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0562b218 DC2000 Security Target _CC_.001

1. The asset under threat is the user s data 6 2 3 3 Threat Agent Expertise Assuming that an appropriate encryption algorithm is used its implementation is not flawed and that key material has not been leaked a high level of expertise is required to successfully gain plaintext from encrypted data Resource The resource requirements to mount an attack of this type are high a very large amount of computing power either distributed or within one unit would be required Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high Vulnerabilities Exploited If a vulnerability were present in the TOE s encryption algorithm or in its implementation this may be exploited to decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success Opportunity Where such encrypted data is present in the insecure domain the opportunity for the threat agent to mount this attack is high 6 2 4 Exposure of Secret Authentication Key Inter document Reference T_access_to_secret_authentication_key This is a threat to the DC2K Secret authentication keys although not loaded into the unit are used to generate signed key exchange certificates If it were possible for an attacker to gain access to such material as it exists externally to the unit it may be possible for him to ultimately determine the key used to encrypt the user s data and then use the key to decrypt
2. 0562B218 001 32 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria Expertise A high level of expertise is required Firstly the threat agent would have to generate a signed Certificate Authority whose authenticity would be verified by the DC2K application and load it into the unit together with known key exchange keysets authorised by that CA Secondly even having achieved this he would have to efficiently exhaust over all possible values of one time random input to the key exchange algorithm to be able to determine the key encryption key established between the two units and subsequently determine the data encryption key Resource An extremely high level of resource is required both to generate the signed CA and to determine the one time random input to the key encryption key generation process Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is also high In particular repeated application of this attack could give rise to the successful decryption of traffic within the entire lifetime of the CA Vulnerabilities Exploited If a vulnerability were present in the DC2K s certificate authentication implementation or in the data authentication algorithm used this may be exploited to decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success Opportunity Where an attacker has access to the unit into which
3. OBE_transmit_data_through_TOE OBE_apply_suitable_TOE_mode_to_data OBE_protect_key_material 0562B218 001 6 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence OBE_protect_algorithms OBE_protect_keyed_unit OBE_check_for_unit_tamper 3 4 Security Functions SF_DC2K_data_authentication_implementation SF_DC2K_key_exchange_algorithm SF_DC2K_encryption_algorithm SF_SGSS_data_authentication_implementation SF_SGSS_Random_Number_Generator SF_SGSS_alarm_circuitry 0562B218 001 7 DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 4 Introduction 4 1 Security Target Identification 4 1 1 Security Target Information Security Target Title Datacryptor 2000 Security Target Common Criteria Part Number 0562B218 Version Number 001 4 1 2 Target of Evaluation Information TOE Title Datacryptor 2000 Top Level Part Numbers Datacryptor 2000 1600x320 Datacryptor Advanced Performance 1600A371 1600C371 1600L371 1600M371 Part Numbers Datacryptor 2000 1600A321 Rev 5 8 1600B321 Rev 006 1600E321 Rev 7 Datacryptor Advanced Performance 1600A372 Rev 3 1600L372 Rev 1 1600M372 Rev 1 Note that the issued version of a unit can be confirmed by contacting Thales e Security Software Version Numbers Datacryptor 2000 Application Software 3 41 Datacryptor Advanced Performance Application Software 3 511 Evaluation to
4. The Datacryptor 2000 consists of the following modules e The SGSS application e The Datacryptor 2000 application e The encryption and key exchange algorithms which are externally loaded 5 4 1 SGSS Software Application The SGSS application runs on the SGSS It consists of a secure bootstrap program that initialises the DC2K system and confirms the authenticity of the Datacryptor 2000 application subsequently loaded Once the Datacryptor 2000 application has been loaded and its authenticity verified by the bootstrap operational control passes from the SGSS application to the DC2K application 5 4 2 Datacryptor 2000 Software Application The DC2K application provides the following functions e Cryptographic verification of encryption algorithms key exchange algorithms Certificate Authorities and key exchange certificates subsequently loaded e Authentication of key exchange protocol as described in 2 section 4 2 1 validation of public data exchange e Unit to management centre communication protocol and data path e Unit to unit communication protocol and data path support e Interface to encryption and key exchange algorithms 5 4 3 Key Exchange Algorithm The externally loaded key exchange algorithm provides the unit with the capability to securely derive a shared key with another unit which can subsequently be used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted between the two units see section 5 4 4 This protocol is explained fully
5. to prevent both unauthorised and authorised access to cryptographic key values see section 8 1 1 4 This means that FCS_CKM 4 is effectively subsumed by FPT_PHP 3 Resistance to Physical Attack Thus dependency FCS_CKM 4 is not relevant in the context of Datacryptor 2000 11 3 3 2 Management of Security Attributes 0562B218 001 58 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria FMT_MSA 2 In the manner in which they are described in 1 management of security attributes is a function that is most meaningful in the context of a typical software security product or system In such a situation users might log on to administratively assigned accounts using unique user IDs and passwords and they may be restricted to only performing certain actions e g read write on files with certain ownership criteria e g owner group all In the context of the TOE however the capability to view and alter security attributes such as key lifetimes unit alarm settings etc rather than to the information under protection itself is performed by establishing an encrypted management session between a management centre and the unit under management Individuals performing these tasks are simply considered as authorised or unauthorised and as stated in section 9 1 7 it is assumed that only authorised individuals have access to the key material Individuals without access to the appropriate key mate
6. DC2K baseboard The SGSS contains all components relevant to the secure operation of the unit The board is subjected to physical protection using a mesh and resin technique Alarm circuitry provided within the SGSS detects intrusion and voltage attacks as well as movement extremes of temperature and pressing the erase button where the user enables these alarms In the event of an alarm all the unit s sensitive contents are erased The baseboard provides the power interface and basic communications support The unit operates within the temperature range 5 C to 40 C and may be stored within the temperature range 5 C to 60 C 5 3 1 Peripherals As well as the unit itself the following items are supplied to the customer e external power supply e network and host cables as necessary e CD containing unit management software and product installation and user manuals Network and host cables are supplied where necessary to provide the physical and electrical conversion required between the Datacryptor 2000 s proprietary external connectors and the communications protocol used by the customer 0562B218 001 12 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria The management software a standard Windows application runs on a PC and provides the customer with the capability to configure the unit s security and communications settings as required 5 4 Logical Description
7. Developer defined life cycle MOE cececsssssssssssesessseseceseseseseseseseeeseeeseseseeeseeeseseeeeeeteteeeeeee 9 2 16 ALC_TAT 1 Well defined development tools cececssscesssesesssesesessssseceseceseseceseseseeeseseseeeseseeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeees 9 2 17 ATE COV 2 ANGlySis Of covera b Crerccccas dares leseishzeeashessdchssuedeise cat aeitharesondh deta aa ea a 9 2 18 ATE_DPT 1 Testing high level design 9 2 19 ATE_FUN 1 Functional testing c cccccccccsecsccsessesseeseseseeeees 9 2 20 ATE_IND 2 Independent testing sample 9 2 21 AVA_MSU 2 Validation of analysis 9 2 22 AVA_SOF 1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation 9 2 23 AVA_VLA 2 Developer vulnerability ANALYSIS ececesesssesesssecesessssseceseceseseseeeseseeeceseseseeeseseeeseseeeeteneeeeeee 50 0562B218 001 2 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 11 1 GENERAL STATEMEN TED s2 c52csccsecdecsccs des o6s T A T E E AE AE ETEEN 11 2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE s ssssesesseseseseosesessesoseseeoesesessesesosresoseoossesossonesseoesoseesesesossesoseooesesossesesosoesosee 11 3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ccccssssssssessesscessessesssssssecescescssessesaessecaessesssesesseseeseccesseeseaseaseascascascnaens 11 3 1 Environment Assumptions 11 3 2 Functional Requirements seseris 11 3 3 Dependencies of Functional Requirements 11 3 4 Assurance Requirements 11 3 5 Security Requirements are Mutually Supportive
8. Exploited Within the definition of the threat the asset has not been subject to the protection of the TOE Therefore no TOE vulnerabilities need be exploited in order to mount a successful attack Opportunity If the threat agent has obtained access to the secure domain either by virtue of authorisation or by breaching physical security measures opportunity to mount the attack is high Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 12 Loading of Malicious Application Code Inter document Reference T_application_replacement This is a threat to the DC2K Amongst other security critical functions the Datacryptor 2000 s application code controls the cryptographic protection measures that are provided to the user s data If that application were 0562B218 001 29 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria replaced by a rogue application that subverted the security provided by the application it is possible that data keys and algorithms could all be exposed 6 2 12 1 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_data A_user_key A_user_algorithm The assets at threat from this attack are the user s data keys and algorithms 6 2 12 2 Attack The attack requires the generation of a substitute application that induces insecurity into the system In addition the application must be formatted and digitally signed by the secret authentication key corresponding to the public
9. FCS_COP 1 key_management OBT_SGSS_provide_resistance_to_physical_a FPT_PHP 3 ttack OBT_SGSS_provide_secure_application_ FCS_COP 1 load OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_algorithm_ FCS_COP 1 load OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_CA_load FCS_COP 1 OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_ FCS_COP 1 exchange_keyset_load Table 3 IT functional requirements required to meet each of the TOE s security objective 0562B218 001 56 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria Table 3 lists each of the security objectives identified in section 7 and for each applies sufficient IT functional requirements taken from section 8 1 1 to meet the objective Since every security objective is met the IT functional requirements are sufficient to meet all of the security objectives In addition where each objective is met by exactly one IT functional requirement it follows that the functional requirement must be necessary as well as sufficient to meet the objective Each security objective from Table 3 is considered below where the indicated IT functional requirements are shown to meet it The objective OBT_DC2K_provide_data_confidentiality is for the TOE to provide the option of a confidentiality service to all data transmitted through it Data confidentiality is achieved using encryption and is fully covered by the data encryption component of the functional requirement FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic Operation Th
10. MEASURES neria a E R E E EE EATE E E EE R E 9 2 1 ACM_AUT 1 Partial CM automation 9 2 2 ACM_CAP 4 Generation support and acceptance procedures 9 2 3 ACM_SCP 2 Development tools CM coverage 9 2 4 ADO_DEL 2 Detection of modification 9 2 5 ADO_IGS 1 Installation generation and start up procedures 9 2 6 ADV_FSP 2 Fully Defined External Interfaces cccscscsssesesesesesesesesseseeieseseseseseseseseseseseseseseeeaeneeaeaeeneseaesees 9 2 7 ADV_HLD 2 Security enforcing high level design scssssseseseseseseseseseeeeseseseseseseseseseceseseneaeseseneaeseseneaeaees 9 2 8 ADV_IMP 1 Subset of the Implementation of the TSF i sscssssssesessssssseseseeseseseeseseneseseseseseseneaeseneneneaeaeaees 9 2 9 ADV_LLD 1 Descriptive low level design cssesesesesessseseseseseseseseseceseseseseseseseseseseseseseseseaeseseseaeaeseaeaeaeseaeaeaees 9 2 10 ADV_RCR 1 Informal correspondence demonstration eceecscseescsseceresesesecssesececeseseseseeeseseseeeeeeeseeteeeeeee 9 2 11 ADV_SPM 1 Informal TOE security policy model e cececsesessssesesssesesecsseseneceseseseseceseseeeseseseseeeeeeeeeeeeeetees 9 2 12 AGD_ADM LAAmMinistrator guidance o scecccecsecsesesssesesssesesssesesesessssssesssessssesescssesssesessesesesaesessaesecsesseeenes 9 2 13 AGD USR J User guidance oien eee A RARE EEEa eA PE EEA EEOSE TE SEES EAn 9 2 14 ALC_DVS 1 Identification of security Measures cceesssseecssesecesseeseseseseseseseseseceseseseseseseeeseeeeeseeeeeeteeeere 9 2 15 ALC_LCD 1
