using SK2 as the key and send sequence counter as ICV In our ca
100. by one SSC 05 06 07 08 D2 86 CA 72 19 We temporarily form the following block 20 We calculate the MAC code of the block in 3DES CFB mode with key SK2 and the send sequence counter as ICV In our case the result is as follows Header Header extension to length 8 0C 2C 03 01 80 00 00 00 MAC 45 F6 E8 BB 84 DE C8 35 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 98 147 amp Tr B S TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE ee 21 We form the command that we send to the card in case protocol T 0 there is no need to send Le Header Le Fixed values MAC received from the previous step Le 0C 2C 03 01 0A 8E 08 45 F6 E8 BB 84 DE C8 35 00 The card responds Fixed values OK Trailer Fixed values MAC OK Trailer 99 02 90 00 8E 08 4A EC FC D6 EB 6D BF 0A 90 00 Next we check the response from the card 22 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 D2 86 CA 73 23 We temporarily form the following block Card response The extension of the card response to length 8 99 02 90 00 80 00 00 00 24 We calculate the MAC code of the block in 3DES CFB mode with key SK2 and the send sequence counter as ICV The result is as follows MAC 4A EC FC D6 EB 6D BF 0A As the MAC code received from the card equals with the calculated MAC code the initial value of the retry coun
101. cations 25 1 Differences between card applications The following subchapters describe differences between card application versions in comparison with the version v1 0 25 1 1 Differences of application version v1 1 DigilD 1 v1 1 cards support only protocol T 0 2 Information about v1 1 cards protocol support is different in cold and warm ATR strings that are issued by the card Cold ATR does not claim T 1 support warm ATR mistakenly does 3 v1 1 cards answer with OK trailer 0x9000 to all application selection commands application recognition with SELECT FILE regardless of whether there is an application with the given AID present in the card or not After the application selection has been performed with a Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 111 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTI e AR S non present AID value then the card responds with error trailer Ox6A83 Record not found to all further commands including the application selection command that tries to select the correct application The card has to be reset in order to recover Due to responding with 0x9000 to all application selection commands v1 1 cards get auto detected as NIST SP 800 73 PIV cards in Windows 7 v1 1 cards respond to application version identification GET DATA commana with application version number 0x0101 and OK trailer 0x9000 Cards with version v1 0 respond with Ox6D00 Instruct
102. ck is shorter than the module of the used key a required amount of zeros is added to the block from the left 3 Incase the given data block is longer than the module of the used key the data block is shortened from the right so that the length of the operation input would be equal to the length of the key module Note Using ECC keys is not actively used in case of EstEID cards Triib Baltic AS Public page 43 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE R 15 2 Calculating the electronic signature in a card with hashing In the EstEID application one command to calculate the hash may include one to three 0x40 byte data blocks Thus there are three possible forms of command series except the last to send the data to be signed onto the card CLA INS P1 P2 Le Data 80 40 lt 40 hex byte data block gt 10 2A 90 AO 42 80 40 CLA INS P1 P2 Le Data 81 80 lt 80 hex byte data block gt 10 2A 90 AO 83 80 81 80 CLA INS P1 P2 Le Data 81 CO lt CO hex byte data block gt 10 2A 90 AO C3 80 81 C0 Note Differently from the previous version EstE D v3 0 and v3 4 applications do not give a calculated hash and it cannot be read from the card in any other way Note Calculating electronic signature with hashing in the card is not actively used in case of EstEID cards In case RSA key is used the hash algorithm is SHA 1 In case EC
103. d not found 6E 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Appendix Table 1 74 Verify command P2 coding b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description x A on si Gi e bee uid Password 0 Ei Pen en er ait bat abe Global all information in the MF 1 na wie es ss ai i ae Local all information under the MF 0 0 0 0 0 sd aii Other values are RFU x x Password number PwdlD Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 147 147
104. de P1 1 00 Command with replace FS Command without replace P2 1 xx Check byte Lc 1 01 FF P1 00 Length of the command data 0 P1 03 Empty Data Le KA t P1 00 Resetting code new password 0 P1 03 Empty Le 0 Empty Appendix Table 1 56 Reset Retry Counter response APDU in the event of an error Appendix Table 1 55 Reset Retry Counter response APDU ifthe command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data var Empty Trailer 2 90 00 Retry counter is now set to its initial value 63 CX As for 90 00 but problems with writing cannot be used Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00 Inconsistent or incorrect data 65 81 Write error 66 12 Parity error in the cryptographic algorithm 67 00 Response data has incorrect length command data is superfluous Le is superfluous 69 82 Security conditions not fulfilled 69 85 Retry counter is not zero referenced password Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 140 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Cc AS 69 88 ncorrect data objects for secure messaging 6A 80 ncorrect transport format for the password 6A 83 Record not found 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value no reference to the resetting code 6A 88 Referenced p
105. ding the referenced key indicates how the response data is to be derived from the token Appendix Table 1 24 Internal Authenticate command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 0x Command class NS 1 88 Command code P1 1 00 Fixed value P2 1 00 Fixed value XY Key reference Lc 0 No command data 1 Dias FF Length of the command data Data 0 Token is already present in the chip card Le XX YY Token that is to be encrypted or signed Le 1 00 FF Length ofthe response data Appendix Table 1 25 Internal Authenticate response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 127 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ee Appendix Table 1 25 Internal Authenticate response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data var KRY Encrypted or signed token Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings 63 CX Repeated write attempts were necessary Appendix Table 1 26 Internal Authenticate response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 65 81 Write error 67 00 Lc is missing or incorrect Le is missing Le is smaller than Lr 69 00 Missing key reference 69 82 Security condition for KO ICC not fulfilled
106. duced by one The initial value of the counter is OxFF and it cannot be reset Once the counter has reached zero authorising with the given passphrase cannot be used any longer For reading 3DESKey retry counter values from the card see chapter 12 3 Reading the passphrase retry counter 17 4 Executing operations with passphrase authorisation The execution of the given operations with passphrase authorisation is analogous to Setting the passphrase by authorising with the former passphrase authorisation see Chapter 17 3 2 including the following steps 1 The session keys and the send sequence counter are derived from the respective 3DESKey The command is constructed analogously to the PIN code authorisation The command is secured with session keys and send sequence counter he command is sent to the card and the response read uw 4 The authenticity of the response is checked Next we will consider each operation separately on the basis of an example The following table shows which passphrase must be used for various operations Tr b Baltic AS Public page 65 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet f rr EL Calculating response to SSL TLS challenge Calculating electronic signature Decrypting the session key with authentication key Decrypting the session key with signature key Passphrase1 Yes Yes Passphrase2 Yes
107. e ICV 0 41 F9 AE 35 48 53 6F 19 B9 3F ED 4E F8 90 C9 3B c We set the youngest bits so that the bytes would be odd Card CMK1 40 F8 AE 34 49 52 6E 19 B9 3E EC 4F F8 91 C8 3B We also calculate Card CMK2a 89 FB 5D 9B BO 83 DO 97 AB 13 5E BF 70 DF FD 86 Card CMK2b 3B 8A BC 9B 98 1F 29 AB B3 OD 97 15 64 29 43 62 Card CMK3 6E DC 2A 25 D6 64 7C DO C1 BF 01 16 08 51 F7 04 19 4 Generating new key pairs The chapter only contains information about generating new key pairs in case of EstEID application version v1 0 Tr b Baltic AS Public page 78 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet RPL Ti ie ae New key pairs may be generated on the card with the respective authorisation from the card centre using CMK2a key The generated key becomes the new key version at the same time the current key version remains The new key version may be used with a special procedure The procedure related to certificate loading turns the current key version into a previous one and the new version the current one The operations with the old key version may be executed with a special procedure 19 4 1 New key pair generation on EstEID card New keys are generated with module size 1024 bits The public key shall be read after the key pair generation from file FID 1000 similarly to the current card version The public key length is dependent on the key module length The generation of a new key pair on Est
108. e OxFE 8 Maximum number of records Maximum value OxFE 9 10 8302 Fixed values 11 12 FID Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 102 147 A rrbe S TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet BALTIC 13 14 8502 Fixed values 15 16 Maximum file capacity Older byte first 17 19 8A0105 Fixed values 20 21 NN A1NN lt Data gt In the current EstEID version file access conditions Not used in EstEID JavaCard version and the element may be left out of the command 22 23 19 NN 6400 Fixed values 19 9 2 File deletion The files created during card personalisation or later may be deleted The file deletion DELETE FILE command is as follows CLA INS P1 P2 Le File FID 00 E4 00 02 02 NN NN 20 EstEID card s symmetric crypto operations 20 1 3DES encrypting in CBC mode 3DES encrypting in CBC mode takes place as follows here ICV is the initialisation vector and 3DESKey the key for i 0 i lt NumBlocks it if i 0 XOR Block 0 ICV else XOR Block i Block i 1 3DESEncrypt Block i 3DESKey 20 2 In 3DES MAC CBC mode Calculating 3DES MAC code in CBC mode takes place as follows here 3DESKey is the key and CalculatedMAC receives the final result Tr b Baltic AS Public page 103 147 A S S TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR B
109. e 0013 of the catalogue EEEE Signature key version 1 Signatur key version 2 DB Authentication key version 1 eooo Authentication key version 2 In order to learn how many times the signature key version 1 has been used do as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default 2 Select the catalogue EEEE with the command SELECT FILE 3 Select file 0013 with the command SELECT FILE 4 Read record 1 of the file File 0013 in the catalogue is a fixed length structured file record length 4F however the same rule applies Using T 0 protocol Le may be omitted In case T 1 Le byte must be used Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 33 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE NS The record is read from the card The key use counter is in bytes no C E as a 3 byte value with the older byte on the left Thus the counter is read as follows lt Byte C Value gt 10 4 lt Byte D Value gt 10 3 lt Byte E Value gt The initial value of key use counter is FFFFFF and each key usage reduces it by one In order to learn how many times the key has been used the counter value read from the card must be subtracted from FFFFFF Note If the secret key s use counter reaches zero then the counter is reset to its initial value OxFFF
110. e calculation of digital signatures TIP This command can use a command specific access condition In this case the command expects in the SC data object only one further data object with the tag A4 It could be of the type AUT or of the type PWD This indicates that prior to each signature creation a key or password based authentication must be performed The security state is reset during command execution Appendix Table 1 36 Compute Digital Signature command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 OX Command class INS 1 ZA Command code for PSO command Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 132 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te Appendix Table 1 36 Compute Digital Signature command APDU Length Contents Description P1 1 OE Plaintext data object not TLV coded P2 1 OA Padding indicator followed by a cryptogram Lc 0 Length of the command data in bytes 1 xx Data 0 Command data not TLV coded x XX YY Le 1 00 FF Length of the response data Appendix Table 1 37 Compute Digital Signature response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 8 XX YY Plaintext dataDigital signature Trailer 2 90 00 Command was performed correctly Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00 Hardware fault during t