11. addition some dependencies themselves have further dependencies as shown below IT functional Requirements FCS_CK M 1 FCS_CKM 2 FCS_CKM 4 FMT_MSA 2 FCS _CKM 4 FMT_MSA 2 FCS_CKM 2 FCS_CKM 1 0562B218 001 57 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria FCS_CKM 4 FCS_CKM 1 FMT_MSA 2 FMT_MSA 2 ADV_SPM 1 see section 11 3 4 FDP_ACC 1 FDP_ACF 1 FMT_SMR 1 FIA_UID 1 FCS_COP 1 Table 4 IT Functional Requirements Dependencies with claimed IT functional requirements in bold type Table 4 shows the dependencies of components with iterated dependencies of dependencies It should be noted that only those components in bold i e FCS_CKM 1 FCS_CKM 2 FCS_COP 1 and FPT_PHP 3 have been claimed as IT functional requirements for the Datacryptor 2000 Taking each unclaimed dependency in turn the following sections provide a rationale as to why these dependencies are inappropriate and or irrelevant in the context of the Datacryptor 2000 evaluation 11 3 3 1 Cryptographic Key Destruction FCS_CKM 4 The Datacryptor 2000 disables cryptographic keys as a result of key expiry or a deletion request from the user However such disabling does not constitute key destruction as such it simply ensures that the keys are unavailable for subsequent use by the product Unlike a standard software system or product the Datacryptor employs physical protection measures
12. in 2 section 4 2 2 steps 1 8 and section 4 1 1 steps 1 5 5 4 4 Encryption Algorithm The externally loaded encryption algorithm provides the DC2K with the capability to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted and received respectively 5 4 5 Excluded Product Functionality Functionality excluded from the TOE includes 0562B218 001 13 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria e Use of the communications ports other than in respect of the cryptographic protection given to user traffic e g remote monitoring via the network port using network management utilities via the network port e Hot Standby functionality e Remote Unit Management 0562B218 001 14 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 6 Target of Evaluation Security Environment 6 1 Assumptions 6 1 1 Assumed Usage The assumed usage of the Datacryptor 2000 is as shown in figure 1 of section 5 2 to provide data confidentiality to the user s information and data assets Additionally it is assumed that the Datacryptor 2000 s data confidentiality capability will be applied to all sensitive data to be passed between two secure domains over an insecure domain and that appropriate policies exist with respect to e Choice of Key lifetime use of keys for prolonged periods may allow cryptanalysis e Enabling of motion sensor as approp
13. include Communications protocols Datacryptor 2000 Link Frame Relay and IPS SMb Datacryptor Advanced Performance IP10 10Mb and IP100 10 100Mb Evaluation to exclude RoHS compliant version Communications protocols Datacryptor 2000 Link Channelised Link Channelised E1 or T1 Frame Relay E1 X 25 IP Trunk mode Datacryptor Advanced Performance Link E3 T3 0562B218 001 8 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria Cryptographic Algorithms Key Exchange Algorithms Diffie Hellman ANSI X9 42 Hybrid1 Data Encryption Algorithms Triple DES Data Encryption Standard as specified in FIPS PUB 46 3 AES 128 256 Advanced Encryption Standard as specified in FIPS PUB 197 Evaluation to exclude AES 192 Data Authentication Algorithms DSA Digital Signature Algorithm as specified in FIPS PUB 186 2 Data Hashing Algorithms SHA 1 Secure Hash Algorithm as specified in FIPS PUB 180 2 This Security Target has been derived using 1 4 2 Security Target Overview The Datacryptor 2000 DC2K is a range of network encryption products that support several different network protocols e g IP Frame Relay etc The primary purpose of the product is to provide data confidentiality It has been designed with flexibility in mind and provides a secure soft upgrade capability to change the network protocol and cryptographic algorithms supported The DC2K uses public key
14. of a Key Exchange Keyset prior to its loading and use This reduces the likelihood of a successful attack Therefore the security objectives are suitable to counter all identified threats 11 3 Security Requirements Rationale 11 3 1 Environment Assumptions Environment Objectives Environment Assumptions defined in section 6 1 OBE_protect_secure_domain 6 1 1 1 6 1 2 OBE_transmit_data_through_TOE 6 1 1 1 6 1 3 3 OBE_apply_suitable_TOE_mode_to_data 6 1 1 1 6 1 3 1 Table 2 Environment Assumptions required to meet each Environment Objective Table 2 lists each of the environment objectives identified in section 7 and for each applies sufficient environment assumptions taken from section 6 1 to meet the objective Since every environment objective is met the environment assumptions are sufficient to meet all of the environment objectives In addition where each objective is fulfilled by exactly one assumption it follows that the assumptions must be necessary as well as sufficient to meet the objective While some objectives require more than one assumption to be fully met it is clear that these are consistent with the standard operation of a secure environment For example protection of key material as identified by objective OBE_protect_key_material requires both e procedural measures to physically protect key material 6 1 3 2 and e trusted personnel to perform this duty 6 1 3 4 and the same arguments f
15. of expertise is required to successfully generate an algorithm that will be verified by the DC2K application Resource The resource requirements to mount an attack of this type are extremely high a very large amount of computing power either distributed or within one unit would be required to generate an algorithm whose authenticity would be verified by the DC2K application Furthermore the only way to achieve the attack is by iteratively generating and attempting to load the algorithms into a unit 0562B218 001 31 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high A sufficiently insecure algorithm might yield plaintext and keys to the threat agent Vulnerabilities Exploited If a vulnerability were present in the DC2K s algorithm authentication implementation or in the data authentication algorithm used this may be exploited to decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success Opportunity Where an attacker has access to the unit into which to load a rogue algorithm either by virtue of being provided with authorised access or by breaching physical security measures the opportunity for the threat agent to mount this attack is present Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 14 Loading of Certificate Authorities Known to the At
16. some cases the cryptographic algorithms used to provide data and key confidentiality services to the user are sensitive Exposure of such a sensitive cryptographic algorithm when it is stored externally to the unit may be undesirable for political reasons and possibly assists future cryptanalysis 0562B218 001 25 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 6 2 8 1 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_algorithm The asset under threat is the user s sensitive cryptographic algorithms 6 2 8 2 Attack The attack is to gain access to the user s sensitive cryptographic algorithms wherever those may be stored with intent to gain expertise in cryptanalysis of the user s communications 6 2 8 3 Threat Agent Expertise A low level of expertise is required When stored externally to the unit the algorithm is not subject to any technical protection Resource Limited resource is required Motivation Since the value of the asset is high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high In particular information gained from this attack could be used to determine information about protective measures applied by other secure applications owned by the user Vulnerabilities Exploited Within the definition of the threat the asset has not been subject to the protection of the TOE Therefore no TOE vulnerabilities need be exploited in order to mount a successf
17. this functionality the management centre has the encryption and key exchange capabilities that are equivalent to those of the Datacryptor 2000 unit However the unit rather than the management centre enforces security by failing to act on a management request if it cannot decrypt it In order to be able to successfully decrypt data sent to it by the management centre both entities must be using the same key for data encryption Similarly in order to agree a common key both entities must successfully complete the key exchange protocol This requires the management centre to have access to key material that has been authorised by the same CA as the unit is operating under It is assumed that only authorised individuals have access to such key material 9 2 Assurance Measures In the sections that follow nor italic font is used to state the developer actions of the assurance requirements extracted directly from 1 and italic font describes the evaluation deliverables that will provide the necessary assurance 9 2 1 ACM AUT 1 Partial CM automation Developer action elements ACM_AUT 1 1D The developer shall use a CM system ACM_AUT 1 2D The developer shall provide a CM plan TOE development conforms to the Project Filing Procedure provided at 3 The plan describes the use of automated tools for configuration management 9 2 2 ACM_CAP 4 Generation support and acceptance procedures Developer action elements ACM_CAP 4 1D The developer
18. validation is successful 9 1 4 4 2 Key Exchange Protocol During the key exchange protocol see 2 section 4 2 1 units exchange signed key exchange certificates Both units must positively verify that the keyset has been authorised by a CA that they are operating under before proceeding to generate a shared key encryption key The DC2K application s data authentication implementation is used for this purpose 0562B218 001 44 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria Note that this procedure is identical whether a unit is communicating with another unit or with the management centre Inter document Reference SF_DC2K_data_authentication_implementation 9 1 5 DC2K Key Exchange Algorithm A secure key exchange algorithm allows two units or a unit and a management centre to establish a common Key Encryption Key KEK without either party having to transmit any secret data An implementation of a secure key exchange algorithm as listed in section 4 1 2 is used for this purpose which requires the input of both parties signed public and secret keys In addition to these values each unit inputs a random one time public secret key pair using the SGSS random number generator ensuring that every KEK generated between the two parties is unique This algorithm is discussed in detail in 2 sections 4 2 2 steps 1 8 and 8 2 Inter document Reference SF_DC2K_key_exchange_al
19. were possible for an attacker to gain access to such material as it exists externally to the unit it may be possible for him to ultimately determine the key used to encrypt the user s data and then use the key to decrypt encrypted data There are three means by which access may be provided to a threat agent e An individual with authorised access to the material may leak the data intentionally or unintentionally e An unauthorised individual may breach physical measures to gain access to the material e The unit may be commissioned with secret key material over an unprotected link or network to which a threat agent may have access 6 2 5 1 Attack Long term secret keys are input by both units participating in the KEK derivation algorithm and in some modes of operation these are loaded from an external source However the algorithm also utilises relatively substantial quantities of one time random data generated by the unit s themselves This random data is never exposed outside the unit Assuming that the units random number generator is operating properly a threat agent would have to guess or exhaust over these random values to be able to determine the key encryption key and subsequently the data encryption key used 6 2 5 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_key A_user_data The asset under threat is the user s secret key exchange algorithm keys exposure of which may subsequently lead to exposure of the user s dat
20. 1 Informal correspondence demonstration Developer action elements ADV_RCR 1 1D The developer shall provide an analysis of correspondence between all adjacent pairs of TSF representations that are provided Reference 14 provides an analysis of the correspondence between all adjacent pairs of the TSF 9 2 11 ADV_SPM 1 Informal TOE security policy model Developer action elements ADV_SPM 1 1D The developer shall provide a TSP model ADV_SPM 1 2D The developer shall demonstrate correspondence between the functional specification and the TSP model A TOE Security Policy Model along with a correspondence with the TOE functional specification is provided in 15 9 2 12 AGD_ADM 1Administrator guidance Developer action elements AGD_ADM 1 1D The developer shall provide administrator guidance addressed to system administrative personnel The TOE is shipped with a manual This is provided at reference 10 and 11 9 2 13 AGD_USR 1 User guidance Developer action elements AGD_USR 1 1D The developer shall provide user guidance The TOE is shipped with a manual This is provided at reference 10 and 11 Note however that users will have no direct interaction with the TOE see 6 1 3 4 This means that in the context of this evaluation there is no user documentation 0562B218 001 48 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 9 2 14 ALC_DVS 1 Identification of security mea
21. 29 0562b276 DC2000 Functional Testing Common Criteria 30 ENG DEV 013 Engineering Release Procedure 0562B218 001 5 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 3 InterDocument References The following terms defined in this Security Target may be referenced in other associated documentation Note that the identifiers DC2K and SGSS are used to distinguish between functions provided or security objectives met by the SGSS and the DC2K 3 1 Threats T_extract_data_from_secure_domain T_record_plaintext_data_from_insecure_domain T_cryptanalyse_data_within_insecure_domain T_access_to_secret_authentication_key T_access_to_secret_key_exchange_alg_keys T_access_to_keys_within_unit T_access_to_algorithm_within_unit T_access_to_algorithm_outside_unit T_cryptanalyse_keys_within_insecure_domain T_loss_of_commissioned_unit T_tamper_with_unit T_application_replacement T_algorithm_replacement T_certificate_authority_replacement T_key_exchange_certificate_replacement 3 2 Assets A_user_data A_user_key A_user_algorithm 3 3 Security Objectives OBT_DC2K_provide_data_confidentiality OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_management OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_algorithm_load OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_CA_load OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_exchange_keyset_load OBT_SGSS_provide_resistance_to_physical_attack OBT_SGSS_provide_secure_application_load OBE_protect_secure_domain
22. 3 Loading of Malicious Encryption or Key Exchange Algorithm 6 2 14 Loading of Certificate Authorities Known to the AttackeT ceeeeee 6 2 15 Loading of Key Exchange Certificates Known to the Attacker 6 3 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIE Sa ta A A R NS 0562B218 001 1 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES scsssssssssssssssssssssssessssssssssssssssscsnsevessssesssessssssssssssnsesessssessssssesssessssssesnsessssesessenssnsessseeee 36 7 1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TARGET OF EVALUATION c cccccccsssssessessecsessceseeseesesecseeseeseecessesseaecsscnecnaees 36 7 11 Datacryptor Security ODJOCUVES siczcvices eaaa E EE venga ts sgeaed stuacscheves NEE OEE 36 FN SGSN Security ODIO CUVES aeria EE EOE E heh Soovaaenat A E RA S 36 72 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT c ccsssssssssssssscescescssessessessecsessesseesesseseeseesesseesessessesecnscnsenaena 37 7 2 1 Application of Physical Protection to the Secure DOMAIN cecsecessssesecscesesessssseceseeseeseseceseeeseetseseeeeteeeeees 37 7 2 2 Application of TOE to all sensitive data transmitted cecccccecesscesecsssseceeecsseeeseceseceseseeeceeeeeseseeeeeseeeeeeneeeeees 37 7 2 3 Appropriate Use of TOE s Protection Capabilities c cececcceessssceecssssesececsseseseseseseseseseseseseseeeeeeteeeeeteneeeeees 37 7 2 4 Application of Physical Security to External Key Material cece
23. ER RER EEE AT EENE 7 4 TAAN LOI DID OA N COo A E E A 8 4 1 SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION cccccsssssessessessecscesceseesceceseecessessessessesecascescsaessesaessesaesaessesaeseseeseeseeseeseaseass 8 4 11 Security Target Information 4 1 2 Target of Evaluation Information 42 SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW m re a 43 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE 5 TARGET OF EVALUATION DESCRIPTION scscssssssssesssssssesssssssesesssssnsnssssensssssesnsessssesesssesssssssesnsssssesesees 11 5 1 PRODUCT TYPE mnane n er E T E E E Ds EUG IS SSeS T EE a ES 11 5 2 IBASIG PURPOSE AEAEE T A O AE AEA E EE 11 5 3 PHYSICATSIDES GRIPTION nirvaana EEO ERNO oso Se a Sue seeds bas de daca E 12 5 3 1 Peripherdl EAA A ee AA AA 12 5 4 VEEE L07 PA DESCRIPTION E EA E E E AEE E E 13 5 4 1 S GSS Software Applicatie eraen RE ERA e Er ra ERE E a EREE SE EE E AA S 13 5 4 2 Datacryptor 2000 Software Application c ccssesseseseseseseseseseseeseseceseseseseseseseseseseseseseneseseseseseaeseaeaeaeaeneaeaeaeas 13 5 4 3 Key Exchange ALG Orithimy cccccccccccccccsssssesssesessssssesessssssesessssssesesssesseseseusssesesesesseseassesaeseseeeeseaeaeeecaeseaeeeeseaeeeneeseaes 13 544 Encryption Als or ith itis eenia ane ici ce Reese angele aw at oa a A ERE EEA seeds nde 13 343 Excluded Product FUnctionality ccccsssssssssssesessssssssscesssssssssssssssssssesssesssssesesesssecesssssssesssssssessssseseseseasseeees 13 6 TARGET OF EVALUATION SECURITY ENVIRONMENT scscscssssssssssessssssssssss
24. Since the Datacryptor 2000 is a network encryptor the user does not have any direct interaction with the TOE instead administrative personnel control all product configuration and operation As such there are no requirements or assumptions placed on users themselves 6 2 Threats This section describes threats to the DC2K Note that some of these threats are potential attacks on the SGSS component of the DC2K The threats have therefore been divided into two categories threats to the SGSS and threats to the DC2K However threats to the SGSS when the SGSS is installed as a component of the DC2K are also threats to the DC2K itself 6 2 1 Extraction of Data from Within the Secure Domain Inter document reference T_extract_data_from_secure_domain This is a threat to the DC2K The DC2K does not provide any security services to data whilst it resides within the secure domain Instead it operates by encrypting any data passed into its host port from the host network machine or switch within the secure domain prior to passing the encrypted data out into the insecure domain A threat exists whereby a threat agent could gain access to unencrypted data whilst it resides within this area 6 2 1 1 Attack The attack is to gain physical access to the secure domain and record data from within that domain 6 2 1 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_data The asset under threat is the user s data 6 2 1 3 Threat Agent Expert
25. THALES ENG DEV 006 Problem Reporting and Change Control 7 THALES ENG DEV 012 Document and Part Numbering v1 0 8 THALES ENG DEV STD 006 Software Tools Standard v1 3 9 THALES OPS 005 In house stores dispatch v1 7 10 1270a357 Datacryptor 2000 Commercial Version User Manual 11 1270a374 Datacryptor AP Commercial Version User Manual 12 dc2000 sdt Datacryptor 2000 SDL 13 0562b247 Datacryptor 2000 Architectural Design 14 0562b248 DC2000 Representation Correspondence Analysis 15 0562b243 DC2000 Security Policy Model amp Functional Specification Security Policy Model Correspondence 16 Not Allocated 17 THALES ENG DEV STD 008 Coding Standard C v2 0 18 THALES ENG DEV STD 011 VHDL Coding v1 0 19 0562b250 Datacryptor 2000 Test Coverage Analysis 20 0562b251 Datacryptor 2000 Depth of Testing Analysis 21 0558a363 Datacryptor 2000 3 4a HMG System Test Specification Commercial tests only 22 0558a368 Datacryptor 2000 IP100 System Test Specification 23 0562b252 DC2000 Guidance Documentation Analysis 24 0562b268 DC2000 Descriptive Low level Design 25 0562b269 DC2000 Semiformal High level Design 26 0562a218 Datacryptor 2000 Security Target 27 0562a253 Datacryptor 2000 Vulnerabilities Analysis 28 0562b254 DC2000 Semiformal Functional Specification
26. Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria This document contains Proprietary Trade Secrets of Thales e Security and or its suppliers its receipt or possession does not convey any right to reproduce disclose its contents or to manufacture use or sell anything that it may describe Reproduction disclosure or use without specific authorization of Thales e Security is strictly forbidden Thales e Security Ltd 4 5 Floors 149 Preston Road Brighton BN1 6AS Tel 44 0 1273 384600 Fax 44 0 1273 384601 0562B218 001 i 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria Contents 1 GLOSSARY ssssssssssssssssssscsssesssssssssssssssssesnsevsssessesssssesessssssssusevassesessesssnsesossssssnsesssesesssessnsosesssscsesssossssssssssessnsesessssess 4 2 REFERENCES 5 2 sicscecesssscossnscscsesnssscssodoaceossssnscbsoncesssnsensenssonengeseessessossusceceesoscsussnnsneopsnsasssesnedssgnsbensessowengcossacbbooseuscsesuensesey 5 3 INTER DOCUMENT REFERENCES c ccsecesesusscssesesvecssssenens sonsecsonsetscngusesuenseseansesasadesososuesendesesosasesneceosanusesseaseestasesncwess 6 3 1 ERR ACL Se oo Sask asics A A at SEs ET eG ESOS 6 3 2 IN SSETS 055 055 655 50c A E aE EGE ESOS ROSA Eh ie IER 6 3 3 SECURITY OBJEGIIVES 6 5245 si5 E E E A ss sdk bas E A islet 6 3 4 SECURITY FUNCTIONS ienen tarn Ea RO
27. a 6 2 5 3 Threat Agent 0562B218 001 22 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence Expertise Resource Motivation Vulnerabilities Exploited Opportunity DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria A high level of expertise is required The threat agent would have to efficiently exhaust over all possible values of one time random input to the key exchange algorithm to be able to determine the key encryption key established between the two units and subsequently determine the data encryption key An extremely high level of resource is required Assuming that at least one of the unit s random number generators is operating correctly a huge amount of computing resource would be required to exhaust over all possible one time random inputs to the algorithm Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high In particular repeated application of this attack could give rise to the successful decryption of traffic within the entire lifetime of the secret key exchange algorithm key Within the definition of the threat the asset has not been subject to the protection of the TOE Therefore no TOE vulnerabilities need be exploited in order to mount a successful attack If the threat agent has obtained access to the secure domain either by virtue of authorisation or by breaching physical security measures or to an insecure commissioning sessio
28. and Internally Consistent 11 4 TARGET OF EVALUATION SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE c ccssssssssssseescescecssessessecsecsecseesesaeeeees 11 4 1 Satisfaction of TOE Security Functional Requirements csccccccssssscsssssssssesssesesenssssesenseeneeeeseeeeneneeeseneees 60 11 4 2 Compliance of Assurance Measures with Assurance Requirements ccsssesesesesesereseseseteteneneteenenens 61 0562B218 001 3 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 1 Glossary CA Certificate Authority CC Common Criteria DC2K Datacryptor 2000 DCAP Datacryptor Advanced Performance DEK Data Encryption Key FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array IP Internet Protocol KEK Key Encryption Key PCB Printed Circuit Board RoHS Restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment SFP Security Function Policy SGSS Secure Generic Sub System TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security Functions TSP TOE Security Policy 0562B218 001 4 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 2 References 1 CCIMB 99 031 CCIMB 99 032 CCIMB 99 033 Common Criteria Version 2 1 Parts 1 2 and 3 2 0550a109 Key Management Specification 3 THALES ENG DEV 002 Project Filing 4 0562b245 Datacryptor 2000 Configuration List 5 ENG PM 001 Managing Projects in the Engineering Group v1 10 6
29. arget Common Criteria 6 1 3 Assumed Environment of Operation 6 1 3 1 Management It is assumed that for the purposes of management the administrator has access to appropriate management software and a PC on which to run such software In order to provide the necessary functionality the management centre must be capable of encrypting and decrypting management information exchanged between itself and the unit under management Note that although the management centre utilises security services such as encryption the DC2K under management will not respond to management requests unless it successfully decrypts information sent to it In this way the Datacryptor 2000 itself provides the security enforcing aspects necessary to ensure authorised management since incorrect or non existent encryption by the management centre will fail to be decrypted correctly and hence will not be acted upon The implementation and functionality of the management centre itself which may be provided by the company or developed by the user is outside of the scope of evaluation 6 1 3 2 Physical Protection Measures It is assumed that physical security measures are applied to information within the secure domain only as appropriate to the value of the data being protected As well as the data itself such physical protection should be afforded to Any Key material which is held externally to the unit Any sensitive key exchange or encryption algorithm held exte
30. cryptography techniques to minimise the administrative overhead of key management and implements sophisticated measures to resist physical attack in order to safeguard key material and sensitive algorithms All information in the supplied deliverables that refers to Datacryptor 2000 DC2K DC2000 or similar actually refers to both the Datacryptor 2000 and the Datacryptor Advanced Performance DCAP unless it is made clear that they refer only to one or the other either explicitly or from the context This document describes the security requirements and operating assumptions of the Datacryptor 2000 Section 5 gives a high level description of the physical and logical attributes of the Datacryptor 2000 and the product s scope and boundaries 0562B218 001 9 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria The assumed operational environment of the Datacryptor 2000 is discussed in section 6 as well as the perceived threats within that environment a statement of the security objectives intended to counter such threats is provided in section 7 Detailed IT security requirements are discussed in section 8 which is split into functional and assurance aspects A Target of Evaluation Summary Specification is given in section 9 which provides a description of how the TOE IT security functions and assurance measures are met by the Datacryptor 2000 Section 11 provides a rati
31. curity Functions realised by a probabilistic or permutational mechanism are cryptographic Hence a statement regarding their strength level is outside the scope of this Security Target 9 2 23 AVA_VLA 2 Developer vulnerability analysis Developer action elements AVA_VLA 2 1D The developer shall perform and document an analysis of the TOE deliverables searching for ways in which a user can violate the TSP AVA_VLA 2 2D The developer shall document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities A Vulnerability Analysis has been carried out on the Datacryptor 2000 This is provided at reference 27 0562B218 001 50 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 10 Protection Profile Claims No claims of conformance to a Protection Profile are made 0562B218 001 51 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 11 Rationale 11 1 General Statement The security objectives are designed to counter the threats in line with the threat descriptions given in section 6 2 11 2 Security Objectives Rationale Objective eee ae secure_domain domain T_record_plaintext_data A_user_data _from_insecure_domain ae Wii TOE OBE_apply_suitable_ TOE Cea to_data a ee within_insecure_domain data_confidentiality T_access_to_secret A_user_key OBE a a key_ uri aera mal T_access_to_secret_key _exchange_alg_keys material T_access_to_ke