111. e host application and the card is secured 2 PKI environment secured communication SE 02 This is the security environment for PKI operations where the user authentication is executed with 3DESKey1 and 3DESKey2 The security environment may be used in full keyboard devices as 3DESKey1 and 3DESKey2 are derived from passphrases As the exchange of data between the host application and the card is secured the pirate codes have less opportunities 3 Certificate loading environment SE 03 The operations used in the given security environment include the new key pair generation and certificate loading The operations can take place once PIN1 is checked in order to guarantee that the card user is aware of the operation 4 Authentication object replacement environment SE 04 Only the authentication object replacement operation may be used in the given security environment 5 Application loading environment SE 05 Only the additional application loading operation may be used in the given security environment The operation requirement is PIN1 check in order to guarantee that the card user is aware of the operation 6 Decrypting operation environments SE 6 SE 7 In the given security environment the decryption of the cryptograms formed with the card user s public keys is executed with the card user s secret keys Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 108 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet
112. e is not used Response to SSL TLS challenge is calculated and returned in spite of the provided Le value Note During calculation of response to SSL TLS challenge if the security status has once been set and PIN1 code verified then the security status of the card remains unchanged after the SSL TLS challenge calculation operation has been executed i e it is possible to repeat the operation in the card without setting the security conditions again 15 Calculating the electronic signature The calculation of electronic signature is the encryption of a hash object formatted according to PKCS 1 ver 1 5 block type 1 with the secret RSA key EstEID enables the calculation of the electronic signature using the RSA key in two ways a Giving the object including the hash of the text to be signed b Sending the text to be signed to the card in blocks and letting the card hash it The signature on a card with hash may be calculated when the operation takes place in a device with limited resources without the hashing function for instance in a POS terminal Electronic signature may also be calculated with the ECC key Triib Baltic AS Public page 40 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet GOAL Tlie NS As keys with various lengths may be used in calculating the signature the Le byte may not always be 0x80 In the signature calculation command sent to the card the value of Le may be 0
113. e we want to decrypt with the signature key we send the following command CLA INS P41 P2 Le Key reference 00 22 41 B8 05 83 03 80 Byte no 0x13 in record no Byte no 0x14 in record no 1 in file EEEE 0033 1 in file EEEE 0033 The same applies when authorising with the passphrase 17 Setting and changing passphrases executing operations by identifying the user with passphrases 17 1 The general principles of using passphrases Passphrase is a series of tokens of unlimited length used to derive 3DES key The same 3DES key has been saved on the EstEID card The key may be used to establish a secure connection between EstEID card and the host application but also to identify the user as similarly to PIN codes the passphrase is known only to the lawful card user Thus also the user may enter the secret key through the passphrase to the host application to execute EstEID PKI operations The card user is considered as authenticated when secure messaging takes place between the card and the host application with the given keys There are no separate authentication procedures 3DESKey1 and 3DESKey2 are derived from Passphrase 1 and Passphrase 2 according to the procedures of deriving 3DESKey from the passphrase Note Using passphrases is not actively used in case of EstEID cards When using passphrases for identification the sequence of operation procedure is as follows l The user enters the passphrase
114. eader for a DF that is to be created 2 File header for an E 3 Record data tag 7 F that is to be created 3 with the following data elements Tag Length Value 83 01 FID 85 RX NYY Contents of the records 85 AK YY Continuation of record contents if necessary 85 KX The above mentioned data objects can be used as follows For a DF Data object 1 at the beginning followed by lt n gt occurrences of data objects 2 and 3 in an arbitrary order For an EF One data object 2 Appendix Table 1 7 Create File command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 Command class OX Final subcommand 1X Subcommand not the final command INS 1 EO Command code Tr b Baltic AS Public page 120 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te Appendix Table 1 7 Create File command APDU Length Contents Description P1 1 xx First byte of the file descriptor P2 1 00 Fixed value Le 1 O FF Length of the command data Data Le IAY Data objects 1 2 and or 3 see above Le 0 Empty Appendix Table 1 8 Create File response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 90 00 Command was performed correctly 63 CX As for 90 00 but problems
115. eamet ALTI WS 12 3 Reading the passphrase retry counter In order to read the passphrase 1 retry counter do as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default 2 Select catalogue EEEE with the command SELECT FILE 3 Select file 0013 with the command SELECT FILE 4 Read record 5 of the file File 0013 is also a variable length structured file Using T 0 protocol Le may be omitted In case T 1 Le byte must be used The record is read from the card ma ee ee eee vawe fas_Joo fos foo for foo Jer fro feo for Ir Ionen The passphrase retry counter is in byte no A Its initial value is FF and each incorrect passphrase insertion reduces the counter by one When the counter reaches zero the passphrase cannot be used any longer and the card must be authenticated with PIN codes or it must be exchanged The passphrase retry counter does not reset with the correct passphrase insertion Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 32 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q T RU B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet En Passphrase 2 retry counter is analogously in record 6 12 4 Reading secret key use counters All secret keys on the card have their own use counter This chapter describes how to read secret key use counter from the card Secret key use counters are in the following records of fil
116. ecryption of the session key is possible only wit h the RSA keys In case of long keys the length of the command sent to the card may exceed the maximum length of APDU In that case the command chaining must be used When securing the command chain with a passphrase each command of the chain must be secured separately T he card user is authenticated once the last command of the chain is secured When decrypting the session key the secret key decrypts tt he RSA crypto block received by encrypting the data block formatted according to PKCS 1 ver 1 5 block type 2 with a respective public key At the same time EstEID card parses the data block received as a result of decryption and only sends out the data Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 48 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE WS Thus NB In case the data block given for decryption is not a data block encrypted according to PKCS 1 ver 1 5 block type 2 with the respective public key there will be an error situation in the EstEID card Decryption operation is possible with both the authentication and signature key In order to decrypt the session key do as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default 2 Select catalogue EEEE with the command SELECT FILE 3 Set the security en
117. ecure messaging 6A 80 Password has incorrect transport format or old and new passwords are identical 6A 83 Record not found 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value 6A 88 Referenced password not found BE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Trailers from the VERIFY command are also possible Appendix Table 1 6 Coding of P2 for Change Reference Data b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description x Password Tr b Baltic AS Public page 119 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 rr s Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te Global all information in the MF Local all information under the MF 0 0 0 wale aa Other values are RFU 1 3 CREATE FILE Password number PwdlD The command CREATE FILE enables you to create a lower level file within the current directory All the necessary information regarding the directory or data field that is to be created is contained in the command data he command in chaining mode n general it will not be possible to accommodate all the information within one command message so for creating new directories you can execute f a successful subcommand is followed by a reset or some other command then the command CREATE FILE will be aborted and the reset or the other interrupting command will be executed Any changes already carried out by the command CREATE FILE will be retained The command data may contain a variety of data objects 1 File h
118. en protected by security mechanisms which also guarantee that the certificates may be loaded only into the EstEID card where they belong to Any attempt to load the certificate into some other EstEID card results in an error situation The implemented security mechanism operates as follows the Token Management Centre TMC converts the certificate code into commands that include the respective MAC code Thus the EstEID card where it belongs to shall also receive it accordingly The certificate loading procedure includes the following operations 1 Select MF on the card Set the security environment no 3 within the card Select catalogue EE EE on the card Set the security environment no 3 again in catalogue EE EE Verify PIN1 code The aim of the verification of PIN1 code is to guarantee that the card user is aware of the operation AR u Read the commands in the certificate loading code file given by TMC and send on to the card The commands in the certificate loading code files are in HEX or BCD format one command on each line lines are separated by LF Ox0A On the command level the certificate renewal process is as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE Look chapter 19 5 Generating certificate loading modules Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 37 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE WS 6 Load the new certificate onto t
119. eration of the protocol feature leads to command error situations As in T 0 protocol all operations may be executed with the EstEID card there is generally no need for T 1 although all operations may also be executed under this protocol Important TIP EstEID cards with v1 1 support only T 0 However in programming for T 0 it is important to consider that the card may respond to the command with the code 61 L as a positive response L one byte here shows how many bytes of data are waiting for the release on the card In order to read the given bytes a new command must be given to the card For example The card replied to the command with the codes 61 0A meaning that there are 10 dec bytes waiting on the card In order to read the bytes we send Tr b Baltic AS Public page 19 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet aitia WR The card responds Released byi 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00 6 PIN1 PIN2 PUK code PIN1 PIN2 and PUK consist of digits 0 9 however the card supports using all of the ASCII symbols in PIN and PUK codes with values ranging from 0x00 to OxFF Note Although not restricted by the card application only the following subset of ASCII character set shall be used 0 1 2 9 Other characters are not supported by the use cases The following table includes the allowed length for PIN and PUK codes Table 6
120. eseceeeeeeaeeseeeaeeaeeestesecereeaeeeeeeaees Decipher response APDU in the event Of AN error ee eeeesseseeeseesceeeeesecseeeeecseesneeseesseesecscessecseesnecseeaeeseesaeeseeaseaecseeeaeeceseaees FESH CONTENGA POU deecaxstenscacseapcatteascusatea asses cissten catetoascs taeascassteascassenscasyioas cusses cass teastaseten catsteascastessnasteascateteasuasteas Public Page 7 if 147 22 22 23 24 24 24 25 25 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 28 29 30 30 30 31 31 32 32 32 33 33 34 34 34 36 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Appendix Tab Tr b Baltic AS Hash response APDU if the command was completed successfully CLA O0 ueesunsessunssnnsnsennennnnannnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnenanna Hash response APDU if the command was completed successfully CLA 10 unnucnsensensunssensunnennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnenannna
121. esponse 17 4 2 Calculating the electronic signature Calculating the electronic signature with passphrase authorisation is similar to the calculation of SSL TLS challenge response The differences are as follows 1 Passphrase2 must be used 3DESKey2 any attempt to authorise with passphrase1 results in an error situation 2 Command header is as follows see Chapter 15 2 Calculating the electronic signature in a card with hashing clause 6 Ulalpool CLA INS P1 P2 oc 2A 9E 9A Tr b Baltic AS Public page 69 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 f eei Orrie Politsei ja Piirivalveamet c AS and a hash object must be placed instead of the challenge in the unsecured data field see Chapter 15 2 Calculating the electronic signature in a card with hashing clause 6 More detailed information on the calculation ofthe electronic signature is given in chapter 15 1 Calculating the electronic signature when the hash is ready 17 4 3 Decrypting session keys Also the securing of session key decrypting commands with passphrase authorisation is analogous to securing the SSL TLS challenge response and electronic signature calculation commands however with several significant nuances Thus we will hereby consider the operation in detail Passphrase1 must be used for authorisation in decrypting the session key with authentication key and passphrase2 used in authorising