32. data encryption key used 6 2 15 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_key The asset directly under threat is the user s key exchange algorithm keys exposure of which may subsequently lead to key encryption keys data encryption keys and finally exposure of the user s data 6 2 15 3 Threat Agent Expertise A high level of expertise is required Firstly the threat agent would have to generate a signed key exchange keyset whose authenticity would be verified by the DC2K application and load it into the unit Secondly even having achieved this he would have to efficiently exhaust over all possible values of one time random input to the key exchange algorithm to be able to determine the key encryption key established between the two units and subsequently determine the data encryption key Resource An extremely high level of resource is required both to generate the signed keyset and to determine the one time random input to the key encryption key generation process Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is also high In particular repeated application of this attack could give rise to the successful decryption of traffic within the entire lifetime of the key exchange certificates Vulnerabilities Exploited If a vulnerability were present in the DC2K s key exchange keyset authentication implementation or in the data authentication algorit
33. des a means of cryptographically verifying the authenticity of an application Implemented correctly this objective greatly reduces the likelihood of this attack being successful Similarly the threat of an attacker installing a rogue encryption or key exchange algorithm T_algorithm_replacement is countered by the TOE security objective OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_algorithm_load which provides a means of cryptographically verifying the authenticity of an algorithm prior to its loading and use This reduces the likelihood of a successful attack If an attacker manages to load their own Certificate Authorities into two communicating instances of the TOE it may lead to the exposure of key material and ultimately to the exposure of user data This threat T_certificate_authority_replacement is countered by the TOE security objective 0562B218 001 54 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_CA_load which provides a means of cryptographically verifying the authenticity of a CA before its loading and use This reduces the likelihood of a successful attack Likewise the threat of an attacker loading known Key Exchange certificates so that keys and user data is exposed T_key_exchange_certificate_replacement is countered by the TOE security objective OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_exchange_keyset_load which provides a means of cryptographically verifying the authenticity
34. e meaning it is a means by which the receiver of data can cryptographically ascertain its origin such that the sender of the data cannot masquerade as someone else 0562B218 001 39 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 8 1 1 4 FPT_PHP 3 Resistance to Physical Attack FPT_PHP 3 1 The TSF shall resist physical intrusion high and low voltage attacks and attacks requiring temperature extremes to the SGSS component of the TOE by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated 8 1 2 Target of Evaluation Security Assurance Requirements The TOE is compliant with the assurance components required by Evaluation Assurance Level 4 see 1 8 2 Security Requirements for the IT Environment There are no security requirements for the Datacryptor 2000 s assumed IT environment See sections 6 1 3 1 and 9 1 7 0562B218 001 40 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 9 Target of Evaluation Summary Specification 9 1 Target of Evaluation Security Functions For reference a previous Security Target 26 is supplied that covered the same Security Functions and obtained EAL4 against the UK Common Criteria Note that although assurance component AVA_SOF 1 is included in the TOE Security Assurance requirements all TOE Security Functions realised by a probabilistic or permutational mechanism are cryptograp
35. e objective OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_management requires three IT functional requirements to fully meet it FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM 2 Cryptographic Key Distribution and FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic Operation Public data exchange is achieved by FCS_COP 1 see 2 section 4 2 1 FCS_CKM 1 and FCS_CKM 2 respectively achieve generation and distribution of keys Logically all three requirements are needed to satisfy this objective fully The objective OBT_SGSS_provide_resistance_to_physical_attack is for the TOE to provide resistance to direct physical attacks aimed at extracting sensitive data The functional requirement FPT_PHP 3 Resistance to Physical Attack satisfies this objective by resisting the physical tampering scenarios listed in its definition The remaining four objectives OBT_SGSS_provide_secure_application_load OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_algorithm_load OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_CA_load OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_exchange_keyset_load are all concerned with providing a means to cryptographically verify the authenticity of a piece of data namely a Datacryptor 2000 application a cryptographic algorithm a Certificate Authority and a Key Exchange Keyset All are satisfied by the data authentication component of the functional requirement FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic Operation 11 3 3 Dependencies of Functional Requirements Reference 1 states that some IT functional requirements are dependent on others and in
36. e see section 9 1 for a discussion of the TOE security functions provided by the SGSS and DC2K Note that although assurance component AVA_SOF 1 is included in the TOE Security Assurance requirements all TOE Security Functions realised by a probabilistic or permutational mechanism are cryptographic Hence a statement regarding their strength level is outside the scope of this Security Target 8 1 1 1 FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM 1 1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms described in 2 and specified cryptographic key sizes as specified in section 4 1 2 that meet the following algorithm specification defined or standards referenced in section 4 1 2 8 1 1 2 FCS_CKM 2 Cryptographic Key Distribution FCS_CKM 2 1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method as defined in 2 that meets the following standards referenced in section 4 1 2 8 1 1 3 FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic Operation FCS_COP 1 1 The TSF shall perform data authentication key exchange protocol data encryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm listed in section 4 1 2 and cryptographic key sizes as in the algorithm specification that meet the following standards referenced within section 4 1 2 In the context of a cryptographic product data authentication has a precis
37. ely cheap IP recording and decoding tools for example are primarily simple software Windows applications Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high Vulnerabilities Exploited Within the definition of the threat the asset has not been subject to the protection of the TOE Therefore no TOE vulnerabilities need be exploited in order to mount a successful attack Opportunity Where such unencrypted data is present in the insecure domain the opportunity for the threat agent to mount this attack is high 6 2 3 Cryptanalysis of data in the insecure domain Inter document Reference T_cryptanalyse_data_within_insecure_domain This is a threat to the DC2K In normal usage it is anticipated that sensitive data residing within the secure domain will be subjected to the TOE s data confidentiality measures prior to it being passed into an insecure domain A threat exists for an attacker to record encrypted data sent across the insecure domain and subject it to cryptanalysis in an attempt to discover the underlying plaintext data 0562B218 001 19 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 6 2 3 1 Attack The attack is to record encrypted data from the insecure domain decode it and perform cryptanalysis to reveal the underlying plaintext data 6 2 3 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_data
38. encrypted data There are two means by which access may be provided to a threat agent 0562B218 001 20 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria e An individual with authorised access to the material may leak the data intentionally or unintentionally e An unauthorised individual may breach physical measures to gain access to the material 6 2 4 1 Attack A threat agent who has gained access to the secret authentication key may forge signed key exchange certificates This would allow an active man in the middle attack to be mounted between two units whereby both units are spoofed into establishing a shared key encryption key with the threat agent rather than the other unit A similarly shared data encryption key could then be generated using the rogue key encryption key and then used to decrypt the user s data 6 2 4 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_key A_user_data The asset under threat is the user group secret authentication key exposure of which may ultimately lead to exposure of the user s data 6 2 4 3 Threat Agent Expertise A high level of expertise is required Even assuming successful access to the secret authentication key the attack is a very sophisticated real time active attack It requires insertion and deletion of data from the line between two units without either unit noticing the presence of the third party Resource A high l
39. ensnsssssesnsssssesnssessesnssesssesers 15 6 1 ASSUMPTIONS occa castescsccsc caves tescsscc dees Gig teu 8ss des sts sede vetoes AVES GCUSEa EE ETETE E Babes Rivas ban eae oS 6 1 1 Assumed Usage wee 6 1 2 Protection of Assets 6 1 3 Assumed Environment of Operation 6 2 AE DI dB a AE E E E E E E T 6 2 1 Extraction of Data from Within the Secure Domain c seseseseseseseseseseseeeseseseseseseseseseneseseseseaeaeseaeseaeaeneaeaeaeas 17 6 2 2 Recording of Plaintext Data Leaked into Insecure Domain sssssssesseeeeseessesesiesrrisrrersesresresrseese 18 6 2 3 Cryptanalysis of data in the insecure COMAIN eccececssscesesscsseseseseseseseseseseseseseceseseseseceseseseeeseseseeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeers 19 6 2 4 Exposure of Secret Authentication Key csesccseseseseseseseseseseseseeseseseseseseseseseseseseseseseaeseseseaeseseseaeseaeseaeaeaeaeaeaens 20 6 2 5 Exposure of Secret Keys Used in the Key Exchange Algorithm 22 6 2 6 Discovery or Substitution of any Key Material Stored within Unit n se 23 6 2 7 Extraction of Sensitive Cryptographic Algorithm From Unit wcssssseseseseseseseseseseteeeeeseseeeeaeeneneaenees 24 6 2 8 Compromise of Sensitive Cryptographic Algorithm when external to Unit 25 6 2 9 Cryptanalysis of Encrypted Keys in the insecure COMIN c ssseseseseseseseseseseseeeseseseseseseseseseseneseaeseneaeaeaens 6 2 10 Unit theft OP LOSS aneignen EERE va EEEE ARARE 6 2 11 Unit tampering essees 6 2 12 Loading of Malicious Application Code 6 2 1
40. ess to the secure domain gains access to data assets residing there T_extract_data_from_secure_domain is countered by OBE_protect_secure_domain which applies physical protection measures to the secure domain The threat that an attacker is able to access sensitive data because it has been sent unencrypted into the insecure domain T_record_plaintext_data_from_insecure_domain is countered by two security objectives OBE_transmit_data_through_TOE and OBE_apply_suitable_TOE_mode_to_data The first ensures that all data transmitted from the secure domain to the insecure domain passes through the TOE The second ensures that the TOE encrypts sensitive data passing through it Clearly if both objectives are met then the threat is removed because sensitive data will not exist in an unencrypted form within the insecure domain The threat that an attacker gains access to data by recording it in its encrypted form while in the insecure domain and then employing cryptanalysis T_cryptanalyse_data_within_insecure_domain is countered by the security objective OBT_DC2K_provide_data_confidentiality which implements a confidentiality service by the use of encryption If correctly implemented this objective diminishes the threat by requiring greater expertise and resources on the part of the attacker The threat of disclosure of the externally held secret authentication key T_access_to_secret_authentication_key makes a man in the middle attack possible T
41. evel of resource is required Equipment to insert and remove traffic from the line in real time is required as is equipment which can spoof the entire key exchange protocol and subsequently react appropriately to any peer unit requests i e subsequent data encryption key updates in a timely fashion Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high In particular repeated application of this attack could give rise to the successful decryption of traffic within the entire lifetime of the secret authentication key Vulnerabilities Exploited Within the definition of the threat the asset has not been subject to the protection of the TOE Therefore no TOE vulnerabilities need be exploited in order to mount a successful attack 0562B218 001 21 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria Opportunity If the threat agent has obtained access to the secure domain either by virtue of authorisation or by breaching physical security measures opportunity to mount the attack is high Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 5 Exposure of Secret Keys Used in the Key Exchange Algorithm Inter document Reference T_access_to_secret_key_exchange_alg_keys This is a threat to the DC2K In some modes of use secret key exchange algorithm keys are loaded into the unit from an external source If it
42. ext_data_from_insecure_domain This is a threat to the DC2K Unencrypted data may be present in the insecure domain for two reasons e The data has not been sent via a channel that passes through the DC2K prior to entering the insecure domain e The data has been sent through a channel that passes through the DC2K but the DC2K s encryption capability has not been applied to the data i e the unit s line mode has been set to an insecure mode A threat exists whereby a threat agent records such unencrypted data from the insecure domain 6 2 2 1 Attack The attack is to record any unencrypted data from the insecure domain 0562B218 001 18 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 6 2 2 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_data The asset under threat is the user s data 6 2 2 3 Threat Agent Expertise A low level of expertise is required Unencrypted data within this domain is not subject to any technical protection but the threat agent will require the capability to extract the data and decode it from standard network protocols Such decoding is within the capability of any individual with a basic understanding of common public domain network protocols Resource Limited resource is required Some means of recording and decoding the data from the insecure domain is required However such tools are available and depending on the protocol are relativ
43. gorithm 9 1 6 DC2K Encryption Algorithm The Datacryptor 2000 uses an encryption algorithm for two purposes key encryption and data encryption for user and management traffic 9 1 6 1 Key Encryption Having agreed a KEK as described in section 9 1 5 the two units or a unit and its management centre must securely derive a data encryption key DEK This is achieved by both entities generating random data encrypting it with the KEK and sending it to the other party The encrypted random data is decrypted by both entities and combined to generate a shared DEK This is described in section 4 1 1 steps 1 5 of 2 9 1 6 2 Data Encryption Having agreed a DEK the encryption algorithm may now be used to encrypt transmitted user or management data and decrypt received user or management data Inter document Reference SF_DC2K_encryption_algorithm 9 1 7 Unit Management A unit may be managed i e its security and communications attributes changed by use of the management centre previously discussed The DC2K and the management centre communicate in the same way that two units communicate firstly a cryptographic key must be established according to the 0562B218 001 45 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria key management protocol described in 2 and subsequently all traffic sent between the management centre and the unit is subject to encryption To provide
44. he DC2K application s data authentication implementation using the public key embedded within it If the verification is successful the algorithm is loaded into the SGSS hardware and may be used Otherwise the algorithm is rejected and cannot be loaded into the unit In this way only Encryption Algorithms that have been signed by an authorised body may be run in the unit Inter document Reference SF_DC2K_data_authentication_implementation 9 1 4 3 Authentication of Certificate Authorities Authentication of Certificate Authorities occurs when signed Certificate Authorities are loaded during the unit s commissioning process or at a later stage The signature on the Certificate Authority is verified by the DC2K s data authentication implementation and may only be loaded and subsequently used if the validation is successful If the CA is loaded its public key may be used in turn to verify the signatures on algorithms and key exchange keysets Inter document Reference SF__DC2K_data_authentication_implementation 9 1 4 4 Authentication of Key Exchange Algorithm Keysets Authentication of Key Exchange Algorithm Keysets occurs at two points in Datacryptor 2000 operation 9 1 4 4 1 Unit Commissioning During the unit s commissioning process Key Exchange Algorithm Keysets signed by a CA are loaded The signature on the keyset is verified by the DC2K s data authentication implementation and may only be loaded and subsequently used if the
45. hic Hence a statement regarding their strength level is outside the scope of this Security Target Random Alarm Circuitry Number Generator Host Port Unit unit communications path SGSS application DC2K application Data authentication algorithm Data authentication algorithm Key Exchange i Certificate Algorithm i Authority DC2K specific hardware routing of low level communications data and power SGSS Hardware physical protection boundary DataCryptor 2000 Unit 9 1 1 TOE System Architecture Figure 2 Datacryptor 2000 Architecture Figure 2 depicts the high level architecture of the Datacryptor 2000 It demonstrates the organisation of the product at a logical and physical level and provides a context in which to discuss the instantiation of the TOE s security functions 0562B218 001 41 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 9 1 2 SGSS Application The SGSS application performs 2 functions e Non security relevant system start up this aspect will not be discussed here e Cryptographic authentication of any DC2K application to be loaded using a data authentication algorithm listed in section 4 1 2 This aspect is discussed below The SGSS contains an implementation of a data authentication algorithm as listed in section 4 1 2 In addition at manufacture time a public key value is embedded in the SGSS application When the DC2K a
46. his threat is countered by the security objective OBE_protect_key_material which ensures the appropriate physical protection measures are used for key material stored externally to the TOE The threat of disclosure of secret key exchange algorithm keys that are loaded into the TOE from an external source T_access_to_secret_key_exchange_alg_keys is also countered by OBE_protect_key_material which applies physical security measures to key material stored externally 0562B218 001 53 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria The threat of an attacker gaining knowledge of secret key material stored within the TOE T_access_to_keys_within_unit is countered by OBT_SGSS_provide_resistance_to_physical_attack which provides resistance to such forms of direct physical attack Similarly the threat of an attacker gaining knowledge of sensitive algorithms while they are stored within the TOE T_access_to_algorithm_within_unit is also countered by OBT_SGSS_provide_resistance_to_physical_attack as it provides resistance to such forms of direct physical attack The threat of an attacker gaining knowledge of sensitive algorithms while they are external to the TOE T_access_to_algorithm_outside_unit is countered by the objective OBE_protect_algorithms which ensures that appropriate physical security measures are applied to algorithms stored externally to the TOE The threat of an attac
47. hm used itself this may be exploited to decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success Opportunity Where an attacker has access to the unit into which to load a replacement keyset either by virtue of being provided with authorised access or by breaching physical security measures the opportunity for the threat agent to mount this attack is present 0562B218 001 34 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 3 Organisational Security Policies No claims are made regarding the Datacryptor 2000 s compliance with specific organisational security policies 0562B218 001 35 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 7 Security Objectives 7 1 Security Objectives for the Target of Evaluation 7 1 1 Datacryptor Security Objectives 7 1 1 1 Provision of Data Confidentiality Service Inter document Reference OBT_DC2K_provide_data_confidentiality The DC2K shall provide the option of a confidentiality service to all data that is transmitted through it 7 1 1 2 Provision of Secure Key Management Service Inter document Reference OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_management The DC2K shall provide a means of securely exchanging key material for use in the provision of data confidentiality 7 1 1 3 Provision of Secure Algorithm Loading Capability Inter document Refere
48. ial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria A commissioned unit that is subsequently lost or stolen has all the necessary keys in place to engage in an encrypted session with another unit that may still be encrypting legitimate user data If the unit s disappearance goes unnoticed for a period of time the user may unknowingly be sending his information to an attacker 6 2 10 1 Attack The attack consists of a threat agent gaining access to a commissioned unit and using the unit to decrypt traffic sent to it by a unit still within the user s possession 6 2 10 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_data The asset under threat is the user s data 6 2 10 3 Threat Agent Expertise A low level of expertise is required to steal the box and to subsequently use it to decrypt traffic transmitted by another unit within the same user group Resource The resource requirement to mount an attack of this type is low No specialist equipment is required Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high Vulnerabilities Exploited Within the definition of the threat the asset has not been subject to the protection of the TOE Therefore no TOE vulnerabilities need be exploited in order to mount a successful attack Opportunity If the threat agent has obtained access to the secure domain either by virtue of authorisation or by breaching phys
49. ical security measures or a user has simply lost a unit within the insecure domain opportunity to mount the attack is high Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 11 Unit tampering Inter document Reference T_tamper_with_unit This is a threat to the DC2K 0562B218 001 28 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria It may be possible to tamper with a unit that is transmitting encrypted data in such a way that the security provided by the unit is undermined If such tampering were to go unnoticed a large amount of data could be leaked 6 2 11 1 Attack The attack consists of a threat agent gaining access to a unit and tampering with it so as to cause plaintext data to be leaked into the insecure domain Such unprotected data could then be recorded from within the insecure domain 6 2 11 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_data The asset under threat is the user s data 6 2 11 3 Threat Agent Expertise A moderate level of expertise is required to alter the box in such a way that it causes insecure operation and the tampering goes unnoticed by the user Resource The resource requirement for such an attack is moderate specialist equipment may be required to alter the box in an unnoticeable fashion Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high Vulnerabilities
50. ise A low level of expertise is required Data within this domain is not subject to any technical protection but the threat agent will require the capability to extract the data and decode it from standard network protocols Such decoding is within 0562B218 001 17 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria the capability of any individual with a basic understanding of common public domain network protocols Resource Limited resource is required Some means of recording and decoding the data from the secure domain is required However such tools are available and depending on the protocol are relatively cheap IP recording and decoding tools for example are primarily simple software Windows applications Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high Vulnerabilities Exploited Within the definition of the threat the asset is not subject to the protection of the TOE Therefore no TOE vulnerabilities need be exploited in order to mount a successful attack Opportunity If the threat agent has obtained access to the secure domain either by virtue of authorisation or by breaching physical security measures opportunity to mount the attack is high Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 2 Recording of Plaintext Data Leaked into Insecure Domain Inter document reference T_record_plaint
51. ive data sensitive data Figure 1 DC2K usage Figure gives a pictorial representation of the primary purpose of the Datacryptor 2000 It shows a simple example of sensitive data being transmitted from one physically secured domain to another through a domain in which no physical security is assumed to be present At a fundamental level the units operate in encrypting decrypting pairs ensuring that confidentiality is afforded to data sent between the two In this way sensitive information may be secured whilst it is in 0562B218 001 11 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria an insecure domain In fact more typically groups of DC2Ks are deployed in various configurations to support many different network topologies and protocols with the data passed between each pair subject to the unit s confidentiality services The DC2K does not provide data security services to information whilst it remains within the secure domain as defined in figure 1 5 3 Physical Description Several host network interface protocols are supported see section 4 1 2 and 2 unit management ports are provided The unit has 5 external interfaces an RS232 serial management data port a 10baseT Ethernet management data port e power connector e host data port e network data port e e The standard unit consists of the Secure Module also known as the Secure Generic Sub System SGSS and the