122. et up the new password as D123 Since no separator is used the chip card has no way of recognizing this situation as an error unless both the old password and the new one are of maximum length Length Contents Description CLA 0x Command class INS 24 Command code Pi 00 Fixed value P2 xx Check byte Lc 01 FF Length ofthe command data Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 118 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Cc AS Appendix Table 1 3 Change Reference Data command APDU Length Contents Description Data Lc RXK NY Old password new password both in the same transfer format Le 0 Empty Appendix Table 1 4 Change Reference Data response APDU ifthe command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings 63CX As for 90 00 but problems with writing Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00 Inconsistent or incorrect data 65 81 Write error 66 12 Parity error in the cryptographic algorithm 67 00 Response data has incorrect length Lc is missing or incorrect Le is superfluous 69 82 Security conditions not fulfilled 69 83 Retry counter expired 69 85 Referenced password cannot be used 69 88 ncorrect data objects for s
123. etry counter s value However version 3 0 cards respond with 0x6984 and version 1 0 cards respond with 0x6A80 Incorrect data in command field and also decrease the retry counter s value Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 20 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTI NS Version 1 1 and 3 0 cards respond to key operations like INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE if the required PIN has not been verified with 0x6985 Conditions of use not satisfied instead of 0x6982 Security status not satisfied See chapter 25 1 Differences between card applications for more information 7 Changing PIN1 PIN2 and PUK code The values of PIN1 PIN2 and PUK codes may always be changed with the command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA PIN1 and PIN2 may be given new values by using command RESET RETRY COUNTER The execution of the given operation requires the verification of PUK or the execution of the operation secured by 3DESKey for PIN1 and by 3DESKey2 for PIN2 Note v3 0 cards allow the same values for old and new PIN and PUK codes when changing a PIN or PUK code with the command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA or when unblocking and simultaneously changing a PIN code with the command RESET RETRY COUNTER See chapter 25 1 2 Differences of application version v3 0 for more information The change of PIN1 PIN2 and PUK code is executed by the following command Previous PIN New PIN or PIN code number o
124. f an error eee eeeeescceceeceeceeseesceeceesee ceeeaeeseesnecseeeaeeseeaeeaeeeeeseseeeaeeneeenecs Coding of P2 for Reset Roty CUMBO isspiss iinne sneer asnan EnaA A Aap SARR vndea cdi vechs SAL SERSA SAES EA NERENS SASA SelSchRlleiconimand APOW An A R A A A ARA Select File response APDU if the command was completed successfully ueseessessesssensennensnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnna Select File response APDU in the event Of an error uensessnssnssnsnnsnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnonnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnsnsnnsnnnnnn Coding GRP TTOn Select File s czcccs cesrazsndransysarereeatdaesonesarenbrase satbtetdssnazaxdzobatesGzabonstdnsnatend iara rata TAKART ra T ataa iTS Gooding Of PA T Select n unsuntiaiienetinuntiunuienniuiintinnniunnininknuntiniiniintinkisinlisteniintiiisi iisitstsen Update Binary command APD nee seen Rn Update Binary response APDU if the command was completed SUCCESSPUILY ee eeeeseeseceseeeeseeseeseeneeeeeeeeeneteseceeeeaeeneeaees Update Binary response APDU in the event Of an Go oo eeeeseeeceeeeesececeeaceeesnecsceseescecseesseeseessecseeaseseeaeeaeeeeesecneeaseneeceees Coding of P1 for Update Binary s2se lt z esacssazcsciseeaszncsacesacessqaserasceazzsceaccaatesotesatasceasesccatesazsestaszzacetacasseatasassaateszsaaztacesseatasacssatasera Update Record command APD 2cse csctasezacascsatctscsetesctacenssascsgtcsatesoqesatascqanascagacaacesogasesacgeatesacaicsatesazesesacet
125. g bytes and output only the relevant plaintext data DES DES3 In the case of DES DES3 the input has to be a multiple of 8 bytes plus padding indicator The only defined padding indicator is 01 ISO padding If the key requires an ICV you must set up one using the command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT After the command call the current block is output decrypted The decryption uses a key from the relevant data field EF containing key This key must be authorised for the decryption RSA In the case of RSA the chip card decrypts the transferred cryptogram length modulus using a private key from the relevant data field EF containing key This key must be authorised for the decryption Card assumes that the plaintext data of the cryptogram is formatted according to PKCS 1 block type 01 The byte 00 is placed before the code in the command call as the padding indicator no further indication PKCS 1 is assumed Card interprets the plaintext data sufficiently that only data which is identified as plaintext data is output When the decryption has been carried out card also checks whether the data has the correct PKCS 1 format If this is not the case then no response data will be output and the retry counter for the private key will be decreased The program supports only algorithm IDs that are defined for decryption Length Contents Description CLA 1
126. g issued by the card during the initial loading EstEID card has two ATR strings So called cold ATR that is issued by the card after the insertion into the reader So called warm ATR that is issued by the card after the booting initiated by the card reader EstEID card application has been realized on various platforms All application versions are compatible and with the same functionality however there are still some differences due to the use of various platforms that should be considered in interfacing EstEID cards All platforms have different ATR strings e The ATR strings of EstEID application realized on MICARDO cards are as follows EstEID v1 0 realised on Micardo Public 2 1 Cold ATR 3B FE 94 00 FF 80 B1 FA 45 1F 03 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 43 Warm ATR 3B 6E 00 FF 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 EstEID v1 0 realised on Micardo Public 3 0 issued since January 2006 Cold ATR 3B DE 18 FF C080 B1 FE45 1F 0345 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 2B Warm ATR 3B 5E 11 FF 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 e The ATR strings of EstEID v1 1 for DigilD realised on MultOS TM by KeyCorp on IE4 cards are as follows Cold ATR 3B 6E 00 00 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 Warm ATR 3B FE 94 00 FF 80 B1 FA 45 1F 03 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 43 Tr b Baltic AS Public page 15 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Ba e
127. ge This is analogous to the command header used in PIN1 authorisation the only difference is CLA byte value 0x0C 8 We temporarily form the following block In our example CLA INS P1 P2 oc 88 00 00 ll Data field formed in step 6 extended to eightfold length Header Header extension Block received in step 6 The extension of the received in step 6 to length 8 block to eightfold length OC 88 00 00 80 00 00 00 87 80 80 00 9 We calcula counter as e the MAC code of the block received in the previous step in 3DES CFB mode using SK2 as the key and send sequence CV The result is MAC 20 10 A7 C3 10 84 AO 59 10 We form the command to be sent to the card In case the protocol is T 1 Le 0 must be added at the end CLA INS P1 P2 Le Fixed value Length of Fixed Crypto block Fixed Fixed Calculated Le the next value received in value value MAC code block clause 5 0c 88 00 00 20 87 11 01 29 CD 8E 08 20 59 00 The card responds Fixed values Encrypted challenge response 0x88 Fixed values MAC 8 bytes OK Trailer bytes 87 81 89 01 8E 08 1E E7 D9 C2 42 90 00 41 D6 63 Trib EstEID card adds a similar extension to make the length eightfold to the encrypted data objects as in case of objects sent to the card see Chapter 14 Calculating the response to SSL TLS challenge clause
128. he card according to the following algorithm while EndOfFile Line ReadLineFromFile Convert Line from BCD to Binary If Protocol TO Remove Le byte Transmit Line to EstEID card The certificate is renewed once all the commands in the certificate loading code file have been sent to the card Note Certificate renewal is actively used only in case of EstEID cards with application version v1 0 Look chapter 19 5 Generating certificate loading modules Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 38 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet atie RR 14 Calculating the response to SSL TLS challenge According to PKCS 1 ver 1 5 block type 1 calculating the response to SSL TLS challenge is the encrypting of the formatted challenge with a secret RSA key In order to calculate the response in EstEID card do as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default 5 Send the command to the card to calculate the response to the challenge a In case of T 0 send Le chalenge eng Challenge Joo le oo foo Sf i he b In case of T 1 send Le challenge length Challenge joo fe lo lo foe a fw Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 39 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ip nie ae e WR
129. he card response includes FMD 00 A4 0X 0C There is no response to the command from the card only OK trailer 0x9000 As the response to the SelectFile command does not include significant information it is recommended to use the command format 00 A4 0X 0C I ID v3 0 cards respond with a double 0x62 FCP tag to SELECT FILE commands which select an elementary file and require FCP value to be included in the response i e the first parameter s value is set to P1 02 and the second parameter is set to P2 04 This should be taken into account when parsing the response See chapter 25 1 2 Differences of application version v3 0 In the given command table symbol X marks parameter which defines the type of data structure to be selected These data structures are Value of X Description 0 Application Master File MF no data in APDU data field 1 Application Dedicated File DF APDU data field contains DF identifier 2 Application Elementary File EF APDU data field contains EF identifier 4 Card Application APDU data field contains Application identifier AID 10 The card user personal data file EstEID card includes a personal data file with the personal data of the card user and with FID File Identifier PD or 50 44 This is a variable length record file including the electronic information except photo and signature image transferred onto the card dur
130. he given format in case a new key pair has not been generated on the card after personalisation In case such a premise cannot be used see the next chapter Tr b Baltic AS Public page 71 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE ee In the example SK1 EB 08 02 E5 4A 25 07 2B B6 98 33 6F 6C B3 E9 E5 SK2 D9 B1 E7 BO 04 21 4F 42 E8 8D 9D CD 50 1D FD 82 and SSC 05 06 07 08 B6 E4 C8 2C 4 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 B6 E4 C8 2D 5 We add one zero byte in front of the crypto block to the left so that the block length would be 0x8 bytes 00 21 A6 B9 E1 6 We add byte 0x80 to the challenge on the right and as many zero bytes as needed to make the block length eightfold As the previous operation made the block length 0x81 bytes after the given operation the block is as follows 1 zero byte Crypto block length 0x80 bytes Extension 00 21 A6 B9 E1 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 7 We encrypt the given block in 3DES CBC mode with key SK1 and use send sequence counter as ICV increased by one in clause 4 Thus as a result Encrypted block length 0x88 bytes 36 OD E2 53 8 We form the command block as follows Fixed values The block received in the previous step length Fixed Fixed value Fixed value 0x88 bytes value Le 87 81 89 01 36 OD E2 53 97 01 00 The bytes
131. he operation inconsistencies in EEEE 0013 64 00 nconsistent or incorrect data 65 81 Error encountered while writing the retry counter 67 00 Response data has incorrect length Lc is not equal to the length of he command data Le is smaller than Lr 69 82 Access conditions for the key not fulfilled 69 83 Retry counter is zero 69 84 Usage counter is zero 69 85 Usage conditions for the key not fulfilled referenced key cannot be used 69 88 DSI has incorrect length incorrect dataobjects for secure messaging 69 88 Key or hash function not found referenced key not found 1 10 2 DECIPHER The PSO command DECIPHER decrypts a cryptogram that is passed together with the command The following cryptographic algorithms can be used DES and DES3 decryption in CBC mode Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 133 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a A RSA decryption using the private key The command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT is used to specify the key that is to be used and hence the cryptographic algorithm The length of the response data is always a multiple of the length of the key The first byte of the command data is the padding indicator which shows whether the chip card processes the plaintext data at the end of the operation and if so how If a defined padding indicator is present card will remove the paddin