52. ker determining key encryption keys or data encryption keys by cryptanalysis of the key exchange protocol between two instances of the TOE T_cryptanalyse_keys_within_insecure_domain is countered by security objective OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_management which provides a means of exchanging key material securely If this objective is met correctly then the threat is greatly diminished because the method of attack becomes impractical The threat of an attacker gaining possession of a commissioned unit 7_loss_of_commissioned_unit is countered by security objective OBE_protect_keyed_unit which applies physical protection measures to commissioned units This reduces the opportunity and so diminishes the threat The threat of an attacker physically tampering with the TOE so that it did not encrypt transmitted data T_tamper_with_unit is countered by two security objectives OBE_check_for_unit_tamper and OBE_protect_keyed_unit The first ensures that units are checked periodically for signs of tampering The objective will mitigate the effects of the threat by ensuring that such an attack is detected The second applies physical protection measures to commissioned units This reduces the opportunity and so diminishes the threat The threat of an attacker subverting the security of the TOE by installing their own application T_application_replacement is countered by the TOE security objective OBT_SGSS_provide_secure_application_load which provi
53. key embedded in the SGSS s secure bootstrap code Having generated such an application the threat agent also needs to load it into the unit 6 2 12 3 Threat Agent Expertise Assuming that the data authentication algorithm and its implementations are not flawed and that the code secret authentication key is unavailable a high level of expertise is required to successfully generate an application that will be verified by the SGSS s bootstrap Resource The resource requirements to mount an attack of this type are extremely high a very large amount of computing power either distributed or within one unit would be required to generate an application whose authenticity would be verified by the SGSS Furthermore the only way to achieve the attack is by iteratively generating and attempting to load the application into a unit Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high A sufficiently insecure application might yield plaintext keys and algorithms to the threat agent Vulnerabilities Exploited If a vulnerability were present in the SGSS s secure bootstrap implementation or in the data authentication algorithm used this may be exploited to decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success Opportunity Where an attacker has access to the unit into which to load a rogue application either by virtue of being provided with authorised acce
54. n opportunity to mount the attack is high Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 6 Discovery or Substitution of any Key Material Stored within Unit Inter document Reference T_access_to_keys_within_unit This is a threat to the SGSS and hence also to the DC2K see 6 2 Most secret key material i e key encryption keys and data encryption keys is generated and stored internally by the DC2K unit If it were possible for a threat agent to discover such key values or substitute them for values known to him it may be possible for that information to be used in the decryption of user data 0562B218 001 23 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 6 2 6 1 Attack The attack is to gain access to the unit s sensitive storage areas and extract some or all of their contents without triggering an alarm which would cause the sensitive contents to be erased 6 2 6 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_key A_user_data The asset under threat is potentially all of the user s secret key material exposure of which may subsequently lead to exposure of the user s data 6 2 6 3 Threat Agent Expertise A high level of expertise is required The threat agent would have to extract keys from the unit without triggering an alarm Resource A high level of resource is required The threat agent would require sophisticated and specialised equi
55. n_implementation It is clear from previous sections of this document 9 1 and 11 3 for example that all four functions are required to support the security objectives met by FCS_COP 1 Therefore the four security functions are necessary and sufficient to counter the threat Finally the functional requirement FPT_PHP 3 Resistance to Physical Attack is met by the security function SF_SGSS_alarm_circuitry as can be seen by comparing 8 1 1 4 and 9 1 3 2 It follows that the set of security functions is both necessary and sufficient to support the IT Functional Requirements Note also that the security functions work together so as to satisfy the Functional Requirements i e the security functions do not conflict with each other and are mutually supportive in satisfying the Functional Requirements 11 4 2 Compliance of Assurance Measures with Assurance Requirements Section 9 2 lists every assurance requirement and separately addresses the assurance measures for each Since this provides a one to one mapping between assurance requirements and assurance measures and assuming the suitability of each assurance measure the set of assurance measures must provide full compliance with the set of assurance requirements 0562B218 001 61 27 April 2007
56. nce OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_algorithm_load The DC2K shall provide a means by which the authenticity of a cryptographic algorithm may be itself cryptographically verified prior to its loading and usage 7 1 1 4 Provision of Secure Certificate Authority Loading Capability Inter document Reference OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_CA_load The DC2K shall provide a means by which the authenticity of a Certificate Authority may be cryptographically verified prior to its loading and usage 7 1 1 5 Provision of Secure Key Exchange Keyset Loading Capability Inter document Reference OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_key_exchange_keyset_load The DC2K shall provide a means by which the authenticity of a Key Exchange Keyset may be cryptographically verified prior to its loading and usage 7 1 2 SGSS Security Objectives 7 1 2 1 Provision of Physical Security Measures to Sensitive Data Stored Within TOE Inter document Reference OBT_SGSS_provide_resistance_to_physical_attack 0562B218 001 36 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria The SGSS shall provide physical resistance to direct technical attack aimed at the extraction of sensitive data from within the unit 7 1 2 2 Provision of Secure Application Loading Capability Inter document Reference OBT_SGSS_provide_secure_application_load The SGSS shall provide a means by which the authenticity of a Datacryptor 2000 application may be cryptographically verified p
57. nge protocols with intent to use key information to decrypt traffic transmitted between the units 6 2 9 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_key A_user_data The asset under threat is the user s key encryption keys and data encryption keys 6 2 9 3 Threat Agent Expertise Assuming that an appropriate key exchange and key encryption algorithms are used and their implementations are not flawed a high level of expertise is required to successfully gain keys from the key exchange protocols Resource The resource requirements to mount an attack of this type are high a very large amount of computing power either distributed or within one unit would be required Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high Access to the unit s keys could potentially lead plaintext for the lifetime of the key exposed Vulnerabilities Exploited If a vulnerability were present in the TOE s key exchange or key encryption algorithms or implementations this may be exploited to decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success Opportunity Where such encrypted keys are present in the insecure domain the opportunity for the threat agent to mount this attack is high 6 2 10 Unit theft or loss Inter document Reference T_loss_of_commissioned_unit This is a threat to the DC2K 0562B218 001 27 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commerc
58. o distinct but related operations FCS_CKM 1 and FCS_CKM 2 apply to the generation and distribution of keys respectively They support each other in the overall objective of secure key management FCS_COP 1 applies to the operations of data authentication data encryption and key exchange protocol These do not conflict with FCS_CKM 1 and FCS_CKM 2 The final security requirement FPT_PHP 3 is concerned with resistance to physical attack and clearly does not conflict with the other requirements all of which are related to cryptographic services 0562B218 001 59 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria The preceding shows that the set of security requirements is internally consistent It also shows that they are mutually supportive in that they support each other where necessary 11 4 Target of Evaluation Summary Specification Rationale 11 4 1 Satisfaction of TOE Security Functional Require ments IT Functional Requirements TOE Security Functions FCS_CKM 1 SF_SGSS_Random_Number_Generator SF_DC2K_key_exchange_algorithm SF_DC2K_encryption_algorithm FCS_CKM 2 SF_DC2K_key_exchange_algorithm FCS_COP 1 SF_SGSS_data_authentication_implementation Table 5 Use of TOE Security Functions to meet IT functional Requirements Table 5 lists each of the IT Functional Requirements identified in section 8 1 1 and identifies all the TOE security functions needed to meet that requi
59. of testing carried out on the TOE is provided at reference 20 The analysis includes a description of the correspondence between the tests performed and the high level design specification 0562B218 001 49 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 9 2 19 ATE_FUN 1 Functional testing Developer action elements ATE_FUN 1 1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results ATE_FUN 1 2D The developer shall provide test documentation The Datacryptor 2000 has been tested as defined in references 21 and 22 inclusive and 29 which include test results 9 2 20 ATE_IND 2 Independent testing sample Developer action elements ATE_IND 2 1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing The TOE is available for independent testing as required 9 2 21 AVA_MSU 2 Validation of analysis Developer action elements AVA_MSU 2 1D The developer shall provide guidance documentation AVA_MSU 2 2D The developer shall document an analysis of the guidance documentation Guidance documentation is provided at reference 10 and 11 An analysis of the guidance documentation is given at reference 23 9 2 22 AVA_SOF 1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation Developer action elements AVA_SOF 1 1D The developer shall perform a strength of TOE security function analysis for each mechanism identified in the ST as having a strength of TOE security function claim All TOE Se
60. ollow for objectives OBE_protect_algorithms and OBE_protect_keyed_unit 0562B218 001 55 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria The objective OBE_check_for_unit_tamper requires that e action be taken in the event of suspected tampering 6 1 1 The objective OBE_protect_secure_domain requires both that e the secure environment is protected by appropriate means 6 1 1 1 and that e the value of the assets protected by the TOE should be appropriate for the EAL4 assurance level claimed for it this will be relatively high and can only be determined by the administrator in light of local conditions 6 1 2 The objective OBE_transmit_data_through_TOE requires both that e sensitive data is transmitted through the TOE 6 1 1 1 and that e suitable connectivity exists to allow this to occur 6 1 3 3 Finally the application of a suitable TOE mode to sensitive data as defined by objective OBE_apply_suitable_TOE_mode_to_data requires that e asuitable mode to be applied to sensitive data 6 1 1 1 and that e a secure management capability by which this action may be taken 6 1 3 1 These arguments demonstrate the consistency of the environment assumptions with respect to the environment objectives 11 3 2 Functional Requirements Security Objective IT Functional Requirement OBT_DC2K_provide_data_confidentiality FCS_COP 1 OBT_DC2K_provide_secure_ FCS_CKM 1 FCS_CKM 2
61. onale for the security target In particular it describes the correlation between the TOE security objectives and the threats arising from the TOE s environment a justification of the suitability of the security requirements with respect to the security objectives and finally the means by which TOE security functions and assurance measures meet the security requirements 4 3 Common Criteria Conformance The Datacryptor 2000 conforms to the Common Criteria within the meaning of 1 as follows Part 2 Conformant Part 3 Conformant at the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 No claims are made with respect to the Datacryptor 2000 s conformance to any Protection Profile 0562B218 001 10 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 5 Target Of Evaluation Description 5 1 Product Type The Datacryptor 2000 is a range of network encryption products 5 2 Basic Purpose DC2K 1 encrypts data DC2K 2 decrypts data received from A prior received from DC2K 1 to passing into insecure and passes onto B domain Se PA A N SS a Secure RA Insecure Domain Pa 7 domain N A 0 ge Secure 4 N domain 3 me DC2K 1 decrypts data DC2K 2 encrypts data received from DC2K 2 received from B prior x and passes onto A to passing into N insecure domain Network machine switch within Network machine switch within physically secure domain containing physically secure domain containing sensit
62. pment to breach the unit s physical protection mechanisms Such equipment might include X ray capability extremely fine drills chemical solvents etc Motivation Since the value of the asset is relatively high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high In particular information gained from this attack could be used to determine keys and hence traffic for the lifetime of the key or keys extracted Vulnerabilities Exploited If a vulnerability were present in the TOE s physical protection design or implementation this may be exploited to decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success Opportunity Opportunity to undertake this attack is limited by the availability of access to the unit itself 6 2 7 Extraction of Sensitive Cryptographic Algorithm From Unit Inter document Reference T_access_to_algorithm_within_unit This is a threat to the SGSS and hence also to the DC2K see 6 2 In some cases the cryptographic algorithms used to provide data and key confidentiality services to the user are sensitive Extraction of such a sensitive cryptographic algorithm from the unit may be undesirable for political reasons and possibly assists future cryptanalysis 0562B218 001 24 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 6 2 7 1 Attack The attack is to gain access to the unit s sensitive storage areas and extract some or all of thei
63. pplication is generated a digital signature is generated over the application using the corresponding secret key which is held securely at the development site The application is concatenated with the signature On loading the DC2K application the signature concatenated with the application is verified by the SGSS application s data authentication implementation using the public key embedded within it If the verification is successful the application is loaded into the SGSS hardware and may be used Otherwise the application is rejected and cannot be loaded into the unit In this way only DC2K applications that have been signed by the manufacturer may be run in the unit Inter document Reference SF __SGSS_data_authentication_implementation 9 1 3 SGSS Hardware 9 1 3 1 Random Number Generator The SGSS hardware contains a hardware random number generator that generates high quality random numbers for use in the Key Exchange Protocol see sections 4 2 2 steps 1 8 and 4 1 1 steps 1 5 of 2 The random number generator output is subject to frequent background diagnostic statistical testing failure of which causes the unit to cease transmission of data This ensures that all random numbers used for security relevant purposes are of high quality Inter document Reference SF_SGSS_Random_Number_Generator 9 1 3 2 Alarm Circuitry The physical security provided by the SGSS operates as a protection mechanism for all the Datacryp
64. r contents without triggering an alarm which would cause the sensitive contents to be erased 6 2 7 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_algorithm The asset under threat is the user s sensitive cryptographic algorithms 6 2 7 3 Threat Agent Expertise A high level of expertise is required The threat agent would have to extract the algorithm from the unit without triggering an alarm Resource A high level of resource is required The threat agent would require sophisticated and specialised equipment to breach the unit s physical protection mechanisms Such equipment might include X ray capability extremely fine drills chemical solvents etc Motivation Since the value of the asset is high it must be assumed that motivation to mount this attack is high In particular information gained from this attack could be used to determine information about protective measures applied by other secure applications owned by the user Vulnerabilities Exploited If a vulnerability were present in the TOE s physical protection design or implementation this may be exploited to decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success Opportunity Opportunity to undertake this attack is limited by the availability of access to the unit itself 6 2 8 Compromise of Sensitive Cryptographic Algorithm when external to unit Inter document Reference T_access_to_algorithm_outside_unit This is a threat to the DC2K In
65. rement Since every requirement is met by one or more security functions the security functions are sufficient to meet all of the IT Functional Requirements In addition where each IT Functional Requirement is met by exactly one security function and assuming the requirement is valid it follows that the security functions must be necessary as well as sufficient to counter the threat The suitability of the security functions to meet the IT Functional Requirements is shown as follows The functional requirement FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic Key Generation is met by the security functions SF_SGSS_Random_Number_Generator SF_DC2K_key_exchange_algorithm and SF_DC2K_encryption_algorithm SF_SGSS_Random_Number_Generator provides a hardware random number generator for use by SF_DC2K_key_exchange_algorithm and SF_DC2K_encryption_algorithm in the generation of KEKs and DEKs respectively The functional requirement FCS_CKM 2 Cryptographic Key Distribution is met by the security function SF_DC2K_key_exchange_algorithm which provides an implementation of a secure key exchange algorithm see 9 1 5 The functional requirement FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic Operation is met by four security functions namely SF_DC2K_key_exchange_algorithm SF_DC2K_encryption_algorithm SF_DC2K_data_authentication_implementation and 0562B218 001 60 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria SF_SGSS_data_authenticatio
66. res Developer action elements ADO_IGS 1 1D The developer shall document procedures necessary for the secure installation generation and start up of the TOE The TOE is shipped with a manual This is provided at reference 10 and 11 9 2 6 ADV_FSP 2 Fully Defined External Interfaces Developer action elements ADV_FSP 2 1D The developer shall provide a functional specification A functional specification of the TOE Security Functions is provided at 28 9 2 7 ADV_HLD 2 Security enforcing high level design Developer action elements ADV_HLD 2 1D The developer shall provide the high level design of the TSF A high level design of the TOE Security Functions is provided at 25 9 2 8 ADV_IMP 1 Subset of the Implementation of the TSF Developer action elements ADV_IMP 1 1D The developer shall provide the implementation representation for a selected subset of the TSF 0562B218 001 47 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria The TSF implementation representation shall be provided in the form of C source VHDL Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language and hardware schematics for the version under evaluation 9 2 9 ADV_LLD 1 Descriptive low level design Developer action elements ADV_LLD 1 1D The developer shall provide the low level design of the TSF A descriptive low level design of the TOE Security Functions is provided at 24 9 2 10 ADV_RCR
67. rial i e unauthorised individuals are unable to manage the box in such a way as to view or alter sensitive information In this way the Datacryptor s claimed IT functional requirements of cryptographic operation cryptographic key distribution cryptographic key generation and resistance to physical attack provide all the necessary support for the dependency FMT_MSA In the manner in which it is described in 1 this dependency is inappropriate for this target of evaluation 11 3 4 Assurance Requirements The assurance requirements specified in this security target are exactly those specified by the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 The actual Evaluation Assurance Level required for the evaluation is specified in section 8 1 2 It may be any EAL up to and including 4 Where the EAL is 4 this set is consistent and mutually supportive All dependencies are implicitly met by inclusion of the dependent component itself or a stronger component from the same assurance family within the set Where the EAL is lower than 4 the actual evaluation assurance requirements are a subset of those at EAL 4 and are therefore at least met if not exceeded by those specified in this document Choice of the assurance component set of the EAL defined in section 8 1 2 is appropriate to the evaluation for company marketing reasons 11 3 5 Security Requirements are Mutually Supportive and Internally Consistent The security requirements do not conflict as they apply t
68. riate to the environment e g motion alarms should be enabled where theft of the unit is a threat e Action on pressing erase button e g in a hostile environment pressing the erase button alone should have the effect of alarming the unit e Action in the event of suspected tampering loss or theft of unit Specific advice on these aspects should be sought from the appropriate security authority 6 1 1 1 Limitations of Use The Datacryptor 2000 does not provide any protection to data whilst it resides in the secure environment as defined in figure of section 5 2 Neither does it provide any protection where data is transmitted from the secure environment that does not pass through the unit or where data is passed through the unit without the encryption capability of the unit having been applied by the operator Therefore it is assumed that e The secure environment is protected to a suitable level by appropriate means e All sensitive data is transmitted through the Datacryptor 2000 e A suitable mode of operation e g encrypt mode is applied to sensitive data passing through the Datacryptor 2000 6 1 2 Protection of Assets The value of the assets protected by the TOE should be appropriate for the EAL4 assurance level claimed for it this will be relatively high and can only be determined by the administrator in light of local conditions 0562B218 001 15 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security T
69. rior to its loading and storage 7 2 Security Objectives for the Environment 7 2 1 Application of Physical Protection to the Secure Domain Inter document Reference OBE_protect_secure_domain Physical protection measures i e securely locked premises guards etc must be applied as necessary to the secure domain in which sensitive and otherwise unprotected data resides The value of the assets protected by the TOE should be appropriate for the EALA assurance level claimed for it this will be relatively high and can only be determined by the administrator in light of local conditions 7 2 2 Application of TOE to all sensitive data transmitted Inter document Reference OBE_transmit_data_through_TOE All sensitive data held within the secure domain must be passed through the TOE prior to it reaching the insecure domain 7 2 3 Appropriate Use of TOE s Protection Capabilities Inter document Reference OBE_apply_suitable_TOE_mode_to_data The DC2K s encrypt line mode must be applied to all sensitive data passing through the unit 7 2 4 Application of Physical Security to External Key Material Inter document Reference OBE_protect_key_material Physical protection measures i e securely locked premises guards etc must be applied as necessary to sensitive key material where this is stored externally to the unit 7 2 5 Application of Physical Security to External Sensitive Algorithms Inter document Reference OBE_protec
70. rnally to the unit The unit itself while keyed The management centre and any network to which the management centre is connected 6 1 3 3 Connectivity It is assumed that during normal operation the unit is connected in an equivalent manner to that shown in figure 1 of section 5 2 In addition it is assumed that when unit management is required a separate connection is made to one of the unit s two management ports and that neither management port is connected to the host network Where secret keys or sensitive algorithms are to be loaded into the unit this must be done over a physically secured network or link 6 1 3 4 Personnel It is assumed that e Administrative personnel provided with key material enabling them to make changes to the security configuration of the unit i e line mode alarm settings key lifetimes are trusted appropriately e Access to keyed units is only provided to trusted administrative personnel e Access to sensitive algorithms is only provided to trusted administrative personnel 0562B218 001 16 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria In addition it is assumed that administrative personnel have the necessary skill to operate a standard Windows application and that they have read the appropriate User Manual 10 or 11 Note that in the context of this TOE basic users of the product are those people whose data is protected by it
71. s generated a digital signature is generated over the algorithm using the corresponding secret key which is held securely at the development site The algorithm is concatenated with the signature On loading the Key Exchange Algorithm the signature concatenated with the algorithm is verified by the DC2K application s data authentication implementation using the public key embedded within it If the verification is successful the algorithm is loaded into the SGSS hardware and may be used Otherwise the algorithm is rejected and cannot be loaded into the unit 0562B218 001 43 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria In this way only Key Exchange Algorithms that have been signed by an authorised body may be run in the unit Inter document Reference SF_DC2K_data_authentication_implementation 9 1 4 2 Authentication of Encryption Algorithm The DC2K application contains an implementation of a data authentication algorithm as listed in section 4 1 2 In addition at manufacture time the DC2K application public key value is embedded in the DC2K application When an Encryption Algorithm is generated a digital signature is generated over the algorithm using the corresponding secret key which is held securely at the development site The algorithm is concatenated with the signature On loading the Encryption Algorithm the signature concatenated with the algorithm is verified by t
72. sensor triggers an alarm on detection of movement In the evaluated configuration the temperature sensor is enabled Note that the motion sensor is unlikely to respond to a small movement of the unit The effect of triggering an alarm is to force the voltage supply rails to all devices containing sensitive information to ground causing them to lose their contents Additionally the interface lines into the DC2K specific hardware are disconnected to prevent an attacker from attempting to prevent device erasure by externally driving in supply voltage Inter document Reference SF_SGSS_alarm_circuitry 9 1 4 DC2K Application The DC2K application is responsible for several security critical functions discussed below cryptographic authentication of key exchange algorithm cryptographic authentication of encryption algorithm cryptographic authentication of Certificate Authorities cryptographic authentication of Key Exchange Algorithm Keysets Note that all four functions employ the same data authentication implementation managed in one library made available to the SGSS application and the DC2K application as described in section 9 1 2 9 1 4 1 Authentication of Key Exchange Algorithm The DC2K application contains an implementation of a data authentication algorithm as listed in section 4 1 2 In addition at manufacture time the DC2K application public key value is embedded in the DC2K application When a Key Exchange Algorithm i