132. he public exponent of the secret keys is generated as a random value except for v3 4 cards where the exponent value could be also fixed value 65537 25 2 Determining the card application version EstEID card application version can be determined by comparing the ATR strings issued by the card with the ATR values that have been defined for the specific EstEID card versions see chapter 3 1 ATR strings and used protocols However due to the similarities of ATR strings of some card versions additional comparison should be conducted in the following cases 1 If the card responds with ATR value that corresponds to the cold ATR of application v1 0 3B FE 94 00 FF 80 B1 FA 45 1F 03 45 73 74 45 49 44 20 76 65 72 20 31 2E 30 43 In this case in order to distinguish between application versions v1 0 and v1 1 DigilD do as follows e Read a record from the personal data file in the card i e the record of first name last name or personal identification code Triib Baltic AS Public Page 114 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE ae e If the card responds with error trailer 0x6A83 Record not found then the card s version is v1 1 DigilD as v1 1 cards contain data only in Document number field Otherwise the card s version is v1 0 2 Ifthe card responds with either cold or warm ATR value of any of v3 0 cards then in order to distinguish between card versions 3 0 and
133. i ja Piirivalveamet BALTIC A 13 1 The certificate file reading and its content If the selected file is a certificate file the response includes the file size in bytes In the application realized in Java card the FCP and FMD content is set during personalisation Therefore the file size cannot be found by checking the offset bytes of the response to the Select File command The location of the bytes showing the file size may be changed by developing the personalisation process or the card application The change may also be caused by the use of a new platform In order to find the file size the element with the Tag 0x85 must be found in the FCP TLV structure for instance 0x62 0x85 0x02 0x06 0x00 The file size in the above example is 0x600 bytes The size of the certificate on the card may also be determined by reading the first block of the file for example 250 bytes and then looking for the certificate length ASN 1 syntax by parsing 13 2 Reading the certificate on the card In order to read the certificate enabling digital identification similarly to other certificates do as follows 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default The card responds total length of the response is 1A bytes vawe fez fe fee fon lon fes fo Im oe fes foo Jos foo ooo File size is in the response
134. i e we tell the card that the following decryption operations must be executed with the signature key Therefore we send a ee bee Key reference lo la de ds Ses os eo 0100 5 Verifying PIN2 code PIN2 oo lo dlo ps 259 aa 6 We send the card the command to decrypt the blocks Encrypted block The card responds Bytes waiting in the Number of bytes waiting the amount of data in the crypto card block in bytes 7 Read the decrypted data from the card mans ji jji joo lo foo lbw bho The card responds The data included in crypto block OK Trailer 16 1 The derivation of the session keys with ECC keys Look Appendix subchapter Decipher of chapter Perrorm Security Operation and inspect paragraph related to RSA for clearer understanding of prepadded 0x00 byte Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 52 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE WS It is possible to use ECC authentication keys and EstEID card for the derivation of the TLS session premaster secret according to Diffie Hellman key derivation algorithm The sequence of commands is as follows 1 Set the reference key for the key derivation CLA INS Pi P2 Lc Reference key 00 22 41 A6 05 83 03 80 11 00 2 Verify PIN1 code CLA INS P1 P2 Le PIN1 00 20 00 PIN1 code number PIN1 code length As ASCII codes
135. ing personalisation Signature key Generated on the card during personalisation The former signature key Unused Certificate enabling signing Loaded on the card during personalisation PIN1 PIN2 PUK Set during personalisation Card management keys CMK1 CMK2a CMK2b CMK3 Set during personalisation 3DESKey1 and 3DESKey2 Completed during personalisation with values 00 00 The personalisation service provider prints the PIN1 PIN2 and PUK codes in the security envelope to be delivered to the card holder 23 EstEID card security structure Each logical operation group on EstEID card has been located in a security environment restricting the selection of available operations so that the access is granted only to operations necessary within the given group For instance operations with secret keys are not accessible during the certificate loading as the latter may take place in an insecure environment or an environment uncontrolled by the card user 23 1 The cross table of security environments and operations The following table shows the security environments used in EstEID cards and the availability of the operations Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 106 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet TRUB Bb AL Tk ie AS
136. ing the personalisation process The file may be read by the personal data file reading procedure with the aim of transferring the card user data in electronic form incase the card has not been loaded a certificate incase the certificate is not processed by the host application to form new certificate requests The card user personal data file is a variable length formatted file The maximum length of the file is 200 5124 bytes the maximum record length is 50 bytes and the number of records 16 The file is completed during the personalisation process and the recorded data cannot be modified later There are technical possibilities to supplement the file during the personalisation process by adding records at the end of the file Similarly the maximum length of the record may be changed Triib Baltic AS Public Page 24 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Cc AS The file includes the records given below The symbols have been encoded according to ANSI code page no 1252 in keeping with ISO 8859 1 Record number content Maximum length 1 Surname 28 bytes 2 First name line 1 15 bytes 3 First name line 2 15 bytes 4 Sex 1 bytes 5 Nationality 3 letters 3 bytes 6 Birth date dd mm yyyy 10 bytes 7 Personal identification code 11 bytes 8 Document number 8 or9 bytes 9 Expir
137. ion code not supported instead For more detailed description of the command see chapter 4 1 The identification of the card application version v1 1 cards have only Document number record filled in personal data file Personal identification code record is filled with 11 space characters each of the remaining records contain one zero byte v1 1 cards respond to personal data file s MF EEEE 5044 SELECT FILE command 00 A4 02 04 02 50 44 with different file header TLV value than v1 0 cards V1 1 cards have the byte no 8 indicating the number of records in the file set to OAhex v1 0 cards have byte no 8 set to 10hex By default the number of records in personal data file is 10hex as in case of v1 0 cards v1 1 cards respond with 0x63CX and decrease the PIN or PUK retry counter respectively when trying to verify PIN or PUK code by using a code value that has invalid length the allowed range is 4 12 digits in case of PIN1 5 12 digits in case of PIN2 and 8 12 digits in case of PUK v1 0 cards respond with trailer Ox6A80 instead When changing the PIN or PUK code command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA by using a new code with an unallowed length then v1 1 cards respond with 0x6400 retry counter value is not decreased v1 0 cards respond with trailer Ox6A80 instead When trying to unblock PIN code with the command RESET RETRY COUNTER if the code has not been blocked previously i e the retry counter value is not 0 then
138. ion version identification GET DATA command with application version number 0x0300 and OK trailer 0x9000 Cards with version v1 0 respond with 0x6D00 Instruction code not supported instead a For more detailed description of the command see chapter 4 1 The identification of the card application version w v3 0 cards respond with a double 0x62 FCP tag to SELECT FILE commands which select an elementary file and require FCP value to be included in the response i e the first parameter s value is set to P1 02 and the second parameter is set to P2 00 This should be taken into account when parsing the response gt v3 0 cards have the personal data file MF EEEE 5004 records padded with spaces to the maximum extent of the respective record s length v1 0 cards have the records with the exact length oO Versions v3 0 and 3 4 have card numbers with the length of 9 bytes instead of 8 bytes This should be taken into account when reading the Document number record from the personal data file 6 v3 0 cards respond to personal data file s MF EEEE 5044 SELECT FILE command 00 A4 02 04 02 50 44 with different file header TLV value than v1 0 cards v3 0 cards have the byte no 7 indicating the maximum length of a record and byte no 8 indicating the number of records in the file set to 7Fhex and 14hex respectively v1 0 cards have byte no 7 set to 32hex and byte no 8 set to 10hex By default the maximu
139. irst generate the authentication key followed by the signature key Note In generating the signature key a reference must be set to the authentication key generated earlier Setting a reference to an authentication key that has not been generated results in an error situation 15 We form the command to generate the key CLA INS P1 P2 Le Fixed values Public key file FID fixed value 00 46 00 00 04 8302 1000 The public key formed in the key pair generation is located in the file FID 1000 Next the command must be forwarded onto the card under EstEID security communication using the session keys and send sequence counter formed in step 13 In the secure messaging only the protection with MAC codes is used encrypting is not used Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 83 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol e ee 16 We increase the send sequence counter by one SSC 05 06 07 08 4E 56 55 CC 17 We change the command header as follows CLA INS P1 p2 oc 46 00 00 18 We temporarily form the following block Header Header extension to length Data Data block extension 8 to length 8 OC 46 00 00 80 00 00 00 81 04 83 02 10 00 80 00 19 We calculate the MAC code of the formed block with the card key CMK2b in 3DES CFB mode with ICV 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 The result is as follows MAC 2B 08 D5 EF B2 53 FC C6
140. ix Table 1 16 Generate Public Key Pair response APDU in the event of an error Appendix Table 1 15 Generate Public Key Pair response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 90 00 Retry counter is set to its initial value from the command Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 65 81 EF_Key_RSA_Public is incorrect 67 00 Lc is missing or incorrect Le exists 69 00 Missing key reference Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 124 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te 69 82 Security condition for key not fulfilled 69 85 Key reference is missing or incorrect 6A 80 Command data are wrong 6A 82 EF_Key_RSA_Public is missing 6A 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value 6E 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent The following table describes the command data Appendix Table 1 17 Generate Public Key Data command data description Byte number Command data 1 Value 83 2 Value 02 3 4 FID of the EF_Key_RSA_Public 1 6 GET CHALLENGE The command GET CHALLENGE returns a certain number of bytes Since the contents of these bytes are determined by an internal hardware random number generator the byte sequence can be considered as a random number The number of bytes
141. key operations like INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE if the required PIN has not been verified with 0x6985 Conditions of use not satisfied instead of 0x6982 Security status not satisfied 13 Versions 3 0 and 3 4 support ECC keys 14 Renewing certificates and generating new key pairs in the card is not actively used in case of card application versions v3 0 and 3 4 15 v3 0 cards public key does not comply with ASN 1 standard Due to that some information systems may not accept the certificates on v3 0 cards Tr b Baltic AS Public page 113 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ip nie ae WR 25 1 3 Differences of application version v3 4 1 v3 4 cards respond to application version identification GET DATA command with two different application version number Some cards respond with application version number 0x0300 and OK trailer 0x9000 and some respond with application version number 0x0304 and OK trailer 0x9000 Cards with version v1 0 respond with 0x6D00 Instruction code not supported instead a For more detailed description of the command see chapter 4 1 The identification of the card application version N Versions v3 0 and 3 4 have card numbers with the length of 9 bytes instead of 8 bytes This should be taken into account when reading the Document number record from the personal data file w v3 0 cards respond to personal data file s MF EE
142. l operation The counter value is not reset once the counter has reached zero the key cannot be used any longer 17 2 Deriving 3DES key from the passphrase The procedure for deriving the key from the passphrase was a joint agreement not a characteristic of EstEID card The need for a uniform procedure is conditioned by the need to ensure the validity of the same passphrase in various applications The joint procedure to derive 3DesKey from the passphrase is as follows l SHA 1 hash of the passphrase is calculated 2 16 bytes from the left of the has are taken 3 the youngest bit of each byte are set so that the byte would be odd EstEID card requirement a byte with wrong parity in the EstEID card key leads to an error situation Note In production the EstEID card s both 3DESKey values are 00 00 all zero bytes The given key cannot be used as zero bytes are even bytes Let the passphrase1 for the derivation of 3DESKey1 as follows KaksUkurjaUkukkeUkaklevadUkuudiUkatusel Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 56 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 And passphrase2 for the derivation of 3DESKey2 as follows the given sentences shall also be used in the examples to follow SeeVUonUminuU paroollause2 with U marking the space character Calculate the SHA 1 hashes of the sentences The hash of passphrase1 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet trie BA L T Ie S
143. m length of a record in personal data file is 32hex and the number of records is 10hex as in case of v1 0 cards SQ v3 0 cards respond with 0x630X trailer instead of 0x63CX when trying to verify PIN or PUK code with an incorrect value with the command VERIFY when the PIN or PUK code s length is in its allowed value range v3 0 cards respond with 0x6984 and decrease the PIN or PUK retry counter respectively when trying to verify PIN or PUK code by using a code value that has invalid length the allowed range is 4 12 digits in case of PIN1 5 12 digits in case of PIN2 and 8 12 digits in case of PUK v1 0 cards respond with trailer 0x6A80 instead o v3 0 cards allow the same values for old and new PIN and PUK codes when changing a PIN or PUK code with the command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA or when unblocking and simultaneously changing a PIN code with the command RESET RETRY COUNTER 10 When changing the PIN or PUK code command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA by using a new code with an unallowed length then v3 0 and v3 4 cards respond with 0x6984 retry counter value is not decreased v1 0 cards respond with trailer Ox6A80 instead 11 When trying to unblock PIN code with the command RESET RETRY COUNTER if the code has not been blocked previously i e the retry counter value is not 0 then v3 0 and v1 1 cards respond with error trailer Ox6A86 v1 0 cards respond with error trailer 0x6985 instead 12 v3 0 cards respond to
144. mand was performed correctly Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 67 00 Lc is not equal to the length of the command data Le is not equal to Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 136 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a Te 20 bytes or Le is superfluous 69 87 Counter or hash value missing 69 88 Length of data object is not 28 or 64 bytes 1 11 READ BINARY The command READ BINARY outputs all or part of the contents of a transparent data field The data field can either be selected previously using the command SELECT FILE or you can use the short file identifier SFI given in parameter P1 to make this data field the current data field In the command the parameters P1 and P2 specify the first byte to be read relative to the beginning of the data field and Le supplies the number of bytes that are to be read Appendix Table 1 46 Read Binary command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 00 Command class NS 1 BO Command code P1 1 xx SFI or MSB of the offset P2 1 00 FF LSB of the offset Le 0 Empty Data 0 Empty Le 1 00 FF Length of the response data Appendix Table 1 47 Read Binary response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty no data available var NAc Y Response A
145. n algorithm for public key cryptography in data transmission DF Dedicated File EF Elementary File AID Application Idenifier Terms Term Definition Authentication Confirming the origin of somebody or something Authorization The procedure during which it is established whether the given person has the rights for the particular action PIN code A code consisting of letters and or digits used to authenticate the user identity Personal Identification Number Passphrase The objects used in EstEID cards for user authentication which could be employed similarly to PIN1 and PIN2 Hash A unique set of bits corresponding to a specific set of data Verification The procedure for verifying the data validity Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 10 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 1 The objects and operations of EstEID security chip application 1 1 User authentication objects Certificate Enabling the digital user identification Certificate Enabling the user s digital signature Data objects Card management keys CMK1 The authentication object replacement key CMK2a Ney key pair generation authentication key CMK2b Certificate renewal key CMK3 Additional application loading key User personal data file Figure 1 EstEID objects 1 2 card Table 1 1 The functions of EstEID security chip objects on the card Object Function on the
146. n requires specific changes in the security environment of the card The given changes are different for generating the authentication key and the signature key In generating the authentication key we set the security environment as follows a We delete the reference to the signature key CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data 00 22 41 B6 02 83 00 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 82 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet EALTIE AS b We set a reference to the authentication key to be generated CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Fixed values Key reference 00 22 41 A4 05 83 00 80 12 00 In generating the signature key we set the security environment as follows a We set a reference to the signature key to be generated CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Fixed values Key reference 00 22 41 B6 05 83 00 80 02 00 b We set a reference to the generated authentication key CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Fixed values Key reference 00 22 41 A4 05 83 00 80 12 00 Setting the authentication key reference in the generation of the signature key is needed as the EstEID card calculates a signature for the generated public key using the authentication key for both the authentication key and the signature key thus in case of the authentication key itself Therefore when renewing both keys we f
147. nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnnn 9 Appendix Table 1 6 Coding of P2 for Change Reference Daia usao aaa aaa aaa E S g Appendix Table 1 7 Ee Aa Eaa Le Ba IP D ENEIT NEIE E E TETEE NE TETEA IEO EEEE OANEI EA EEA NENEA 20 Appendix Table 1 8 Create File response APDU if the command was completed successfully uuuneeseesussenuanunnenuannnennnnnnennnnnnnnnnnnnnennnannnnnnnnn 21 Appendix Table 1 9 Create File response APDU in the event Of an error neeesesseessnssensnessnsnnnnnnnnnennnnnnnsnnnnnsnnsnnnsnnnnnennnnnnnensnsnensnnnnsnennnnnnn non 21 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 6 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A Tr b Baltic AS ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ppendix 1 ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab External Mutual Authentication command APDU
148. o 0x32 so that the key generation would be allowed and then write the record back into the file However overwriting the record in file FID EEEE 0013 requires the card centre authorisation Next we do as follows Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 80 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet GAL Tlie NS 6 Form the command to overwrite the record in the file FID EEEE 0013 The following command is to overwrite record no 4 concerning Authentication key2 Header Le Data 00 DC 04 04 4F 830412001012C00281809103FFFFFF7B 18800100A10A8B080030010302040305 E407950140890221137B11800106A103 8B010BB807950140890211307B118001 07A1038B010CB807950 14089021130 7 We change the command header as follows Header OC DC 04 04 CLA 0C means that the command is forwarded to EstEID card under secure messaging However in the given operation no session key derivation or encrypting is used Only MAC code is calculated 8 We form the following block Fixed value Data block length Lc Data block 81 4F 83 04 11 30 9 We temporarily form the following block Command header Command header The block formed in the previous step The extension of the block formed in extension to length the previous step to eightfold length 8 0C DC 04 04 80 00 00 00 81 4F 83 04 11 30 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 We calculate the
149. ommunicating with the card via card reader drivers for instance PC SC CT API etc The document includes detailed descriptions of the use of the card commands The present document is not meant or necessary for programmers designing applications using EstEID cards via higher level drivers such as Cryptok or Microsoft CSP The document requires comprehension of the general principles of smart card communication The document employs the hexadecimal numeral system unless specifically marked with the decimal number system abbreviation dec Abbreviations Abbreviation Definition MF Root directory in the security chip file system Master File ASN 1 A standard used in telecommunication and computer networking to describe encode transmit and decode the message application data unit transmitted in the network APDU The application protocol data unit of the chip Application Protocol Data Unit ASCII The standard 7 bit code table to present digitally the English alphabet and other keyboard symbols HEX The symbol for the hexadecimal numeral system BCD The presentation of numbers in a way that the first 4 and last 4 bits of each byte could be viewed as separate digits ranging 0 through 9 in the hexadecimal numeral system DEC The symbol for the decimal number system Card Management Centre The institution executing the EstEID card administration operations authorized by the chip administrator Card
150. on 24 We read the public key from the card The public key is in the file FID EEEE 1000 It is a sequence file with the length of 0x12C bytes The file structure is as follows Bytes Content 0 0x19 Fixed values 0x20 0x9F Module OxA0 0xA1 Fixed values OxA1 The length of public exponent 0x3 or 0x4 bytes OxA2 0xA4 v i OxA2 0xA5 Public exponent OxA6 0xAB Fixed values OxAC 0x12B Key signature calculated with the authentication key RSA SHA 1 PKCS 1 In order to set the given key as the current key record no 1 of the file FID EEEE 0033 the only record in the file must be modified This may take place for example after loading the certificate about the generated key onto the card The modification of record no 1 of the file FID EEEE 0033 may take place so that the record is read from the file the key reference generated into the record is replaced and then the content of the record is written back into the file The record is readily readable in the file the card centre authorisation is needed only for overwriting In order to receive the authorisation we do as follows Tr b Baltic AS Public page 85 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol e ee Let the new content of the record be as follows Fixed values Authentication Fixed values Signature key key reference reference 00 A4 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 12 00 B6 08 95 01 40 83 0
151. on of PUK or the execution of the operation secured by 3DESKey for PIN1 and by 3DESKey2 for PIN2 Both PIN codes may be unblocked by the PIN code replacement procedure Given procedure can be found from Chapter 19 6 1 PIN code replacement procedure PIN codes of EstEID card may be unblocked using two methods by using RESET RETRY COUNTER command 1 leaving the blocked PIN code the same 2 simultaneously replacing the blocked PIN code with a new one The PUK code is similarly blocked after three consecutive incorrect insertions The card with the blocked PUK code could be reactivated by the PIN code replacement procedure The blocked PUK code cannot be unblocked by the card user the given procedure can be made only by the service provider 8 1 Unblocking the PIN code by leaving the code unchanged The PIN code may be unblocked by leaving the code unchanged with the following commands 1 Verifying the PUK code PUK code number 00 PUK code length 2 Unblocking the PIN code PIN code number PIN1 01 PIN2 02 For example Let the PUK be 12345678 and the blocked PIN1 In order to unblock we send Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 22 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet AL Tlie NS 1 Verifying the PUK code CLA INS PUK oo foo foo foo fos ts 34253057 98 2 Unblocking the PIN1 code 8 2 Unblocking the PIN code by replacing the blocked PIN code with a
152. orm with CLA set to 0x10 a In case T 0 we send 1 byte with value Encrypted block 8 This form of the command is used in case a new key pair has not been generated on the card after personalisation In case the given premise cannot be used some additional operations are necessary More detailed description below Similar chaining operation is performed in chapter 15 2 Calculating the electronic signature in a card with hashing in clause 5 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 50 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet aitia WR The very last or only command has CLA value 0x00 and following form a In case T 0 we send 1 byte with value Encrypted block b In case T 1 we have to use Le as well Le 00 is given as the length of the decrypted data block in the crypto block is not known EstEID card responds with the data block in the crypto block For example We need to decrypt the block with a signature key let PIN2 be 12345 and the protocol used T 0 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default ns wo be I ha e Too caa Ins o le la le he Tom Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 51 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp T RU B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet BAL T 1e a We set the signature key for the decryption operation