73. sessssesssssssesessssseseeessseeeesseseeeeeeeseseeeeeeeeeees 37 7 2 5 Application of Physical Security to External Sensitive Algorithms ossessi 37 7 2 6 Application of Physical Security to Unit When Keyed ccsssssssssssssesesssssesessseseseeessceseseeeseseeeeeeeseeneneeeeees 38 727 Check FOr Signs Of Unit TQM Perin oasi EE E E R E E 38 8 1 TARGET OF EVALUATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS csccsscssssscssessessssscessessesssseesecesceecesesaesaecaesaecseeaeeneeenes 8 1 1 Target of Evaluation Security Functional Requirements 6 1 2 Target of Evaluation Security Assurance Requirements 8 2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT ccsssscsscsscssessessecsecsesseeseesesseeceseccessessessenseascnscnscnaens 9 TARGET OF EVALUATION SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ssssssssssssssossssosssssessssesassessscsssssessecessscessscosencoeeeed L 9 1 TARGET OF EVALUATION SECURITY FUNCTIONS ccccssssscsscsscssesceseesseseceeseecessesssscssecnsceecssesaesaecaecaecseeseeaeeeees 9 1 1 TOE System Architecture tsananin a a a a NEER RE DTD SGSSAP DUG At hniena a E E E N AEAEE TE ca T E E ENE E E DLS SGSS GVA W Are ie a o E OEE E REEN EEEE T ORE DLA DEC2KApPlic tiot nei a E E AE E E aaa ata eats eens a as OLS DECZK Key Exeh ngeAlgorithm eine orenen a AKAA AATRE KAET EOE PITENEE eaei DLO DCZK Encryptton Aleorithmi sareni a ac EREE E E TS E E E Ee 9 1 7 Unit Ma nagemen bera Ea E A E E A A EA aT Oa 9 2 ASSURANCE
74. shall provide a reference for the TOE A unique TOE reference is provided in section 4 1 ACM_CAP 4 2D The developer shall use a CM system ACM_CAP 4 3D The developer shall provide CM documentation TOE development conforms to the Project Filing Procedure at 3 The procedure describes the use of automated tools for configuration management References 4 and 5 provide a Configuration List and the procedure for Managing Projects in the Engineering Group respectively Documentation describing the use of an automated version control system is provided at 6 Problem Reporting and Change Control 0562B218 001 46 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 9 2 3 ACM_SCP 2 Development tools CM coverage Developer action elements ACM_SCP 2 1D The developer shall provide CM documentation Documentation management conforms to the Project Filing Procedure described at 3 In addition references 7 and 8 discuss the production of documentation and tracking of software tools respectively 9 2 4 ADO_DEL 2 Detection of modification Developer action elements ADO_DEL 2 1D The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the user ADO_DEL 2 2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures TOE delivery conforms to the company Packing and Despatch procedures provided at reference 9 9 2 5 ADO_IGS 1 Installation generation and start up procedu
75. ss 0562B218 001 30 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria or by breaching physical security measures the opportunity for the threat agent to mount this attack is present Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 13 Loading of Malicious Encryption or Key Exchange Algorithm Inter document Reference T_algorithm_replacement This is a threat to the DC2K The Datacryptor 2000 s encryption and key exchange algorithms are soft loaded under the cryptographic control of the application If those algorithms were replaced by rogue algorithms that performed poor or non existent data or key encryption the user s keys and data may be exposed 6 2 13 1 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_data A_user_key The assets at threat from this attack are the user s data and keys 6 2 13 2 Attack The attack requires the generation of substitute algorithms that induces insecurity into the system In addition the algorithms must be formatted and digitally signed by the secret authentication key corresponding to the public key embedded in the Datacryptor s application code Having generated such algorithms the threat agent also needs to be able to load them into the unit 6 2 13 3 Threat Agent Expertise Assuming that the data authentication algorithm and its implementations are not flawed and that the secret algorithm authentication key is unavailable a high level
76. sures Developer action elements ALC_DVS 1 1D The developer shall produce development security documentation Development of the TOE conforms to the standards defined within the UK Government s Manual of Protective Security 9 2 15 ALC_LCD 1 Developer defined life cycle model Developer action elements ALC_LCD 1 1D The developer shall establish a life cycle model to be used in the development and maintenance of the TOE ALC_LCD 1 2D The developer shall provide life cycle definition documentation A life cycle model for the Datacryptor 2000 is defined at 5 9 2 16 ALC_TAT 1 Well defined development tools Developer action elements ALC_TAT 1 1D The developer shall identify the development tools being used for the TOE ALC_TAT 1 2D The developer shall document the selected implementation dependent options of the development tools TOE development tools used are described in the software tools registry as defined in 8 The coding standards used are described at references 17 and 18 C and VHDL coding standards respectively 9 2 17 ATE_COV 2 Analysis of coverage Developer action elements ATE_COV 2 1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage An analysis of the Datacryptor 2000 Test Coverage is provided at reference 19 9 2 18 ATE_DPT 1 Testing high level design Developer action elements ATE_DPT 1 1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing An analysis of the depth
77. t_algorithms Physical protection measures i e securely locked premises guards etc must be applied as necessary to sensitive algorithms where these are stored externally to the unit 0562B218 001 37 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 7 2 6 Application of Physical Security to Unit When Keyed Inter document Reference OBE_protect_keyed_unit Physical protection measures i e securely locked premises guards etc must be applied as necessary to units that have been commissioned 7 2 7 Check For Signs of Unit Tampering Inter document Reference OBE_check_for_unit_tamper Units should be checked periodically for signs of tampering If tampering is deemed to have taken place this should be reported immediately to the appropriate authority 0562B218 001 38 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 8 IT Security Requirements 8 1 Target of Evaluation Security Requirements 8 1 1 Target of Evaluation Security Functional Requirements The following security functional requirements defined in the form of components extracted from 1 are required to fully support the TOE security objectives The assignment operation on the security requirements is indicated by normal underlined text in square brackets Section 11 4 1 lists the TOE security functions that meet each of the security functional requirements Pleas
78. tacker Inter document Reference T_certificate_authority_replacement This is a threat to the DC2K The Datacryptor 2000 s Certificate Authorities are signed and loaded under the cryptographic control of the application If this key material were replaced with equivalent key material known to the threat agent in two units it may be possible for him subsequently to load consistent known or degenerate key exchange keysets into both units Ultimately this attack might lead to the threat agent being able to determine the key used to encrypt the user s data and use this key to decrypt encrypted data 6 2 14 1 Attack Long term public and secret keys are input by both units participating in the KEK derivation algorithm However the algorithm also utilises relatively substantial quantities of one time random data generated by the unit s themselves This random data is never exposed outside the unit Assuming that the units random number generator is operating properly a threat agent would have to guess or exhaust over these random values to be able to determine the key encryption key and subsequently the data encryption key used 6 2 14 2 Asset Inter document Reference A_user_key The asset directly under threat is the integrity of the user s Certificate Authority alteration of which may subsequently lead to the exposure of key encryption keys data encryption keys and finally exposure of the user s data 6 2 14 3 Threat Agent
79. to load a replacement CA and keyset either by virtue of being provided with authorised access or by breaching physical security measures the opportunity for the threat agent to mount this attack is present Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 15 Loading of Key Exchange Certificates Known to the Attacker Inter document Reference T_key_exchange_certificate_replacement This is a threat to the DC2K The Datacryptor 2000 s Key Exchange public key certificates and in some instances the corresponding secret key are signed and loaded under the cryptographic control of the application If this keyset were replaced with equivalent key material known to the threat agent it may be possible for him to determine the key encryption key and data encryption key and finally use this key to decrypt encrypted data 0562B218 001 33 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria 6 2 15 1 Attack Long term public and secret keys are input by both units participating in the KEK derivation algorithm However the algorithm also utilises relatively substantial quantities of one time random data generated by the unit s themselves This random data is never exposed outside the unit Assuming that the units random number generator is operating properly a threat agent would have to guess or exhaust over these random values to be able to determine the key encryption key and subsequently the
80. tor 2000 s sensitive contents keys sensitive algorithms etc by providing resistance to physical intrusion and voltage attacks and temperature and motion sensors Intrusion protection is provided by a copper mesh that consists of two circuits a continuity circuit and a guard circuit The SGSS is surrounded by the mesh and potted in an opaque resin An alarm is triggered if the continuity circuit is broken or if the two circuits are bridged The wires of the circuit are lacquered so that they cannot bridge simply by touching Any attempt to drill through the resin and mesh should result in an alarm being triggered either by breaking the continuity circuit or by shorting 0562B218 001 42 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria the two circuits Similarly attempting to dissolve the resin to gain access to the secure area would dissolve the lacquer on the wires of the mesh causing the two circuits to short The alarm circuit is powered from the main power supply when this is available or by a battery otherwise Should the battery fail or become disconnected i e voltage drops an alarm will be triggered Similarly if the voltage levels surge or are actively driven above the normal levels an alarm is triggered This prevents both high and low voltage attacks A temperature sensor causes the alarm circuit to be triggered at temperatures above 60 C or below 5 C and a movement
81. ul attack Opportunity If the threat agent has obtained access to the secure domain either by virtue of authorisation or by breaching physical security measures opportunity to mount the attack is high Otherwise opportunity is extremely limited 6 2 9 Cryptanalysis of Encrypted Keys in the insecure domain Inter document Reference T_cryptanalyse_keys_within_insecure_domain This is a threat to the DC2K Two communicating Datacryptor 2000s must undertake a key exchange protocol prior to exchanging encrypted data Full details of the key exchange protocols are provided in sections 4 2 2 steps 1 8 and 4 1 1 steps 1 5 of 2 the use of public key cryptography allows two commissioned units operating within the same user group to negotiate a shared Key Encryption Key and subsequently a 0562B218 001 26 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria data encryption key These protocols operate in such a way that there is no requirement for any secret data to be transmitted from either unit A threat exists whereby an attacker may perform cryptanalysis on the key exchange protocols to determine the key encryption keys and or data encryption keys subsequently used by the unit An alternative attack may be to force the re use of a key possibly leading to easier cryptanalysis of encrypted data 6 2 9 1 Attack The attack is to perform cryptanalysis on the DC2K s key excha
82. ys OBT_SGSS_provide_ within_unit resistance_to_ A_user_data physical_attack T_access_to_algorithm_ A_user_algorithm OBT_SGSS_provide_ within_unit resistance_to_ physical_attack outside_unit algorithms T_cryptanalyse_keys OBT_DC2K_provide_ within_insecure_domain secure_key_ management bot A all A a commissioned_unit unit T_tamper_with_unit A_user_data OBE_check_for_unit _tamper OBE_protect_keyed_ unit T_application_ A_user_algorithm OBT_SGSS_provide_ Po 0562B218 001 52 27 April 2007 Thales e Security Commercial in Confidence DC2000 Security Target Common Criteria replacement secure_application_ load T_algorithm_ OBT_DC2K_provide_ replacement secure_algorithm_ load T_certificate_authority_ OBT_DC2K_provide_ replacement secure_CA_load T_key_exchange_ OBT_DC2K_provide_ certificate_replacement secure_key_exchange by _keyset_load Table 1 correlation between threats and security objectives required to fully counteract threat Table 1 lists each of the threats identified in section 6 2 and for each applies sufficient security objectives taken from section 7 to fully counteract the threat Since every threat is counteracted the security objectives are sufficient to meet all of the assumed threats The following shows that for each threat the security objectives applied to it in Table 1 successfully counter that threat The threat that an attacker with physical acc

0562b218 DC2000 Security Target _CC_.001

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