153. ow it is recommended to programme the applications so that the card operations would be executed in a short period of time one after another and the card be switched off after the completion of operations receiving the results but still in the application s use Firstly the given action reduces the possibility that the user removes the card from the reader prematurely and secondly avoids the pirate code access to the card 25 6 Signing application codes Application codes must be signed so that the user could check the authenticity of the software processing the EstEID card Tr b Baltic AS Public page 116 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a A Appendix 1 MICARDO related APDU commands and responses Following appendix consists APDU command descriptions for v1 0 EstEID cards Same card behaviour is implemented also in following EstEID versions so it could mimicry the first version EstEID v1 0 card can respond to commands that are not described here Appendix consists of descriptions for commands that are used in current document Command INS Brief description See page CHANGE REFERENCE DATA 04 Changes the password for cardholder authentication 117 CREATE FILE EQ Creates a directory or data field 120 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE MUTUAL 39 Authenticates the external world external world and 424 AUTHENTICATE chip card GENERAT
154. personalisation is as follows Byte no 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B Cc D E F 10 11 12 13 14 Value 00 A4 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 11 00 B6 08 95 01 40 83 03 80 01 00 The reference of the active authentication key is in bytes no 9 A and the signature key reference in bytes no 0x13 0x14 In order to execute the decryption operation with the current key version it must be first determined which of the keys is the current one by reading record no 1 in file MF EEEE 0033 Then the security environment within the card must be modified by telling the card that the operation must be executed with the given key Thus the procedure given in clause Modify the security environment by setting a reference to the key that we want to use in the decryption operation 4 of the Chapter 16 Decrypting the session key is as follows Triib Baltic AS Public Page 54 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE NS We modify the security environment within the card by setting a reference to the key we want to use in decryption operation Read record no 1 in file FID 0033 In case we want to decrypt with the authentication key we send the following command CLA INS P1 P2 Le Key reference 00 22 41 B8 05 83 03 80 Byte no 9 in record no 1 in Byte no Ain record no 1 in file EEEE 0033 file EEEE 0033 In cas
155. ponse data Appendix Table 1 50 Read Record command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 0x Command class NS 1 B2 Command code P1 1 01a FE Number of the record that is to be read P2 1 xx Type of addressing Lc 0 Empty Data 0 Empty Le 1 00 FF Length of the response data Appendix Table 1 51 Read Record response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Tr b Baltic AS Public page 138 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet an TR Appendix Table 1 51 Read Record response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data var XXY Contents of a record Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings 62 82 Length of the response data is smaller than Le 62 81 Record and its checksum are inconsistent Appendix Table 1 52 Read Record response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00 EF to be read out is deactivated inconsistent or incorrect data 67 00 Response data has incorrect length Lc is superfluous Le is missing Le is smaller than Lr 69 81 EF to be read out is not formatted 69 82 Security conditions not fulfilled 69 86 Command not allowed no EF is selected 69 88 Incorrect data objects for secure mes
156. portion of the command BA CCT components in the data portion of the command BE DST components in the data portion of the command B8 CT components in the data portion of the command All other values RFU 1 10 PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION The command PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION PSO can be used to call a variety of cryptographic algorithms The following algorithms are offered 1 Computation of a digital signature 2 Hashing of data 3 Decryption of data These functions are specified as PSO commands They access various cryptographic algorithms and keys so you may need to adjust the security environment before you execute a PSO command This will usually be done by calling the command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT The desired PSO command is specified using parameters P1 and P2 The contained data may vary depending on which PSO command is used Appendix Table 1 33 Perform Security Operation command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 Command class 0x Final subcommand 1X Subcommand not the final command NS 1 22 Command code for PSO command P1 1 RX NY Tag ofthe data object that is used in the response data P2 1 RK YY Tag of the data object compiled from Lc and Data Lc 0 Empty 1 RX NYY Length ofthe command data Length Data 0 Empty Le XX YY Command data Value Le 0 Empty Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 131 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip
157. quence must have CLA with usual value 0x00 This informs the card that no further data is being sent EstEID applications use APDU command chaining only for signing and decrypting operations For example we have 3 blocks of data we have to send to the card In this case first two APDU commands look something similar to following with CLA byte set to 0x10 1 First APDU command CLA INS P1 P2 Le Block nr1 Le 10 XX XX XX 40 01 40 00 2 Second APDU command CLA INS P1 P2 Le Block nr1 Le 10 XX XX XX 40 01 40 00 Tr b Baltic AS Public page 115 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet oA L Tlie WS Last APDU command has CLA with value 0x00 informing the card that no more data needs to be waited from host 3 Third and last APDU command CLA INS pI P2 Lc Block nr1 Le 00 XX XX XX 32 01 32 00 Inside the card these blocks will be concatenated and ready for performing some operation with them 25 4 Variable length PIN codes The PIN and PUK codes of EstEID chip are variable length codes and the application cannot foresee the code length Thus the application must allow the entry of variable length codes 25 5 Minimising transaction time As EstEID card is used in environments where various programs are used simultaneously and the user s control over the environment is generally l
158. r PUK PUK The length of the previous As ASCII As ASCII PIN length of the new PIN For example Let the previous PIN1 be 1234 and the new PIN1 54321 We will change the PIN1 code with the following command CLA INS Previous PIN New PI Joo fa fos fost sz 3534333231 For example Let the previous PUK be 12345678 and the new PUK 1234567890 We will change the PUK code with the following command Previous PUK Now PUK c wo la lo lo hz 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 RESET RETRY COUNTER command must be used for replacing the blocked PIN codes Look chapter 8 2 Unblocking the PIN code by replacing the blocked PIN code with a new one Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 21 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE NS 8 Unblocking PIN1 and PIN2 codes In EstEID cards PIN1 PIN2 and PUK codes have retry counters with the initial value 3 In other words after three consecutive incorrect entries the codes will be blocked Each code has a separate counter the incorrect insertion of one code does not change the counters of other codes i e inserting PIN1 incorrectly does not change the counter for PIN2 and PUK incorrect insertions and does not block them The blocked PIN1 and PIN2 may be unblocked with the PUK code The retry counter may be reset with the command RESET RETRY COUNTER The execution of the given operation requires the verificati
159. rU1 0 with U marking the space character Note ATR historical bytes have not been standardised ISO 7816 4 attempts to standardise the given bytes however it has not been used in practice Thus the fact that the smart card can represent itsself as EstEID card by return an ATR similar to the EstEID one Furthermore other smart cards may be programmed in a way that they operate similarly to EstEID card The electronic attribute of the EstEID card is the secret keys on the card with its public side certified by the national certification centre and its visual attributes are the personalised security elements and the card holder s data However it may be stated that in case the card s ATR does not correspond to the EstEID card s ATR it is not a EstEID card Tr b Baltic AS Public page 16 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ap ie eo The version number has not been changed in ATR as the application is compatible with the former version However the other parts of ATR have been changed and thus also the offset of the beginning of historical bytes In order to secure the smooth operation of EstEID card with as many PC SC interface readers as possible then in case of cards with application version v1 0 and v1 1 the value of TA3 parameter the maximum length of data field has been assigned as 250 In case of cards with application version v3 0 and 3 4 the value of TA3 parameter is 254
160. raseiacassezicsaezuaeataeasaiascesegiaeaeteateszeasetacerseaieeascuatesaieccbaszvacgiaeasceatesaeasotasaraestaraveagtauates2 79 19 5 Generating certificate loading m dules 4 u me ac ea 88 19 6 Replacing PIN TOUUET EE EEE EEE EEE 94 19 6 1 PIN Gode replacement Brogeduresnuninsssuniu BEI 94 19 7 Loading and deleting additional applications iaa aaa TE IA EAEE A EEO N 99 19 8 Application loading module garnar N eoero ore naeia aeai ai aae ETEEN EA sete AOPE APEE ee teediotedesusen ete a AR iaae ee 100 19 9 Creating and deleting files 19 9 1 Filerereatllonas essen ar EEE ETERER NENNEN TEE 101 19 9 2 Pil GIS a p MeRRER NER ERTEEERRERR ER NETTER ER EERERNERTENER ER NEREENET EAREN EAEE AEAEE EEEIEE AEAEE EAE EEE 103 20 EstEID card s symmetric crypto operations 103 20 1 SBES Enerypting in CBE MOA8 under EAEE E EAEE AA EEEE E E E E A E EAE 103 20 2 IN 3DES MAC CBG Mal see euere nenne 103 20 3 SIDES MAC CF BE MR een ee oo eier 104 21 EstEID file system 105 22 Objects on EstEID card at issuance 106 23 EstEID card security structure 106 23 1 The cross table of security environments and Operations ccc cecceseeeesseeeesceeeeeceseaeeeceeeeeceeeeeceaeaeeesnaeeeseasaesesaseesaeeeeseaeaeeesseseeseeaeeeaeaeeees 106 23 2 Gommone on the Security Sn vitOMMents sf ceeds 2cce cece cecavede foes sna EAER ENEE A AARE este fades ince AE AAEREN eaten EEIE SEEE ae 108 24 EstEID card error messages 109 25 Instructions for the wri
161. required is specified in the command This command is generally used to prepare chip card input data that is to be encrypted or transferred with the protection of a cryptogram The random number supplied by the chip card is then used to prepare the input data as IcvSecureMessaging Appendix Table 1 18 Get Challenge command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 OX Command class NS 1 84 Command code P1 1 00 Fixed value P2 1 00 Fixed value Le 0 Empty Data 0 Empty Le 1 00 Length of the response data Lr 8 bytes Lr Le Ot FF Tr b Baltic AS Public page 125 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet En TR Appendix Table 1 19 Get Challenge response APDU ifthe command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data Var RX NY Random number Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 67 00 Lc is superfluous Le is missing 69 85 Could not create random number 69 86 P1 or P2 possesses an illegal value BE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent 1 7 GET RESPONSE The command GET RESPONSE is used to send response data from the chip card to the external world TIP The command is relevant only for the chip card protocol T 0 Length Contents Description CLA 1
162. ry CLA Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 46 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet aitia WR o foo dlo 2 Select catalogue EEEE 3 Set the security environment no 1 within the card 4 Verify PIN2 ca ms Pin2 Joo foo fo foe os Tas 5 As the text length is 8A bytes the hash must be calculated by using APDU command chaining and sent to the card as blocks where the length of the first two is 40 hex and the length of the last one OA bytes hex Block 80 40 st 4olhexoyie deta Dodo 80 40 Auto Jon s itjate Jv iJveosteJveoksYv iJ s idukite J haakeslJvedamisek Block 2 CLA INS P1 P2 Le 80 40 lt second 40 hex byte data block gt 10 2A 90 AO 42 80 40 sUvaiVerit6ddeUtegemiseks Vettenahtud vahemaltUneljarattaline Umootorsdiduk Block 3 CLA INS 80 L lt last 40 hex byte or shorter data block gt The card responds Tr b Baltic AS Public page 47 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE WS Bytes waiting in the Number of bytes card waiting 6 Read the calculated hash this operation may be omitted 7 Calculate the electronic signature The card responds Bytes waiting in the Number of bytes card waiting 8 Read the electronic signature from the card The card responds 80 hex bytes OK trailer 90 00 16 Decrypting the session key The d
163. s 78 C8 8 7B Ei 31 BO 93 97 AQ F8 93 SF E1 AE 6B SE 01 E8 81 A8 4F A8 CA 80 E9 A9 5F FD 02 C6 00 We have hereby reached our initial result two EstEID secure messaging session keys and an 8 byte send sequence counter have been derived The top row of the above table 78 6B is session key 1 SK1 and the row below 5E 00 is session key 2 SK2 We get the initial value of the send sequence counter as follows send sequence counter bytes 0 3 are the decrypted response block bytes OxC to OxF from the card see Reading counters in the card Chapter 12 and send sequence counter bytes 4 7 are the bytes 4 7 of the same block Thus in our example send sequence counter is SSC 05 06 07 08 D4 84 88 A3 Next we may execute the operation under EstEID security communication 10 The send sequence counter must be increased by one before each operation executed with session keys The youngest bite of the send sequence counter is on the right Thus by increasing send sequence counter by one we get SSC 05 06 07 08 D4 84 88 A4 11 We form the overwriting command for record no 1 of file FID 0010 similarly to the authorisation with PIN2 Counting starts from zero Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 62 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet a e ee CLA INS P1 P2 Le Key ID Key value in new passphrase Kured l inud kurjad ilmad 00 DC
164. s NS 1 D6 Command code P1 1 xx SFI or MSB of the offset P2 1 DORF LSB of the offset Lc 1 Oa FF Length of the command data Data Le XXN Y New data Le 0 Empty Triib Baltic AS Public Page 143 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet an ee Appendix Table 1 64 Update Binary response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty var IXY Information about the file Trailer 2 90 00 No errors and no warnings 63 CX Repeated write attempts were necessary Appendix Table 1 65 Update Binary response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 64 00 Referenced EF is deactivated user data and checksum are inconsistent inconsistent or incorrect data 65 81 Write error 67 00 Response data has incorrect length command data is missing or Lc is not equal to the length of the command data Le is superfluous 69 81 Referenced EF is not transparent 69 82 Security conditions are not fulfilled 69 86 Command not allowed no EF is selected 69 88 Incorrect data objects for secure messaging 6A 82 File not found via SFI 6A 84 Length of user data is less than offset data length 6A 86 Parameters P1 P2 incorrect 6B 00 Offset lies outside the EF 6E 00
165. saging 6A 82 File not found via SFI BA 83 Referenced record does not exist 6A 86 Parameters P1 P2 incorrect BE 00 CLA and INS are inconsistent Appendix Table 1 53 Coding of P2 for Read Record b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Description SFI usage 0 0 0 0 0 on ig na References the current EF no SFI x x x x x at bie a 5 bit SFI x x x Type of addressing 1 0 0 Absolute record number is given in P1 1 13 RESET RETRY COUNTER The command RESET RETRY COUNTER has the effect of resetting the retry counter for a password to its initial value Which password the operation refers to is specified by the parameter P2 It is also possible to replace the old password by a new one P1 00 The replacement of the old password is authorized by a resetting code password which is integrated in the command Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 139 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 NOTICE An unauthorized reset of the retry counter should be prevented for reasons of security As the execution of the command is determined by access rules e g a preceding successful authentication procedure which may be password or key based can Politsei ja Piirivalveamet rr s c be demanded Alternatively the reset can depend on a resetting code Appendix Table 1 54 Reset Retry Counter command APDU Length Contents Description CLA 1 0x Command class INS 1 20 Command co
166. se the result is as follows MAC 60 19 E8 61 7C 6D 88 25 16 We decrypt the data block received from the card using SK1 as 3DES key and send sequence counter as ICV The result is 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 80 00 00 00 00 00 17 We leave out the extension at the end giving us the session key object value 0123456789 in the form of ASCII 18 Operations with the previous key versions It is possible to execute operations on EstEID card with the previous key versions The given procedures are similar to the operations executed with current keys however the current key version must be read from file EEEE 0033 and the security environment in the card modified by setting the references to the previous key version z S ID Operations with previous key versions are not actively used in case of EstEID cards 18 1 Calculating the SSL TLS challenge response with the previous key version When calculating the SSL TLS challenge response with the previous authentication key version do as follows Tr b Baltic AS Public page 74 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Bol e ee 1 Select the Master File 2 Select catalogue EEEE 3 Set the security environment no 1 within the card 4 Read record no 1 in file FID 0033 5 Set the key reference with the command CLA INS P1 P2 Le Key reference 00 22 41 A4 05 83 03 80 Key reference value In case b
167. seeeeeseanaeeeeaeeeseaeaeeeaeaneese 29 12 2 Finding the retry counter values ieissiccccsccccesescececcoenecocsenst a E E soteceansuseccastezecacueeanes 30 12 3 Reading the passphrase retry GouERE aaa SEA SAEN 32 12 4 Reading secret Key Use COUNICIS i206 sce 5 04 Sirenen ren a Se ae enn tea nena fhe ee denn cai Reece 33 12 4 1 Determining T rentiy aclive keys VON aA 34 13 Certificates 35 13 1 The certificate file reading and its content 13 2 Reading the Certificate yon the Card cscs cece ce co EE E NE A T AE A AAS E AEE ion AA A EE E ete eee eee 36 13 3 Gertifie te loading E E PE A P E E E A E dane TA A E A O E E A E T 37 13 4 euio aa e SE HNENERI IERELE RER A EEE ESHFEIEEEREEINEEEEFEITEEREE EUER IEHNEEEREREUNENTERNEHETEERRENTERNEREEEEEULERTERTERREEEUEESOERIERERFEINERERFEEER 37 14 Calculating the response to SSL TLS challenge 39 15 Calculating the electronic signature 40 15 1 Calculating the electronic signature when the hash is ready uu2244ssnennennennesnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnennnnnnnn nenne nnnnnnnnnn nenne nnnnnn nennen 41 181 1 Calculating the electronic signature with ECC key when the hash is ready ececeseeseeeseeseseeeeeseesecsseesecseeeaeceeeeseeaeceesaeeneeeaeeeeeaeeeteaeseeeneteeeneeeaee 43 15 2 Calculating the electronic signature in a card with hashing 0 eee eceeeeseeeeeceeeeeceeeaececeaeeeceeeeeceaeaeeecnaeeecaaeaeseaeaeeesuaseesaseaeeeaaeeesaaeeeseaeaseeenas 44 16 Decr
168. sential before issuing the command EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE to use the command GET CHALLENGE to pass a random number to the external world In the variant MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE the card token that has been processed by the external world is received together with a random number that is then processed by card and sent back to the external world This makes it possible to perform mutual authentication with onlyone command Length Contents Description CLA 0x Command class NS 82 Command code P1 00 Fixed value P2 00 Fixed value Lc 01 FF Length of the command data Data Le AX YY Command data Le 0 Empty for one sided authentication 1 00 FF Length ofthe response data Appendix Table 1 11 External Mutual Authentication response APDU if the command was completed successfully Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty for one sided authentication var KAY Y Mutual authentication Trailer 2 90 00 Authentication was successful 63 CX As for 90 00 but problems with writing X indicates the number of attempts 63 CX Authentication not successful X indicates the retry counter for the key Appendix Table 1 12 External Mutual Authentication response APDU in the event of an error Length Contents Description Data 0 Empty Trailer 2 65 81 Write error 67 00 Response data has incorrect length
169. successful change of the passphrase resets the initial value of the counter 2 3 For different supported key lengths look chapter 2 1 The used encryption algorithms and key lengths Passphrases are the objects used in EstEID cards for the user authentication that could be employed similarly to PIN1 and PIN2 A more detailed use of the passphrases is given in the following part of the manual 4 EstEID card enables after certain authentication operations the generation of new key pairs The previous key pairs are stored The generation of new key pairs will be discussed below After personalisation and until the generation of new key pairs version 1 of the keys will be used Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 28 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet RT Te ae 12 1 Reading the key types module lengths and use counters on the card File MF EEEE 0013 includes altogether 16 records each of which related to one key Note In case of EstEID cards with version v1 0 there are 2 authentication keys and 2 signature keys actively used on the card In case of other application versions only 1 authentication key and 1 signature key is actively used Table 12 1 File EEEE 0013 key records The record number of file MF EEEE 0013 Name of certificate Key reference 1 Signature key 1 0x01 2 Signature key 2 0x02 3 Authentication key 1 0x11 4
170. te at the end added 12 09 2013 Table 2 1 version titles streamlined Chapter 25 1 3 note point 1 amended Chapert 25 1 3 note point 9 added Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 2 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE RR To the extent of 90 the present document is based on the EstEID user manual from 2003 This is allowed by the fact that there are no significant changes made in the EstEID cards instead only specific improvements and developments to the former card versions Abbreviations 9 Terms 10 1 The objects and operations of EstEID security chip application 11 1 1 Ihe objeets ofESIEID Sec urfity chi 2 2 2 He ee len dees tee nee enden eee eee 11 1 2 The functions of EstEID security chip objects on the card r uuensesnensnsennnnnennonesnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnsnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnntnnnnnnenennnnnenternnennn 11 13 EstEID security Chipsoperationsr zn E ENSE ANE EAEN E AEA E A ENE AEAEE A 12 2 EstEID card principles 13 2 1 The used encryption algorithms and key lengths cioara da ana n aaa Eiaeai da pE RE da api Ean KEA AE EPE AREKE REAR Aa AETERNE 13 2 1 1 EStEIB chip instruetion SOE EAEE A sense A AA AA A a A EEE EIER EITHER EEE 14 2 1 2 SU PPOrted al GOMMMIMS PSPRPEFEPIFERNEREHPERFENEFEPEFTPRFEPNEEHEREIENFELTPELTPEFTENFEEHELLTENEEETERTEEUFTETFEITEEEFERTEETEEULPELTETFETNEEEFERFEETEELTPEFEEEFIENEECHEELTENEELTPEFTECFEFTELETEL
171. ter has been successfully restored In case we wish to replace also PIN2 and PUK codes the steps 7 24 must be repeated with the respective values 19 7 Loading and deleting additional applications In order to protect the EstEID issuer rights the loading and deletion of applications on to the card must be authorised by the issuer Similarly the card issuer has the control over the structure and principles of the loaded applications EstEID card accepts commands forming new catalogues and data files only in command sequences secured by CMk3 Secure loading command sequences are formed with the key responding to APDU commands by calculating MAC codes The loading command sequences are formed as card specific by the card management centre and these are generally available The formation procedure of the additional application loading command sequence is as follows Tr b Baltic AS Public page 99 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTE ee The code forming the application is given to the card administrator The card administrator inspects the code evaluating the memory capacity used by the application etc and in case of confirmation begins to form secure loading code sequences The same procedure applies also to the application deletion command sequences Application loading may take place once PIN1 is checked in order to guarantee that the card user is aware of the operation
172. ters of the applications using the card 111 25 1 Differences between card applications 25 1 1 Differences of application version v1 1 BigilB a 111 25 1 2 Bifferences of applicatioh version Ya nateaiiteiiesaeletaniieeter lien nnlerstarhlelstauhladtan letter efananstessnargasanarstesasanseesssarsiosecoratetacansaasenarssors 112 25 1 3 Differences Of aooe VErSlOM N Aaa ee 114 25 2 Determining the card application volsin sssaaa E SE EESE 114 25 3 Card APDU message Chaining ssisscccict cescscctssdecos secezecd sscccaat a a E NE 115 25 3 1 APDU Gomimanid Gai scccces ccc EAE E E EEEE T EA EET EE EE IEE E E EAP EA AE E EEA 115 25 4 Variable length PIN COd S scn ERRLERPESLESETERFERERE 116 25 5 Minimising transaction time ea nenne 116 25 6 Signing Application COMOS ieaiai EE EAE EEEE 116 Appendix 117 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 5 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp y Politsei ja Piirivalveamet T R J B Cc AS 1 MICARDO related APDU commands and responses 117 1 1 Command Glass aaa 117 1 2 CHANGE REFERENCE DATA 0040er kann santas RAR aan 118 1 3 GREATE FILE aao re en cccv cea aceudasu sccvue auc esto ESE E yc va sted scatens N EENAA AE A E REENER 120 1 4 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE sissors nininini Eaa eaa ctescsetcetaceaacdedcanccuisstesscesstea sede cten cdebesesceaasaea scecatesetdasaesshsdeanecdse 121 1 5 GENERATE PUBLIC KEY PA oroesiad fescue dees rade
173. th the command READ RECORD 5 We read record no 1 from the file with the command READ RECORD Pt record number wo deo bwo oe o In case protocol T 0 is used Le may also be omitted Le is 0 as the record length is not known In case protocol T 0 is used the card responds The card has bytes waiting The number of bytes waiting length of surname Read the surname from the card oo Joo foo foo Tengmotsumame The card response using T 1 protocol we immediately get the following response Surname OK Trailer 90 00 Other records are read in a similar manner 11 Card user s secret keys EstEID card has two secret keys that are respectively related to the certificate enabling digital identification of the card user and the certificate enabling the digital signature by the card user The secret keys are generated 1 initially during the card personalisation within the card 2 during the new key pair generation procedure also within the card Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 27 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 6 eei Orrie Politsei ja Piirivalveamet c AS T T j he secret keys cannot be read from the card The key length is 2048 bits for v1 and v2 cards it is 1024 bits and EstEID saves the key in CRT format he public exponent of the secret keys is generated as a random value except for v3 4 cards where the exponent value could be also fixed value 65537
174. the decryption with the signature key The reverse will lead to an error situation Let our passphrase2 be See on minu paroollause2 And the crypto block including the session key with the length of 0x80 bytes as follows 21 A6 B9 E1 3DESKey2 derived from the passphrase has been calculated as in chapter 17 3 2 30 A1 DB 94 DF 29 BC 65 A8 17 25 2B A6 73 88 FE 9B 7B D6 43 1 Set security environment no 2 in Master File and security environment no 7 in EEEE catalogue Therefore Select Master File CLA INS P1 P2 00 A4 00 oc Set the security environment no 2 within the card CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 02 Select catalogue EEEE i There is no data on the possibility of calculating the electronic signature with passphrase authorisation and hash use on the card On the other hand there is also no immediate need for the given operation as the passphrase is used in larger full keyboard devices which have the hash function included in the system software and there is no need for hashing on the card Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 70 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet ALTI NS CLA INS P1 P2 Lc FID 00 A4 01 oc 02 EE EE Set the security environment no7 within the card CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 07 2
175. to 3DESKeys Card user authentication a b card user authentication with PIN1 PIN2 and PUK card user authentication with 3DESKey1 and 3DESKey2 Operations with secret keys Card management operations a b Replacing authentication objects Generating new key pairs Loading certificates Loading and deleting additional applications Forming secure loading command series 2 EstEID card principles 2 1 EstEID card application version 3 0 supports operations with the following keys Table 2 1 EstEID card application versions properties The used encryption algorithms and key lengths v1 1 v1 0 v3 0 v3 4 DigilD Implementation platform MICARDO Multos Java Card 1024 1280 1536 RSA module length 1024 bits 2048 bits 1984 2048 bits Hash algorithm support SHA 1 SHA 224 SHA 1 SHA 224 SHA 256 SHA 384 SHA 512 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 13 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Politsei ja Piirivalveamet SKAEHT Table 2 1 EstEID card application versions properties v1 1 v1 0 v3 0 v3 4 DigilD The RSA key length of the same security level 160 bits 1024 bits ECC module lengths Not supported R 192 bits 1536 bits 224 bits 2048 bits 256 bits 3072 bits PKCS 1 padding support v1 5 Protocol support T 0 T 1 T 0 T 0 T 1 T 0 T 1 Note Module lengths of 1280 1536 and 1984 are not actively used in case of EstE
176. ty communication is used in the command 15 We temporarily form the following block Command header extended to the length 8 bytes Il Command data field extended to the eightfold length In our case oC DC 01 04 80 00 00 00 87 19 01 08 BB 57 9A AB 1B A2 B5 D5 BB 1E 83 16 Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 63 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet baicie F FO AC F8 94 DD 24 7F CF 16 F9 FB 80 00 00 00 00 16 We calculate the MAC code of the block in 3DES CFB mode using SK1 as the key and send sequence counter as ICV The result is as follows MAC 87 94 E4 7E E2 CB 00 1F 17 We form the final command adding MAC code to the command formed in clause 14 and establish Lc value If necessary also Le is added using T 1 protocol which is always 0 CLA INS P1 P2 Le Fixed value Length of Fixed Crypto block Fixed value Fixed Calculated the next value from clause 13 value MAC code block oc DC 01 04 25 87 19 01 08 FB 8E 08 87 1F The given command is sent to the card The card responds as follows Fixed values OK Trailer Fixed values Response MAC OK Trailer 99 02 90 00 8E 08 51 CB 48 70 4D 6C DA 4C 90 00 OK Trailer 90 00 shows that the security communication operated correctly OK Trailer 90 00 shows also that the c
177. v1 1 and v3 0 cards respond with error trailer Ox6A86 v1 0 cards respond with error trailer 0x6985 instead 10 v1 1 cards respond to key operations like INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE if the required PIN has not been verified with 0x6985 Conditions of use not satisfied instead of 0x6982 Security status not satisfied 11 Certificate loading to cards during personalization is actively used only in case of v1 1 cards 1 25 1 2 Differences of application version v3 0 v3 0 cards answer with OK trailer 0x9000 to all application selection commands application recognition with SELECT FILE regardless of whether there is an application with the given AID present in the card or not a Due to responding with 0x9000 to all application selection commands v3 0 cards get auto detected as NIST SP 800 73 I PIV cards in Windows 7 b Additionally in some cases after responding with 0x9000 to selecting an application that is not present in the card version v3 0 cards erroneously respond to an undocumented APDU 80 20 00 00 ISO VERIFY with a proprietary CLA byte with 0x6984 Incorrect reference data and decrease the PUK retry counter value If the application selection is called out repeatedly then eventually the PUK code s retry counter expires and the code gets blocked Tr b Baltic AS Public page 112 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet aTi e RR 2 v3 0 cards respond to applicat
178. vious values The replacement of PIN codes requires the following two operations 1 Overwriting the file records storing PIN code values 2 Initialising the retry counters 19 6 1 PIN code replacement procedure We will consider the PIN code replacement procedure on the basis of the following example Let the card user s personal identification number be 01234567890 new PIN1 1234 new PIN2 12345 and new PUK 12345678 1 The retry counter may be initialised only if its value is O the card is blocked Thus we need to read the retry counter values from the card see Chapter 12 and in case these are not zeros we execute the PIN control operation with the incorrect PIN code until the counter values are zeros 2 We select the Master file CLA INS P1 P2 00 A4 00 oc 3 We select FID 0012 the given file stores the PIN code values Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 94 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet EALTIE AS CLA INS P1 p2 FID 00 A4 02 oc 00 12 4 We set the security environment no 4 in the Master file CLA INS P1 P2 00 22 F3 04 Next we derive the session key similarly to the procedures in Chapter 17 3 2 The card s CMK1 is used as 3DES key with the sequence number 1 In our case SK1 19 EB A2 29 ED EC 4F E9 E9 27 B4 FC 35 9E 8F DF SK2 36 C3 42 23 9C B6 7F OB EC 3B 04
179. vironment no 6 within the card 4 Modify the security environment by deleting the reference to the authentication key i e tell the card that there is no need for authentication operations w l la te ost 5 Modify the security environment by deleting the reference to the signature key i e tell the card that there is no need for signing operations w be n dle he w 6 Modify the security environment by setting a reference to the key that we want to use in the decryption operation In case we want to decrypt with the authentication key we send the following command For more detailed information on the operations see Appendix Chapter MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Triib Baltic AS Public page 49 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q T RU B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Eh jum Ins I he he Tori loo d a Sw fos lesonsornon In case we want to decrypt with the signature key we send the following command u he soson 7 In case we want to decrypt with the authentication key we verify PIN1 code 8 We send the card the command to decrypt the block The length of the encrypted block is 80 bytes as the length of the keys used is 1024 hex bits If the session key to be decrypted exceeds the maximum APDU length encrypted session key must be sent successively as blocks In the case of commands chaining all commands except the very last one have the following f
180. y date dd mm yyyy 10 bytes 0 Place of birth 35 bytes 1 Date of issuance dd mm yyyy 10 bytes 2 Type of residence permit 50 bytes 13 Notes line 1 50 bytes 4 Notes line 2 50 bytes 5 Notes line 3 50 bytes 6 Notes line 4 50 bytes Note Application versions v3 0 and v3 4 have card numbers with the length of 9 bytes instead of 8 bytes This should be taken into account when reading the Document number record from the personal data file See chapter 25 1 2 Differences of application version v3 0 for more information Note v3 0 cards have the personal data file MF EEEE 5004 records padded with spaces which should be taken into account when parsing the records See chapter 25 1 2 Differences of application version v3 0 for more information 10 1 Reading data from the personal data file The personal data file content is always readable authentication is not required In order to read the information do the following 1 Select the Master File MF with the command SELECT FILE After the initial loading the given command may be omitted as the directory has been selected by default Tr b Baltic AS Public page 25 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 Q TR I B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet AL Tlie NS 2 Select the catalogue EEEE with the command SELECT FILE 3 Select the file 5044 with the command SELECT FILE The command is given so that the EstEID card responds with the file header In
181. y dependent on the card user but authorised by the card centre The permission is given by cryptographic methods The card management system enables the execution of four operation types related to EstEID cards 1 Generating certificate loading codes in order to replace a certificate on a EstEID card for instance after the expiry of the validity of the present certificate and the issuance of a new one the certificate must be converted into a so called special loading code The loading codes can be generated only by the card centre with a respective secret key Tr b Baltic AS Public page 76 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR A B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet RL TEN TE 2 Authorization of setting new PIN and PUK codes to the card if the PUK code s value is unknown in the given operation new PIN and PUK codes are set to the card without the need for previous codes The card holder identity is identified by non electronic means and in order to avoid the abuse of the operation a respective system of organisational measures must be developed 3 Generating the modules for loading additional applications onto the card it is possible to load also other applications onto the EstEID card however this can only take place with the permission of the qualified institution The additional application loading is technically supervised by the card centre EstEID card accepts additional applications only when converted into
182. ypting the session key 48 16 1 The derivation of the session keys with ECC keys unnuseensnsennnsnrnnnnnsnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnsnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnsntnnnnnnnnntnnnnnsnnnnsennnntnnnnnsernensnsnnnntennnennn 52 16 2 Session key decryption in case a new key pair has been generated on the card after personalisation 17 Setting and changing passphrases executing operations by identifying the user with passphrases 55 17 1 The general principles of using PassphFaSaS 2 2 22 24 22 z2 2 cassia ER Aa E A EL Rania aaie eae AAEN AE AIEEE RR ens 55 17 2 Deriving 3DES key from the passphrase 17 3 Setting passphrases Onto the Gad osionsa A cadeseedsddecsdscegecued stsecscs sodedend stewseuessaedoctadansccecedecsenstaues 57 7 31 Setting the passphrase byauthorising with PIN2 Code cccsiececasecucesncesacestoncnsectvecnsesirechtestonstiacdsccbieeuoeablastonchiectosetsestusebiestoesbtectonsbsestueehiesioedrastoniieey 58 7 3 2 Setting the passphrase by authorising with the former passphrase u s224s0ussannsonsnnnnnnonnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnannnnnnnnnnnnnn 59 17 4 Executing operations with passphrase authorisation eursesnensesnnnnnsnnnnnnnennnnnsnnnnnnnnnnnsnnnnnsnnnnnnnnnnnntnnnnnnnnnnnsnsnnnnnsnnnnnsnnnnnnsnnnnnnnnansnnn 65 7 4 1 Calculating the response 10 SSIL TES GhallenG WUPERPEFERTPPRFPRLPFFEPFPEREPFFERTEEFFPEFLPFFERTPEREEEFEFFFEEPEFEEFFEETEEEFECFERTPEFTPEFTEFFEEFELE
183. ytes no 9 and A from file FID 0033 are 1100 the key reference value is 1200 and vice versa in order to use the non current key version in the operation execution 6 Verify PIN1 7 Send the card the command to calculate the challenge response CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Challenge length Challenge Le 00 88 00 00 24 pari 80 8 The format of the card response does not differ from the response received in the operation executed with the current key In case passphrases are used for authorisation the reading of file FID EEEE 0033 and the setting of key references must be executed between the procedures of clause 1 and 2 see Setting the passphrase by authorising with the former passphrase Chapter 17 3 2 i e after setting the security environment and prior to deriving the session keys 18 2 Calculating the electronic signature with the previous key version In order to calculate the electronic signature with the previous key version do as follows see also Chapter 15 Calculating the electronic signature 1 Select the Master File 2 Select catalogue EEEE 3 Set the security environment no 1 within the card 4 Read record no 1 in file FID 0033 5 Set the key reference with the command Tr b Baltic AS Public Page 75 147 TB SPEC EstEID Chip App 20120611 amp TR J B Politsei ja Piirivalveamet Dee CLA INS P1 P2 Le Key reference 00 22 41 B6 05 8

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